D6.1 REPORT ON HUMAN VALUES IN THREAT ANALYSIS

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Abstract: This report aims to clarify the role of values in the conceptualisation of security in threat analyses in the different sectors of the overall security landscape in Europe. This is done on the basis of analyses of official documents, policy pronouncements, literature reviews and interviews. It is argued that the connection between values and threats often remains unclear in security strategies and risk assessments referring to values like human rights, democracy and the rule of law for their justification. In want of common operationalisations of these values, it results in a great variety of risk assessments where the value impact of risks is evaluated differently. As a basis for security policy, there is therefore a need for making the normative judgments involved in the analyses more explicit. The authors of this report highlight three basic dimensions of such value judgments, related to questions of universalism vs. relativism and individualism vs. collectivism. These are exemplified by cases of refugee management and everyday security. Against this background, the landscape of European threat analysis is then reviewed, including a new type of national risk assessments prescribed by EU regulations on disaster risk management.

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## Contents

Introduction: Values in European Threat Analysis – Coherent Policy or Convenient Justification? ...... 1

1. Value, Threat and Risk .................................................................................................................. 6
   1.1. Value .................................................................................................................................. 6
   1.2. Threat ................................................................................................................................. 9
   1.3. Risk ..................................................................................................................................... 11

2. Values in European Politics: Dimensions, Positions and Controversies ................................. 17
   2.1. European values? ............................................................................................................... 17
   2.2. Universal or relative? ...................................................................................................... 19
   2.3. Individual or collective? .................................................................................................. 23
   2.4. The ‘refugee crisis’: Securing whom, and how? ............................................................ 30

3. Values in European Threat Analysis .......................................................................................... 41
   3.1. Threats to Europe: EU and National security strategies .................................................. 41
   3.2. The global governance of risk: frameworks for action ..................................................... 48
   3.3. Risk assessment under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism .......................................... 55
   3.4. The first national risk assessments .................................................................................. 60
   3.5. The first EU risk assessment ........................................................................................... 65
   3.6. The World Economic Forum risk assessment .................................................................. 67

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 73

Literature .......................................................................................................................................... 76
Introduction: Values in European Threat Analysis – Coherent Policy or Convenient Justification?

European security strategies at the national and EU levels are presented as responses to a set of threats. These threats are defined as threats to certain shared values – essentially the life and health of the citizens, the fundamental principles of human rights and democracy, and the institutions and infrastructure required to maintain these values, essentially the state. In the opening of the EU Internal security strategy from 2010, it is stated that:

*Europe must consolidate a security model, based on the principles and values of the Union: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, democracy, dialogue, tolerance, transparency and solidarity.*

The first of five key principles of the European Agenda on Security that substituted the EU Internal Security Strategy in 2015 repeats this focus on values:

*First, we need to ensure full compliance with fundamental rights. Security and respect for fundamental rights are not conflicting aims, but consistent and complementary policy objectives. The Union’s approach is based on the common democratic values of our open societies, including the rule of law, and must respect and promote fundamental rights, as set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.*

Similarly, the NATO Strategic Concept from 2010 declares:

*While the world is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values. [...] NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.*

* [...] An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence.*

In the national security and defence strategies of European countries, state sovereignty is still the essential value to be protected. Yet, a comparison of security strategies at national and EU levels render a picture in which European countries are united by a mutual concern for state sovereignty as qualified by the values of human rights, democracy and international law. Furthermore, threats to

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4. Ibid., 26.
5. For an analysis of the connection between National security strategies and strategies of civil protection, see Section 3.1 of this report.
state sovereignty are seen as part of a larger continuum of security threats of common concern, including terrorism, organised crime, cyber attacks, pandemics, industrial accidents and natural disaster. In effect, calls are continuously made for closer integration of military and civil security agencies in Europe tasked with external and internal dimensions of security.

The presumed absence of military threats to European countries since the end of the Cold War has warranted this development, putting civilian organisations like the police and civil protection agencies in the lead of European security cooperation. These organisations have a lower bar for sharing their resources and information than national militaries. Historically, the EU has been an economic and political project rather than a military one, and the ‘civilization of security’ has been a prerequisite for the increasingly active role of the EU in the security field. In the 2003 EU Security Strategy which intensified this process, it was stated:

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

With the recent upsurge of new military threats to Europe, primarily from Russia in the EU neighbourhood and from an intensified threat by IS and al-Qaida to European citizens, this ‘unconventional’ approach to security is nonetheless in question. Will it lead to a further strengthening of European military cooperation, or perhaps a return to Cold War dynamics in which the EU is entirely overshadowed by NATO as an arena for security politics, and where the non-conventional threats are granted less attention? Has there been a shift in European values since the Cold War that precludes such a reversal?

Furthermore, the recent increase in the number of refugees to Europe involves a high conflict potential among countries with competing interests and divergent attitudes towards refugees. Some governments have reacted by presenting the refugees as threats to the values of their countries, while others emphasise their responsibilities for protecting the refugees. In both cases, the distribution of material resources, which were already strained due to the financial crisis, is up for debate within and across nations, with strong incentives for pushing responsibilities to neighbouring countries. In this

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6 In addition to conventional threats of international war and nuclear weapons, also NATO refers to these ‘non-conventional’ threats as central concerns in its strategic concept, and invites close collaboration with international organisations like the EU in addressing them. NATO, "Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," 10-13, 26-32.

situation, the reliance of European security on shared values like human rights, solidarity and dialogue is put to a test.

When evaluating the changing security landscape we need to ask not only what the new threats are but what the role of values is in the very analysis of threats, e.g. in the conception of Russia, the IS and al-Qaida, and refugees as threats that should lead to a reorientation of European security cooperation. Exactly what are they a threat to? To the unique values of European nations? To the values of Europe as a whole? To the values of humanity? To the international legal order? The answers to these questions are integral to how the threats are defined and addressed. Should the threats be met by a return to national defence? By closer EU defence collaboration? Through the UN and a further strengthening of international law? Or, perhaps, through the evolution of a world federation based on the values and principles of the EU?

The interconnection between threats and values is therefore essential to an understanding of the politics of security in Europe. This is the focus of this report, highlighting the role of values in European threat analyses within the scope of societal security. As a concept of security in European policy discourse, societal security encompasses the internal and external security policy of the EU and EU member states. It implies a connection between national security strategies, domestic policies of policing and civil protection, and the security policies of the EU. Defined by this conceptual scope, this report therefore addresses the broad picture of European security, while excluding a more global focus on ‘human’, or ‘world’ security.

The theme of the report is addressed through a series of sub-questions: What is the meaning of values in the context of European politics? What are their role in the main types of European threat analysis? How do values figure in selected empirical cases where threat analyses are made, implemented and contested? Against this background, what is the role of values in European threat analysis, and is it a matter of coherent policy or convenient justification?

In Chapter 1, the central concepts of values, threats and risks are introduced. Chapter 2 provides a closer examination of the conception of values in European politics, and political and sociological theory. The examination is exemplified by two cases: conceptions of threat in the debate on boat refugees arriving at the shores of Europe; and everyday perceptions of threat among European citizens. These cases serve the purpose of illustration rather than empirical evidence, and represents samples of relevant research in other parts of the SOURCE project. In Chapter 3, major security strategies and risk assessments in European politics are presented and analysed against the backdrop. Finally, in the Conclusion, findings are summarised regarding the roles of values in European threat analysis, and the question of coherent vs. convenient justification is discussed.

It is concluded that the way in which values currently figure in European security policies glosses over the essentially contested nature of values within and across European societies. Rather than reflecting

a common commitment to a set of inalienable fundamental values, any harmony of values within and across European countries presupposes an overlapping consensus of values in a particular historical setting. This setting is characterised by political and economic features that are not reducible to values as such. For instance, a common commitment to the life of all citizens of European countries presupposes a situation in which no country is perceived as an existential threat to the life and welfare of the citizens of its neighbours. This situation stems from factors like mutual economic interest, shared military alliances, and the outcome of previous warfare, rather than from a historical shift in value orientation. In other words, such a shift should be seen as integral to the broader social, economic and political processes. The analysis of threats and their implications should therefore not focus on threats relative to a set of general values like life, health or democracy, but on threats as relative to the political settings in which these values attain their significance and meaning. If a harmony of values among European citizens presupposes a minimum of e.g. social justice or strong military alliances, it would be counterproductive to neglect these elements due to the immediate threat to the shared values posed by e.g. terrorism, organised crime or natural disaster. On the other hand, values are also not reducible to these material and cultural preconditions. Any comprehensive analysis of threats and their mitigation needs to consider the role of values in the equation. Values are not the answer to what security is or how it is to be obtained but the starting point for an adequate understanding of how security works in society.

This conclusion complicates the use of threat analysis in European security politics. Firstly, it reveals the way in which threat analyses referring to shared values may conveniently justify underlying political agendas. Secondly, it indicates that threat analyses that truly strive for coherence with a set general values risk losing touch with reality. This is partly the case with the systems of civil protection which are currently constructed across Europe on the basis of standardized schemes of threat analysis and risk assessment. Thirdly, the way in which threats are relative to historically situated values – be they universal or not – retains a need for explicitly normative political debate on security threats, combined with the rooting of the threat analyses of public authorities in democratic procedures. This harmonises with the second key principle of The European Agenda on Security: ‘[M]ore transparency, accountability and democratic control, to give citizens confidence.’

This report responds to the general objective of SOURCE Work Package 6: providing a documentary and analytic foundation for on-going research on the dependencies between societal security and ethical values, in particular in comparison with values implicit in ‘hard’ security measures’. In accordance with the description of SOURCE Deliverable 6.1, this involved ‘clarifying, through the analysis of official documents, policy pronouncements, literature searches and follow-up interviews, the function of values in the conceptualisation of security in different sectors of the overall security landscape set out in Work Package 2’ encompassed by the SOURCE project. The study was conducted in collaboration between Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), King’s College London (KCL) and Vienna Centre for Societal Security (VICESSE). It draws on previous reports in the SOURCE project (including

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9 Douglas, Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences, 3.
10 Quotes from the Description of Work of the SOURCE project, Work Package 6, pp. 27-30.
D.1.1, 2.4, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2, as well as the mapping of debates and news coverage of societal security by the Mediawatch resource in workpackage 8)\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} For access to these reports, please visit the SOURCE website: http://www.societalsecurity.net/content/source-deliverables.
1. Value, Threat and Risk

The concepts of threat, risk and values are used in many ways, and it is far from evident what exactly ‘values in threat analysis’ means. The notion of threat is wide open for interpretation, encompassing threats to individuals as well as states, and the notion of value is amongst the most ambiguous and contested terms of our language. In security policies, ‘risk’ has taken on a more specific meaning relating to risk assessment and management, involving a particular combination of ‘threat’ and ‘value’. Yet, the interpretation of risk still relies on the definition of these broader terms. Hence, there is a great potential both for conceptual analyses drawing on debates in the fields of social and political theory and for empirical analyses of how these terms are used on contemporary practices of threat analysis. In this chapter, we prepare the ground for such analyses in the coming chapters through brief introductions to the concepts of values, threat and risk.

1.1. Value

Like with the EU and NATO strategies quoted in the introduction to this report, security strategies in Europe tend to evoke shared values rather than sheer instrumental interests for their justification, also at the national level. By appealing to normative principles like human rights or state sovereignty, the policies are supposedly anchored at a deeper level than the fault lines of European politics. For example, national politicians may fight bitterly over the distribution of a state budget but be entirely united in a commitment to protecting the life of the citizens and the sovereignty of the state. They may disagree on exactly how those values are to be promoted, but will at least share a common denominator in their security policies. What, then, is meant by ‘values’ in this connection?

Due to the wide variety of uses of the word, dictionary definitions of value differ. The definition that is most coherent with the uses of ‘values’ in European security policies seems to be ‘one’s principles or standards; one’s judgement of what is valuable or important in life’. This definition alludes to the notion of ‘moral value’, as distinguished from e.g. economic or aesthetic value. It also evokes the distinction that is often drawn between values and interests in politics. In distinction from moral values, interests may be entirely instrumental, i.e. without involving an ethical, value based evaluation of the ends that motivate the interests. In this usage, interests pertain to Max Weber’s conception of practical, instrumental rationality, while the notion of values alludes to his category of substantive, value based rationality. When security policies refer to values rather than interests in this sense, they claim moral high ground. The characterisation of the European Union as a value based ‘normative power’ alludes to this distinction from non-moral foreign and security policy.

However, this conception of values as moral values is too narrow for grasping the role of values in European politics. When we say that threats are relative to something of value, we speak of value in the mundane sense of ‘something that is valued’. Also actors who do not explicitly refer to values when presenting their interests rely on a normative position on ‘what is valuable or important in life’

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12 For a theoretical proposition of such anchoring, see e.g. Paul Roe, ”The 'Value' of Positive Security,” Review of International Studies 34 (2008).
in this broad sense – be it explicit or implicit. For instance, if a security strategy refers to ‘the national interest’ without further normative justification, it may seem entirely instrumental, reflecting a state’s non-moral strife for power. Yet, it presupposes the valuation of the state as something worth empowering. This presupposition can be spelled out in a security strategy by reference to certain values, but the moral status of the strategy does not rely on such explicit reference. This also means that policies that do not refer to moral values as a source of justification can indeed be evaluated on equally moral grounds as policies that make such moral claims.

Furthermore, the priorities of a security strategy may be inspired by moral principles like human rights and democracy, but the practices of the agencies implementing the strategy will not necessarily be reducible to these motives. Needless to say, circumstances conditioning the formulation, interpretation and execution of the principles are essential to their manifestation. Furthermore, the official motives of a security strategy may very well be vicarious, as a way of concealing underlying rationales and generating political support and moral superiority. Rather than only looking into the official justifications of security practices like threat analysis, determining their value therefore presupposes the evaluation of what the actual values driving the practices are, combined with analysis of their effects.

Indeed, the idea of values as a driver of behaviour is itself deeply problematic, as values should rather be seen as part of a larger complex of causes and motives for social behaviour. Essentialist conceptions of values as foundations for action are therefore suspicious. Instead, the conception of value is the place of contention, a negotiation that represents a tug-of-war between values as something universal and eternal, and values based on immediate interests.  

### Intrinsic or Extrinsic?

Values may be perceived as intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic values are ends in themselves, while extrinsic values are of instrumental value as means to other ends (ends that are not necessarily conceptualised as values). The value of security can both be defined as intrinsic and extrinsic. As an intrinsic value, security is a desirable condition for individuals or societies (identified with the absence of fear and disorder). In this respect, a security strategy would not have to refer to other values than security in order to be ‘value based’. In the context of security policies, however, security is generally conceived as a means to other ends. At the individual level, those ends may be survival, health, freedom or prosperity, and at the level of society or state, it can be political autonomy, economic growth or territorial control. Yet, as with the triple role of values as objects of, sources of and threats to security, the ends to which security is a means are often themselves seen as sources of security – like trust, good health, economic wealth or territorial control.

In security policies, values are not only something to be secured – they may also be invoked as an active element of a security strategy: if the right values are not just protected but nurtured, society will supposedly be more secure. For instance, the EU Security Strategy claims:

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The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.  

As described in the former section on risk, this view of values as a source of security is reinforced by the notion of ‘resilience’ – or the ability of a society to sustain stress like attacks and disasters. Values with a positive effect on security in society, like trust, mutual aid, respect for life and autonomy of individuals, non-violence and democracy, are of an immaterial kind, and can therefore not be immediately destroyed by physical events like war, political violence or nuclear accidents. On these terms, security policies that nurture the right ‘security values’ should be highly effective. However, any notion of security that ascribe certain qualities to values independent of their physical/material and immediate social circumstances should be met with suspicion (as argued in the next chapter).

Furthermore, values may evidently be the source of insecurity as well. For instance, the values of an extremist ideology may justify political violence, and conflicts of values may exacerbate competition for resources within and between states. Concerning natural disasters emanating from climate change, values relating to ever-increasing levels of material welfare can ultimately be seen as sources of insecurity.

When introduced to security studies in the early 1990s, the term societal security was inspired by the security logic of nationalism, religion and controversies over migration. These were not defined by the boundaries of states but by social identities, or ‘imagined communities’. The notion of societal security generalises this identity-based dynamic from nationhood and ethnicity to society at large. While often overlapping with the territorial borders of states, the notion of society in ‘societal’ security may also be applied at sub-state and transnational levels. The connection with conflicts over nationhood or religion illustrates the two faces of societal security – as a source of security within a community of values, and as a source of potential conflict between such communities.

As a prescriptive term in European security discourse, societal security highlights the agenda of securing the values of a society – its people, its institutions, its resources and infrastructure – entities that are not generally grasped by a state centric focus on national security, and also not by a focus on the needs of individuals (human security). If the EU is perceived as a community of values, a prescriptive commitment to societal security warrants a common European security policy beyond the scope of the national security of EU member states. Nevertheless, if other communities are seen as equally or more important for European citizens, it opens for contestations of the EU as a prevalent security actor. Societal security could even be evoked in defence of a return from EU to national

security, if the nation state is regarded as the essential value community in Europe and the normative agenda of the EU is perceived as conflicting with the values of the nations. In general, the identity focus of societal security lends itself to conservative and nationalist agendas as well as to radical agendas challenging the status quo by reference to values (see e.g. Section 2.1).

1.2. Threat

The security policies of states and organisations are presented as responses to a set of threats.\(^\text{18}\) Hence, the analysis of threats has an essential role in the formation and justification of security policies. How, then, are threats analysed? Do security policies actually evolve from the recognition of threats, or is the analysis of threats integral to the general objectives of the policies? Can threats be defined independent of the values and interests that divide states and political parties in ‘normal politics’, as a sphere of ‘the exception’ where their interests meet in a common concern for security? Or are threats themselves subjected to regular political strategy and disagreement?

The study of securitization highlights the political role of threats – how perceptions of existential threats are established, with significant political effects.\(^\text{19}\) It partly answers affirmatively to the latter three questions above: threat analyses are part of political strategies, but as an exceptional field of politics where playing the security card trumps regular decision making. A focus on the role of values in these securitization processes nonetheless demonstrates that what could be seen as fairly instrumental political strategies of threat analysis are embedded in broader social and political dynamics.\(^\text{20}\) Referring to the legitimacy of security practices, Thierry Balzacq argued: ‘Security practices that result from securitization remain socially binding so long as they respond to commonly held values’.\(^\text{21}\) Attention to values thereby adds a crucial dimension to the study of securitization.

Some threats are essentially contested – like the (absurd) idea that Muslims pose a threat to European civilization. Here, it is evident how the perception of the threat is embedded in a political outlook from which it cannot be separated. Other threats seem more objective – like the threat posed by nuclear accidents or threats that are ‘natural’ and that can be analysed by the natural sciences. Yet, as with the controversy over climate change, conclusions in the natural sciences may be contested and politicians may disagree on their political implications.

\(^\text{18}\) ISO Standard 22300:2012 on societal security defines threat as: ‘potential cause of an unwanted incident, which can result in harm to individuals, a system or organization, the environment or the community.’ In this report, ‘threat’ refers both to intended/malicious and to unintended (accidental) and natural (not man-made) phenomena. The EU Guideline on risk assessment from 2010 limits ‘threat’ to ‘a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or activity of an intentional/ malicious character. European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Paper: Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management, Sec(2010) 1626,” (Brussels, 2010), 11.


\(^\text{20}\) Burgess, The Ethical Subject of Security: Geopolitical Reason and the Threat against Europe, 13.

Essentially for the role of values, threats are per definition relative to something that is threatened – be it military installations, public buildings, web servers, religious groups, citizens in general, animals, plants, ecosystems or cultural artefacts. Both the understanding and valuation of these entities differ, also within science. For instance, the military equipment of a state may be perceived as essential by some citizens and redundant by others, while citizens of foreign countries may perceive this equipment as threatening. And while some may perceive the extinction of animal species as a fundamental threat, others may be indifferent. So much for the objectivity of threats. Threats are only objective in a conditional sense, where the conditions both raise questions of knowledge (epistemology) and values (ethics).

We may therefore presume that rather than being an objective foundation for European security policies, threat analyses in Europe mirror wider political perceptions of how the world is to be understood and what is to be valued. Hence, any notion of national or societal security will be deeply political, even if presented as an instrumental response to objective threats. Or, especially when presented as objective and relying on the knowledge of experts rather than on democratic debate and contestation.

For example, when used prescriptively in European policies and research, the notion of societal security is often presented as a response to a changing threat environment that puts the EU at the centre stage. Could it be that the changing threat environment is itself a result of changes in European politics since the end of the Cold War – changes in which problems like pandemics and natural disasters that were previously perceived as regular concerns for states become a challenge for a newly evolved security community? Indeed, there were intensive efforts in the EU throughout the 1990s at building such a conception of a security community, as a basis for the eventual formation of a common European Security and Defence Policy. Threats are helpful for building a sense of community, so developing a security concept and threat picture that corresponds to the political community that one wishes to strengthen would be a logical political strategy.

In this report, we focus on European threat analysis of three kinds, reflecting a division of labour between the military, police and civil protection:

- Analyses of threats to the state posed by foreign states or organisations (war and espionage: military);
- Analyses of threats to the citizens of states posed by organisations and individuals within and across state borders (crime: policing)
- Analyses of threats to the citizens posed by other extraordinary events like industrial accidents, pandemics and natural disasters (emergencies and disasters: civil protection)

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24 This focus for instance excludes risk assessments in the realm of finance. On this topic, see SOURCE Deliverable 5.1.
Because these three domains are closely interrelated, the threat analyses nonetheless overlap. For instance, analyses of threats to national security take criminal organisations into regard (relating to terrorism, illicit arms trade or cyber crime, e.g.); analyses of criminal threats include the involvement of foreign states in e.g. cyber attacks, terrorism or drugs trafficking as well as the failure of ‘failed states’ to contain criminal activity; and civil protection agencies include a focus on the most disastrous events that may follow from crime and warfare, like a terrorist attack with chemical or biological weapons or, worst case, nuclear war. Both civil and military security policies in Europe highlight these continuities between internal and external security, and between civil and military protection.

As mentioned, the concept of societal security highlights the identity dimension of threats: that threats to communities, and not only to states or individuals, are an essential part of the politics of security. This dimension is included in the notion of ‘threats to the citizens’ in the second and third category of threat analyses above. However, as documented in Chapter 3, the identity aspect of security remains implicit in most European threat analysis.

In EU guidelines on national risk management, risk assessments are supposed to encompass all significant hazards that the citizens are exposed to, including aspects of crime and war (see Section 3.3). ‘Hazard’ is defined as follows: ‘a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage.’ As a consequence of this broad focus, civil (police and rescue) and military agencies are expected to collaborate in the analysis and mitigation of threats. Furthermore, risk assessments from a range of related domains like finance, insurance and corporate security are of direct relevance to such comprehensive national risk assessments – reflecting the cross-sectoral scope of the notion of societal security. Since 2013 onwards, all EU member states are required to develop and report on their risk management policies every third year, with first deadline in 2015 (see Section 3.3).

1.3. Risk

The political dimension of threats, and the role of values in the equation, is more evident when threats are translated into risks. Generally, the calculation of risk involves the combined assessment of the probability and impact of events, where impact explicitly refers to values (see Figure 7 in section 3.3 for an example). Risk management, then, is about reducing the likelihood and impact of identified risks. In this connection, impact does not refer to the consequences for any values that might be affected but on selected values like the life and health of individuals, economic value etc.

25 Burgess, The Ethical Subject of Security: Geopolitical Reason and the Threat against Europe, 144-46.
In the above mentioned 2010 European Commission guidelines on disaster risk management, impact (consequences) is divided into human impacts, economic and environmental impacts, and political/social impacts’, and specified as follows:27

**Human impacts** are defined as the quantitative measurement of the following factors: number of deaths, number of severely injured or ill people, and number of permanently displaced people.

**Economic and environmental impacts** are the sum of the costs of cure or healthcare, cost of immediate or longer-term emergency measures, costs of restoration of buildings, public transport systems and infrastructure, property, cultural heritage, etc., costs of environmental restoration and other environmental costs (or environmental damage), costs of disruption of economic activity, value of insurance pay-outs, indirect costs on the economy, indirect social costs, and other direct and indirect costs, as relevant.

**Political/social impacts** are usually rated on a semi-quantitative scale and may include categories such as public outrage and anxiety, encroachment of the territory, infringement of the international position, violation of the democratic system, and social psychological impact, impact on public order and safety, political implications, psychological implications, and damage to cultural assets, and other factors considered important which cannot be measured in single units, such as certain environmental damage.28

These definitions provide an overview of the values that are at stake: life, health, material infrastructure, political order etc. The three domains are associated with different measures. Human impacts are estimated in terms of number of affected people; economic and environmental impacts in terms of cost/damage in Euro; and political and social impacts are measured in terms of ‘a semi-quantitative scale comprising a number of classes, e.g. (1) limited/insignificant, (2) minor/substantial, (3) moderate/serious, (4) significant/very serious, (5) catastrophic/disastrous.’29 It is recognised that certain environmental impacts are not easily quantifiable in money – as is obviously the case with e.g. cultural heritage and environmental degradation. This dimension, then, is to be included in the estimation of social impact. Assessments are to be made separately for the three domains, as the measures are of a different nature.30

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the ways in which impacts are measured in risk assessments still varies extensively. If we for instance look at the complexities of conceptualising and measuring the impact of terrorism, this should not come as a surprise. The impact of terrorism is not reducible to the number of casualties, material damage and immediate economic costs associated with reconstruction. It also involves issues like fear, trust, political options and broader economic costs like the disruption of trade and increased public expenditure for security management. This allows for a range of divergent measures of impact. Also the difficulties with quantifying the value of impacts like fear and long-term

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27 Ibid., 10, referring to ISO 31010.
28 Ibid., 10-11 and 17, partly referring to the assessment criteria of selected member states.
29 Ibid., 17.
30 Ibid.
political consequences makes awareness of the role of values in the analyses necessary for guaranteeing the political coherence of risk management strategies.

In spite of introducing a standard conceptualisation of impact, the Commission guidelines leave the decision on exactly how they are to be measured to the national authorities (see Section 3.3). In Norway, for example, the civil protection authority responsible for making a scenario based ‘national risk picture’ has specified five ‘societal values’ across the domains and given them scores that allow for integration in a common picture. The values are: life and health; nature and culture; economy; societal stability; and democratic values and governing capacity. The assessment of these is based on an elaborate system of ‘consequence types’ relative to the values, with related scores according to different kinds of measures (only economy is measured in money). Interestingly, the ‘democratic values’ that we have seen highlighted in national and international security strategies only figure as a minor element of the overall assessment.

This Norwegian methodology is probably as transparent as national risk assessments get. Nonetheless, it is hard to read or evaluate exactly how the various scores have been determined on the basis of the published material. This would require a further consultation with the responsible bureaucrats and demand highly specialised expertise. Hence, politicians and bureaucrats tasked with managing the risks still fully relies on the expertise of the responsible agency. While the EU guidelines emphasise democratic oversight and public consultation, it is hard to imagine exactly how this could be done except involving central stakeholders in the very assessments. On the other hand, stakeholders tend to have their own stakes in highlighting, or potentially downplaying, ‘their’ risks. As expressed in interviews with Norwegian risk analysts, they are aware of this and keep a critical distance to the input from stakeholders, leaving themselves with the final word in the interpretation of impacts. Bureaucrats and politicians tasked with the management of the risks are also aware of this subjective element to the assessments, and make their own interpretations by seeing them in a larger picture beyond the mandates of the risk assessment agencies. Furthermore, when choosing which risks to highlight as scenarios in the annual risk picture, the agencies consider public attention and political agendas – partly as a corrective to the threat picture communicated in the media, and partly as a way of better informing ongoing political processes. This, again, involves a political dimension that is not communicated in the results. Their role as producers of an objective national risk picture based on objective measures of societal values therefore necessarily involves a considerable subjective element. If we accept that this will always be the case, the democratic challenge is therefore not necessarily to make the results even more objective but recognising the subjective element and making not only the results but the premises of the assessments as transparent as possible.

31 DSB, “Fremgangsmåte for Utarbeidelse Av Nasjonalt Risikobilde (Nrb) (Method for Development of a National Risk Picture),” ed. Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap (2014), 18. The selection of these values is based on white papers by the state authorities on societal security, as well as on the methods of other spearheads of national risk assessment, like the UK, Netherlands and EU. If we look at the white papers, however, the conceptualisation of the societal values gets little attention – to the extent that it seems like a conscious choice not to enter contentious debates on their definition.

32 Interviews conducted with representatives of the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Civil Protection, fall 2015.
The subjective dimension of risk assessment has long been emphasised in sociological, psychological and anthropological studies of risk. In the opening of *Risk: A Sociological Theory*, Niklas Luhmann refers research findings that challenge the authority of statistical theories and quantitative measures of risk. As an example, he writes: ‘We now know that housewives in the supermarket and street children in Brazil can calculate highly successfully – but not the way they learned to do so, or did not learn to do so, at school’.\(^{33}\) And turning to the question of measuring values quantitatively, he continues: ‘We know that values can be quantified – with the result that what was really meant can no longer be recognized.’\(^{34}\) This speaks directly to our investigation of the role of values in threat analysis. If the calculations and procedures of formalised risk assessments like the ones referred above and in the third chapter do not harmonise with how risks are actually understood and dealt with, there is a need for critical analysis.

Regarding how the impact and seriousness of risks, or the ‘risk threshold’, are determined, Luhmann emphasises how it depends on the position of the observer. For instance, ‘...subsistence farmers are highly averse to risk because they are under the constant threat of hunger, of losing their seed, of being unable to continue production’.\(^{35}\) A risk that might seem acceptable to a politician or industrial farmer may involve a disaster for the subsistence farmer. Similarly: ‘Under money economy circumstances we find corresponding results: entrepreneurs facing liquidity problems are less willing to take risks than those who are not plagued by this problem when the risk is of a given magnitude’.\(^{36}\) Hence:

> It will probably be necessary to take into account that the disaster threshold will have to be located at very different positions, depending on whether one is involved in risk as a decision maker or as someone affected by risky decisions. This makes it difficult to hope for consensus on such calculation even when dealing with specific situations.\(^{37}\)

It is not only the assessment of the seriousness of the risk that relies on the subjective position of the observer. The very selection of which risks that are taken into account, and which that are not, relies on the hierarchies of power and the predominant norms of a society.\(^{38}\) Indeed, when a national risk picture categorises e.g. food security as an insignificant risk, or exclude problems like poverty, it reflect a national perspective distanced from the actual risk perceptions of those exposed to these risks (see e.g. Section 2.5 and 3.4).

**Political economy of risk assessment**

Those organisations tasked with counteracting the risks identified by national and international risk assessments – law enforcement and security agencies, civil servants, emergency services, disaster preparedness agencies, etc. – are often also making their own risk and threat analyses as well as

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33 Luhmann, *Risk: A Sociological Theory*, 2. In support of this statement, Luhmann refers to a range of studies.
34 Ibid. In support of these statements, Luhmann lists a range of references that we do not include here.
36 Ibid., 3.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. In this connection, Luhmann refers to the work of Mary Douglas amongst others, including *Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences*.
contributing to the assessments by designated agencies. The stated objective of their assessments is generally to raise awareness about specific threats and inform the operational strategies that seek to mitigate them. However, threat assessment is at risk of becoming highly politicised, particularly during times of economic ‘austerity’ when different government agencies and bodies are effectively competing for declining public funds. In addition to seeking to influence debates about the public resources necessary to counter specific threats or mitigate the impact of certain risks, threat assessments may also advocate the wider policies necessary to address the threats. For example, new powers on the part of executive agencies tasked with mitigating the risk posed by natural hazards, or greater powers of surveillance on the part of those tasked with combating terrorism or cybercrime.

Private entities are also competing for public funds earmarked to combat various threats prioritised for government. To corporations in the security field, threats are an occasion of profit. Indeed a vast industry already worth hundreds of billions of dollars annually is now competing for lucrative contracts across the spectrum of homeland security and disaster management. The private sector is also increasingly embroiled in national security and risk management policies because much of the critical infrastructure that state policy seeks to protect or make more resilient is now privately owned. Energy utilities, cyber-infrastructure, transport services and the financial system, for example, are becoming security actors in their own right as states impose statutory obligations to maintain and secure essential services, and to cooperate with government agencies where necessary.

In the 21st century, public security is – in the words of the former EU Commissioner for Justice and Home affairs – ‘no longer a monopoly that belongs to public administrations, but a common good, for which responsibility and implementation should be shared by public and private bodies’. The private sector therefore has the same interest as resource-constrained public bodies in stressing the severity in certain threats and risk mitigation measures. To this end it lobbies lobbying for public-private partnerships that gives the latter greater influence over public policy decisions. This in turn supports its primary objective of securing contracts to provide services and in order to turn a profit for company owners and shareholders. This adds another set of values to the diverse stakeholder interests that are shaping risk assessment and mitigation. As Lipschultz and Turcotte suggest of the political economy of threats and the production of fear:

\[\text{Counter-terrorism is more than a response to acts of terrorism; it is an autonomous arena of supply that requires a demand to survive and succeed. But the demand for counter-terrorism and the protection it ostensibly supplies are not automatic; they must be created and sustained. The division of labour within the counter-terrorist arena means that like toothpaste, cereal and SUVs, different products require different sales strategies.}\]

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Embracing uncertainty and resilience

Policies of risk management usually concentrate on risks falling within the category of high impact and high probability. Some of the cases that have generated significant attention in the field of security due to their high impact, like 9/11, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2011 Japan Tsunami, nonetheless fell within the category of high impact but low probability (see e.g. national risk assessments of UK and Netherlands in Section 3.4). The emphasis on these kinds of events as matters of security have entailed a reduced focus on prediction. As described by report D5.1 in the SOURCE project, there has been a general shift in risk assessment from statistical probability towards uncertainty. When essential threats are not conceived as predictable, efforts of threat management concentrate on reducing vulnerabilities and strengthening capacities for effective response instead of preventing ‘the unknowable’. With this approach, the centrality of values in the risk equation further increases, as the evaluation of vulnerabilities and the design of responses are not determined by previous events. Instead, they are formed by judgements of what the essential values and ‘valuables’ of society are, and how these can be protected against the unknown.

This turn towards uncertainty and the reduction of vulnerabilities also relates to the prevalence of ‘resilience’ as a policy doctrine. The European Commission guidelines define resilience as ‘the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions’. This is an extremely broad and open concept of risk management, lending itself to virtually any policy agenda. Basically, it is up to those with a mandate and capacity to act in its name to define what the preservation and restoration of the essential basic structures and functions of a system, community or society means. Furthermore, due to an emphasis on complexity and the impossibility of controlling the effects of policy interventions, resilience based approaches are generally developed as a mode of ‘bottom-up adaptation’ rather than top-down governance. Resonating with the shift from risk to uncertainty, they tend not to be justified by set ends and means but as the reaction to circumstances that cannot be controlled. An example is policies of adaptation to climate change that presuppose that the changes themselves are beyond the control of political authorities. The result is a situation where the focus on the promotion of certain values is replaced by a focus on the reduction of vulnerability, but where the values of those defining what to protect are still decisive for the response. This concealed mode of value based risk management requires the ability to analyse the implicit normative positions at stake. In the next chapter, we establish a framework for such analysis, emphasising fundamental distinctions involved in normative political judgement and behaviour.

42 SOURCE Report D5.1, pp.21-23. See also Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede, eds., Risk and the War on Terror (London: Routledge, 2008), 11.
45 For an exposition of this line of thought, see e.g. Sara Holiday Nelson, “Resilience and the Neoliberal Counter-Revolution: From Ecologies of Control to Production of the Common,” Resilience 2, no. 1 (2014).
2. Values in European Politics: Dimensions, Positions and Controversies

The conception of values relies on fundamental assumptions about the world. What are the right values? Are values valid for everyone? And how are values formed and nurtured? In this chapter, these questions are addressed against the background of European politics, drawing on perspectives from moral philosophy and sociology. The matter is then exemplified with the European response to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and the everyday conceptions of security among European citizens.

2.1. European values?

The references in the EU and NATO strategies to shared European values resonate with a widespread perception of Europe as a community of values. The EU is often viewed as ‘normative’ or ‘civilizing’ power, driven by values rather than egotist self-preservation and operating through political and economic rather than military means, overcoming the logic of war and violence. Paralleling the argument by Francis Fukuyama on ‘the end of history’ after the Cold War, this shift involves not only a value-based rationality but a change of values in accordance with liberal principles. This view is for instance expressed by José M. Magone in his introduction to a recent handbook on European politics: ‘Europe has become a regional community of democratic states that have clearly adopted common principles and values, even though there is some diversity in the interpretation of nationally defended liberal democracies’. European politics have supposedly therefore turned from a Cold War logic into a project of democratic peace, or Kantian ‘perpetual peace’.

In support of this view, Magone summaries the work of John McCormick on Europeanism, where it is argued that Europe is being united through a range of shifts in values (since 1979), including:

- From strong nation-state, single identity, to waning national identity, moving towards multiple identities (regional, national and European)
- From embedded role of the individual in the community, towards (limited) erosion of the community due to the individualization of society
- From tendency to emphasize homogeneity in national identity, to recognition of ethnic diversity

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46 Burgess, The Ethical Subject of Security: Geopolitical Reason and the Threat against Europe, 136-44. Here, Burgess identifies six conceptions of values in the Treaty of the European Union: values as foundation, aim, source of intergovernmental unity, gatekeeper, basis for rights, and as security.


50 Magone, McCormick
• *From strong nation-state thinking in international politics, to growing importance of glocalization; the global and local have become one.*

While these might rightly be historical tendencies, the comprehensive survey results of the European Values Study tell a different story.\(^{52}\) As presented in the Atlas of European Values, Europeans still tend to have a rather strong national identity, while the identification with Europe as such is minimal.\(^{53}\) When asked ‘Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all, and second?’, with the options ‘locality or town where you live; region of country where you live; country where you live; Europe; the world as a whole,’ the percentage of respondents ranking Europe as their first or second most important group varies between 1 (Poland, Romania, Turkey, Russia) and 8 (Switzerland) on average per country, (with e.g. Spain, UK and Greece on 3, Germany and Sweden on 6, France and Belgium on 7, and Luxembourg as an outlier on 21). In comparison, the results for ‘your country’ vary from 15 (Germany) to 64 (Finland), with e.g. France on 40, UK on 38, Spain on 21, Greece on 49, Norway on 25, Sweden on 32 and Iceland on 56. The option of ‘locality or town’ is generally ranked higher than the country, while ‘region of country’ is ranked somewhat lower than the country. This picture of a continuous association with the nation is also shown in the high number of affirmative answers to whether people are ‘very or quite proud of being a citizen of their country’, varying between 61 (Bosnia) and 99 (Ireland), with e.g. Germany on 75, Italy and Sweden on 88, France, UK and Norway on 91, and Poland on 96.

On the question of which groups whose living conditions they felt much or very much concerned about, the respondents primarily point towards their own family. Generally, more than 88% per country, with Finland (24), Czech Republic (31), Ireland (42) and UK (48) as outliers. Sweden is e.g. on 98 and Slovakia on 76, with France on 88 and Germany on 97. Regarding their fellow countrymen, the results range between 20-30, with Latvia on 11, Finland on 16, Germany on 45, Switzerland on 52 and Turkey on 70. The percentage of respondents who are much or very much concerned about fellow Europeans generally varies between 7 and 20, with Latvia on 5, UK and Finland on 10, France on 16, Germany on 29 and Switzerland on 35. For ‘humans all over the world’, the result generally varies between 20-30 percent in Western Europe, and 15-20 in Eastern Europe, with Netherlands, Estland and Latvia below 10, Finland on 44, Switzerland on 53 and Turkey on 60.\(^{54}\)

While indicating significant commonalities among European countries, the European Value Survey does therefore not confirm the thesis of widespread Europeanism.\(^{55}\) A primary concern for oneself and one’s family or nation cannot be directly translated into a common European project. However, it also does not exclude such an orientation. As previously argued, if the concern for one’s nation involves a general valuation of nations, it can be translated into a political principle of international

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\(^{52}\) On the European Values Study (EVS), see: [www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu](http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu). For an overview and analysis of findings, see Wil Arts and Loek Halman, eds., *Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe: Painting Europe’s Moral Landscapes* European Values Studies (Leiden: Brill 2013).


\(^{55}\) Burgess nonetheless argues that such commonality is no prerequisite for forming a ‘community of values’ or ‘security community’ as long as the community shares a relationship to an adversary – a common ‘other’. Burgess, *The Ethical Subject of Security: Geopolitical Reason and the Threat against Europe*, 143-44.
collaboration. Similarly, if I am concerned about my family because I see families as a universal value, it invites a different political orientation than if my family is all that matters. Furthermore, if preserving my family is seen as relying on broader social dynamics beyond my control, it also has different political consequences than if I see my family as entirely self-preserving. Likewise, if the preservation of the nation that is regarded as depending on close international collaboration, then support for such collaboration does not rely on a general moral commitment to nations beyond one’s own. This raises fundamental questions of the moral and social nature of values: are the values of European citizens universal or relative, and are they the results of individual action or social structures? As argued in the following sections, the answers to these questions divide major positions in European politics. Without a clarification of how the respondents view these questions, the survey results listed above cannot be translated into a normative political position.

2.2. Universal or relative?

When conceived as universal, values are of value to all human beings, independent of cultural or historical contexts. People may not be aware of it, or may even object to the value, but if it is universal it is still conceived as valuable to them. The doctrine of universal human rights relies on a conception of human life and liberty as universal values. The narrower notion of ‘human security’ concentrates on the universal value of life and personal safety. The concept of ‘human capabilities’ identifies a broader set of values that apply to all of humanity, including the capability to love and to express oneself through art. Universal prescriptions of peace, security and justice presuppose a conception of universal values of some form – if only the universal value of determining one’s own values.

When conceived as relative, values only apply to particular individuals or groups under certain conditions. For instance, the valuation by a community of the life and dignity of its members does not necessarily involve a valuation of all human life and dignity, and also not an equal valuation of the life and dignity of all the members. Furthermore, as documented by historians and ethnographers, ideas of what is valuable or important in life vary radically across time and space, and are one of the defining features that distinguish cultures, religions and other social groupings. Proponents of universalism insist that there still are commonalities across all societies – commonalities in how they differ – for instance related to common biological features. ‘Relativists’ nonetheless respond that such features take on radically different meanings in different social settings, making it artificial to generalise from e.g. a human need for food and shelter to a set of shared values with universal political implications.

From this relativist perspective, any attempt at promoting the interests of others based on a conception of universal values will therefore be biased, reinforcing the values of the benefactors rather than those of the beneficiaries.

The recognition of the relativity of values does not, however, exclude that some values are relative to all human beings and hence universal. Like with intrinsic vs. extrinsic values, it is no contradiction to say that some values are universal while others are not. Yet, due to its salience for normative judgements of what is right ‘for others’, there is a longstanding debate in moral and political philosophy between positions that see some values as universal and positions that reject such a view. There is also a range of positions between the two absolutes. For instance, values like state sovereignty or human rights may be seen as relative to the historical and cultural circumstances of modern statehood but applicable to all countries of the world due to their common features as states. With the global reach of the state system, the result is a conditional universalism of a relativist kind. Evidently, such an empirical argument requires nuances as to the degree to which features of ‘globalization’ actually warrant a conception of universal values.

Another way of reconciling a recognition of the relativity of values with a universal morality is to distinguish between morality of two kinds. Jürgen Habermas, for instance, distinguishes between moral and ethical norms, where moral ‘second-order’ norms refer to universal principles of justice regulating the interaction between people with divergent ethical norms, or values. While regarding the latter as varying according to cultural and social context, Habermas argues that common principles of justice may be reached through rational debate that elevates itself from the particular values of the participants. In her work on the normative character of the EU, Helene Sjursen applies this model as an explanation of how the diversity in European values may be reconciled with a notion of European values if these are rooted in principles of justice.

In the above cited definition of value (Section 1.1), values are relative to judgements made by individual persons (‘one’s judgement of what is valuable or important’), not simply to objective facts of ‘what is important and meaningful’). While this could be seen as a relativist definition, the conception of values as personal does not exclude the possibility that the judgement by a person is universally valid (as opposed to the conflicting judgements by others). This ambivalence of the term is present in notions like ‘European,’ ‘British’ or ‘Christian’ values. The way in which the values are pertaining to and uniting a particular group is highlighted. Still, this does not rule out that the group is right on a universal basis. When e.g. referring to ‘the principles and values of the Union: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, democracy, dialogue, tolerance, transparency and solidarity’ in the European Agenda on Security, it is indicated that these are also universally valid and justify a key role for Europe in the world. The European Security Agenda from 2003, A Secure Europe in a Better World, is exactly about doing good in the world while also serving

European interests – because these dimensions supposedly harmonise due to their reliance on the same set of fundamental values.

The debate between universalism and relativism is of critical importance in the realm of security politics. If security is defined by reference to universal values, they may be promoted through international collaboration and integration – but also through international intervention and repression. If values, to the contrary, are seen as limited to the boundaries of states or international organisations, security becomes a question of protecting these in competition with the values of others. While the notion of national/state security resonates with the latter position, it is also compatible with universalism if the security of all nations/states is valued and not just that of one’s own. Similarly, the notion of societal security emphasises the particular values of a society, as distinguished from the values of all human beings across borders - yet, it does so without necessarily excluding a valuation of the security of all societies. This is obviously an essential nuance, distinguishing egocentric/ethnocentric security policies from policies that seek to harmonise and promote the security needs of all nations, states or societies across the world.

**Realism, internationalism and cosmopolitanism**

In political theory, a basic distinction is drawn between three overarching positions on morality in world politics: realism, internationalism and cosmopolitanism. While highlighting the international dimension of security politics, this distinction is instructive for the question of the universality of values and its implications for the understanding of threats.

**Realism** implies that states fight for their self-preservation in an international condition of perpetual war. There is no role for moral values in international politics except protecting the values of one’s own state. Prescriptively, states are expected to pursue their self-interest, and advised not to rely on international collaboration as a source of survival.

**Internationalism** is the view that states form a ‘society of states’ with certain shared norms of mutual interest, allowing for genuine international collaboration. Most values are still limited to the internal life of states, and world politics ought to be organised in a way that allow all states that abide by the rules to advance the values of their governments, entailing a strong emphasis on mutual recognition of state sovereignty.

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According to cosmopolitanism, world politics is ultimately a society of individuals, or ‘world citizens’, rather than states. World politics ought to be organised in a way that promotes the interests of individuals on a universal and equal basis.\(^{64}\)

The understanding of the universality of values plays a significant role in the three positions. In realism, values are entirely relative to the actors of world politics. There is nothing that binds states together in a common moral project or that require states to act in a certain way according to universal moral standards. The prescriptive position of cosmopolitanism, to the contrary, relies on the assumption of a set of universal values according to which politics ought to be organised. Internationalism generally involves a combination of relativism and universalism, where most values are seen as relative to the state while some are shared among states (either as a historical development or as a reflection of ‘eternal’ universal values).

Essentially for our investigation, internationalism comes in several strands, from relativist leaning pluralism to universalist leaning solidarism. When contrasted with cosmopolitanism, internationalism is often defined along the lines of the pluralist position. Pluralism does not allow for any limitations on state sovereignty except when states violate the rules of the game. It thereby limits international collaboration to what is strictly necessary to maintain the international system. To pluralists, the current governance practices of the EU, or even the UN, are therefore too intrusive, although preferable to an entirely unregulated world without the principles of non-intervention and self-determination.\(^{65}\)

Solidarism is the view that state sovereignty ought to be the main ordering principle of international affairs, but that it should be premised on the interests of the citizenry. Hence, it does not advance just any kind of sovereign statehood but political orders that are seen as conducive to this goal from a universal perspective. States have to make themselves deserving of state sovereignty and may need assistance in reaching the level where the right to non-interference is granted. Solidarism thereby leaves a central role for international collaboration, or global governance, in addressing grievances across borders and promoting the prerequisites for legitimate, representative statehood.

Liberal solidarists committed to human rights differ from (non-internationalist) liberal cosmopolitans by drawing a distinction between basic/fundamental human rights (as universal) and more comprehensive human rights doctrines (as relative to individual states, nations or peoples). The former applies as a basis for limited interference across state borders, while the latter is left for individual states to define. John Rawls’s *The Law of Peoples* (1999) is a prominent example of this position.\(^{66}\)

As seen in the argument by José Magone, the EU is often presented as a liberal cosmopolitan project where the sovereignty of the state is transferred to a supranational level in accordance with universal principles of human rights. In the realm of security, the EU members states nonetheless retain their

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\(^{64}\) Here, the notion of ‘individual’ should nonetheless be understood broadly, allowing for a wide range of philosophical interpretations. It is, for instance, not reducible to the understandings of the autonomous individual in the liberal philosophical tradition.

\(^{65}\) A prominent example is Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*.

sovereign authority, although committing to close regional collaboration. Rather than being strictly cosmopolitan, European security policies are therefore torn between pluralist and solidarist modes of internationalism. As demonstrated in the next chapter, EU security policy is solidarist, while the national security strategies are more pluralist in their reiterations of state sovereignty. Referring to international law as an essential source of national security, they are not realist, however, but committing to the sovereignty of all states that abide by international law.

Hence, regarding the values invoked in European threat analysis, we may expect to find pluralist and solidarist variations of internationalism. Some of the values to be protected, like life and health, harmonise with universal human rights doctrine and invites close international collaboration for their promotion. Others, like economic and cultural values, territorial control and military assets are of a less universal character and lend themselves to the principle of state sovereignty.

In distinction from the unmistakably cosmopolitan notion of human security, the notion of societal security harmonises with this solidarist-pluralist balancing between universalism and relativism, cosmopolitanism and realism.\(^{67}\) Especially if the ‘societal’ is defined more broadly than by the territorial borders of a state, it can refer to a range of interconnected societies within and across state borders – which is how the term society is generally used in the discipline of sociology.\(^{68}\) In this version, the concept of societal security challenges the state centricity of realism and pluralist internationalism while also challenging the individualism of cosmopolitanism. Instead, it implies the protection of values at many levels, both inside states, nationally, regionally and globally. Indeed, it resonates with how security is already addressed through national, regional and global institutions that challenge realist approaches to national security without realising a liberal cosmopolitan agenda. Seen from liberal cosmopolitanism, it is fairly conservative, even reactionary, in reiterating existing social bonds and boundaries instead of starting from the question of how all individuals can be made as free and equal as possible. As a normative agenda, societal security leaves a central role for sociology in identifying the values to be secured within and across state borders. Which brings us to the problem that not only moral philosophers but sociologists disagree on what values are.

2.3. Individual or collective?

The definition of values as stemming from the judgments of individual persons could be seen as implying that the role of values in society is explained by the nature, reasoning, identity or behaviour of individuals. However, the judgements of individuals can also be understood through a focus on social factors, like economic conditions or cultural patterns. This distinction between individual (or ‘actor’) centric and social (or ‘structure’) centric conceptions of values is equally essential to the study of values in security politics as the distinction between universalist and relativist conceptions. It

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\(^{67}\) For an account of solidarist-pluralism as a positions of its own, see Dower, *World Ethics: The New Agenda*. Here, we rather describe solidarism-pluralism as a multifaceted continuum.

\(^{68}\) This is also how the term was introduced in Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. 

D6.1 – FP7 – 313288
reflects debates between liberalism and communitarianism, between rationalism and constructivism and between liberalism and Marxism in political science and International Relations.

In classic sociology, Max Weber is associated with individual centred explanations of society, and Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim with structural explanations. In Durkheim’s study of suicide, he explains a phenomenon that is generally seen as deeply personal with structural factors like changes in the social economy. In general, he conceives values as ‘social facts’ relating to the character of a society. While they appear at the personal level, they are the result of material and cultural conditions internalised through processes of socialization. According to Durkheim, values have an essential social function as a source of integration between individuals. When societies become ever more individualistic, the morality of the individuals is decisive for continuous social integration and political order.

The notion of societal security as securing ‘societal’ rather than individual values resembles a Durkheimian notion of society as ‘larger than its individual parts’. Yet also Durkheim recognised that modern societies are characterised by extensive pluralism of values. Indeed, it was this pluralism that premised his interest in how integration and social cohesion is still possible, resulting in his notion of ‘organic solidarity’. In highly differentiated societies, he argues, social cohesion does not stem from the equality of values – that people share the same values and morality (as in ‘mechanical solidarity’). Instead, it evolves from norms regulating the interaction between people with different values, reflecting how they are mutually dependent. For instance, a security expert, the owner of a private security company, a manual worker, a politician and a citizen of the country where the product of the security company is used may hold radically different views on what is important or valuable in life. Yet, they may be united by a set of moral values like individual autonomy and property rights which facilitate their interaction. In this sense, it makes sense for European security policies to highlight second-order values like human rights and democracy – not because these are the primary values of European citizens but because it is the kind of values that facilitates their peaceful coexistence.

Marx takes an even more structural perspective, explaining the values of persons by material conditions rather than personal socialization processes and cultural norms. Conceiving modern capitalist society as deeply unjust, divided and conflictual, he explains the degree of order and security as a result of repression and alienation rather than social integration. There is therefore a conflict between securing the predominant false values of a society and realising its genuine collective value potential. In this respect, threat analyses focusing on threats to the existing social structure would actually undermine the security of the society as a whole. The fact that the members of the lower classes may be strong supporters of the values of the status quo is seen as part of the problem. Clearly, this analysis relies on a social conception of values where the judgments by individuals are secondary to the logic of society as a whole.

Weber rejects the structural explanations of Marx and Durkheim, seeing them as reductive and imprecise. Advancing an alternative of ‘methodological individualism,’ he argues that values can only

70 *The Division of Labour in Society*, 2 ed. (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013 [1902]).
71 Ibid., 88f.
be explained through the consideration of how individuals relate to, and form, their social environment. Social structures are still an essential part of the story, as preconditions for individual value formations, but it is through an understanding of how people think and act that we understand the role of values in society. According to Weber, the social scientist does not hold a privileged position from which to evaluate the correctness of people’s values. Instead, scientists are themselves immersed in a subjective value perspective, and should therefore abstain from engaging in normative debate in the name of science. In distinction from the value theories of Marx and Durkheim, this approach does not provide politicians with a scientific basis for normative judgement and political prescription.

Modern sociology provides a range of variations on this theme of the social dimension of values. In his aforementioned work on risk, Niklas Luhmann draws on his general theory of social systems. Resonating with Durkheim, he sees systems like politics, economy and science as self-maintaining organisms with their own logic. In politics, it is the difference between being in position or opposition that organises the system. Values like life, health and solidarity are subjected to this primary distinction, getting their significance from the way in which they can help a politician acquiring power. In a democracy, alluding to prevalent values of a society is a useful political strategy independent of whether the politician personally shares those values. Similarly, the economic system is organised by the distinction between gaining or losing money. Markets engage with moral values insofar as they can be transferred to economic value. In distinction from Durkheim, however, Luhmann does not see the systems of society as parts of a functional whole. Hence, the way in which e.g. politics work does not necessarily support the economic system etc. The systems rather compete for predominance. There is no privileged point from which to evaluate the value claims made in one system. On this account, there is no basis for a general notion of societal values. The systems of society will always compete for the definition and appropriation of values, and the field of security and risk management is a continuation of this competition. According to Luhmann, we should therefore be sceptical whenever claims are made to acting on behalf of common values.

Bourdieu complements this critical perspective with a view to the logic of values within social systems, or social fields. He is not primarily concentrating on how the fields maintain themselves and relate to other fields but on the ways in which values define social conflicts within the fields. In his classic, The Distinction, he analyses how not only economic but aesthetic values differentiate the privileged from the marginalised groups of society. The values gain their value through their role in justifying one’s position in the social hierarchy. As such, the tendency of elites to value e.g. opera and expensive wine is a way of differentiating themselves from the crowd, leaving an appearance of elevation. Being able to live according to the right values, the values of the privileged, is a form of ‘symbolic capital’.

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73 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968 [1922]).
76 Risk: A Sociological Theory, Chapter 8.
77 Ibid., Chapter 9.
79 The notion of social capital was introduced in Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 171.
Weber, he is sceptical towards privileged scholars, politicians or priests making moral judgments about society because it tends to reflect and reinforce the social hierarchies that put them in their privileged position in the first place. Under the heading ‘morality as egoistic universalism’, he writes that value claims based on rational argumentation in the public sphere (associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas) tend to ignore ‘factors of discrimination (such as sex, education or income) which limit the chances of access not only (…) to positions in the political field, but, more profoundly, to articulated political opinion (…) and consequently to the political field’. In this sense, an emphasis of security policies on values like life, health and human rights may downplay values like equality and deprivation because the latter might be conflicting with current hierarchies that the policy makers actively maintain. Similarly, when public agencies evaluate the impact of risks and plan for their mitigation, the values that define the social position of the bureaucrats, experts and stakeholders involved are at stake. With an emphasis on more or less invisible dynamics of ‘symbolic power,’ the democratic rooting of the mandates and procedures of e.g. a civil protection agency does not entail representation of society as a whole.

Ulrich Beck provides another important corrective to the ways values figure in security strategies and threat analyses. Highlighting the international dimensions of threats like war, terrorism, crime, pandemics and climate change, he criticises security policies for being biased by a national focus. Also scholars tend to reproduce the image of the nation or state as the primary unit of analysis when studying the impact and management of such risks. Instead of such ‘methodological nationalism,’ he prescribes a ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ that concentrates on the global or transnational character of the threats and their mitigation. Regarding values, this makes the sovereign state less essential, and instead of the question of how to protect the state the question becomes how to protect the values of individuals across borders through effective international collaboration. The argument is a mode of ‘relativist universalism’ mentioned above, where a cosmopolitan agenda is not derived from moral universalism but from a sociological observation of ‘globalization’ entailing a global, supranational political perspective.

In his work on liberalism and biopolitics, Michel Foucault disentangles the fundamental premise in European politics of life, health and liberty as primary values to be protected and nurtured. Tracing the historical evolution of this mode of thinking in the rise of modern politics, he rejects the universality and objectivity of current versions of liberal cosmopolitanism and solidarism. He does not argue against human rights as such, but demonstrates that their promotion is part of a broader social and political culture that is reinforced at the expense of alternatives. In this respect, the

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82 For a discussion concerning this perspective on European security, see Burgess, *The Ethical Subject of Security: Geopolitical Reason and the Threat against Europe*, 152-60.
promotion of societal security in Europe and beyond is a way of bolstering liberal modernity without highlighting this ‘side-effect’ as the overarching rationale.

Essentially, European security policies associated with the notion of societal security do not presuppose a communitarian valuation of society as such. It may also refer to the societal preconditions for the pursuit of individual values. For instance, social infrastructure like electricity, roads or water may be valued due to their role in promoting the values held by individuals – as means to individual self-realisation (hence as extrinsic values) – rather than because of their intrinsic value as parts of the social fabric. Instead of a collectivist turn towards society, the upsurge of civil protection and policing as prioritised security concerns may therefore be a response to a new stage of individualism where the primary concern of public authorities has become the sovereignty of the individual.84

Liberalism, republicanism and socialism

The distinction between individualist and structuralist conceptions of society is reflected in the distinction between the ideologies of liberalism and socialism. Drawing on fundamental features of Marxism, socialists regard the values of individuals as a potential hindrance to the realization of values for all. Also the values of the masses who find meaning in their current situation instead of realising their self-interest through radical social transformation are a hindrance to realising the values of humanity. Hence, power ought to be transferred from the individual to the state for the generation of social equality – as a precondition for the formation of genuinely free individual judgement.

Liberalists, to the contrary, reject any such theoretical evaluation of the values held by individuals, seeing the role of politics as promoting freedom of individuals to live according to their own values as long as they do not undermine the same freedom of others. In modern liberalism, the state has an essential role in securing this freedom, which requires that the state is sufficiently sovereign. Hence, while associated with the limitation of state interference, state security is still a central part of political liberalism. The exception is cosmopolitan liberal visions where the role of the state is replaced by a global political systems like ‘world federalism’ or ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ that are supposed to serve individual freedom and security more effectively than the state system.85

In European politics, most positions fall between liberalism and socialism on the scale between individualist and collectivist conceptions of society and values. This space is generally associated with variations of liberal or social democracy with a more or less regulated market economy. However, these familiar distinctions can be related to a broad category of republicanism. Like socialism, republican political theory criticises the individualist outlook of liberalism, emphasising the social conditions for individual freedom. On the other hand, republicans reject the socialist prescription of


transferring power from the individual to the state. Centring on the ideal of popular sovereignty exercised by free citizens in the Roman republic, republicanism opposes all structural constraints to individual self-governance. It is not enough that citizens are not interfered with in their pursuit of their values. Even the possibility that someone would coerce them, relating to an unequal distribution of power and resources, goes against the republican ideal. As we have seen, the understanding of what this norm implies nonetheless relies on contended conceptions of social structures and therefore harbours both liberal- and socialist leaning variations.

Second, republicanism adds more significance than liberalism to the role of values in uniting a political community/republic and defining the meaning of political freedom: efforts of emancipation should not be guided by an abstract ideal of individual autonomy freed from the yokes of tradition but by public support for the values that supposedly constitute the essence of society. The value judgement that this involves resonates with the way in which social/structural conceptions of values bracket the values held by the individuals of a society, interpreting them as manifestations of a certain social logic in which the essential values of society are to be found.

In Europe, the republican concern for individual freedom is associated with liberalism, and republicanism rarely features as a separate political category. Proponents of republicanism emphasising its ancient roots nonetheless see liberalism as an over-individualistic branch of a broader notion of republicanism. With a view to the role of values in politics and of how values are socially constituted, republicanism coheres with the way in which liberalism is generally combined with (or compromised by) elements of conservatism and nationalism in European politics. It also harmonises with the democratic and often somewhat conservative forms of socialism among leftist European parties.

In distinction from the ‘uncompromised’ forms of socialism and liberalism, conservatives see values as something to be recognised and preserved in their own right. However, in accordance with republicanism, they do not simply reiterate the values that are most prevalent in society. Conservatism involves a judgement on what the right values to maintain in society are — often in opposition to new and ‘foreign’ values. Nationalist variations of such conservatism forfeit an ideal of states as united by the right ‘national’ values and traditions. Multiculturalism, to the contrary, ascribe a similar quality to values while challenging the nationalist idea and ideal of states as homogenous and ‘mono-cultural’.

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87 This emphasis on (American) values is a familiar theme in the US Republican Party, which arguably otherwise has less in common with republicanism than the Democratic Party. For a telling example of republicanism in the context of peacebuilding, see Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War," International Security 30, no. 4 (2006).
88 This is a central claim of the previously cited Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government; Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism.
Against this background, we see that there may be extensive variation in the conceptions of values evoked in European security policies, and that there will never be a straightforward meaning of the ‘values of a society’ when the significance of threats is analysed. For instance, the analysis of the threat IS posed to European values in 2015 relies on questions like whether European values are actually shared across Europe, whether they are universal and hence warrant an outright refutation of the political claims made by the IS, whether the values rely on economic, military and cultural structures rather than on the will of individuals, and what it therefore takes to secure them.

The relationship between the political positions on the universality and sociality of values introduced in this chapter is illustrated in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Conceptions of values according to universality and sociality](image)

Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, European politics have mainly been characterised by variations along the scale from liberal democracy to social democracy, and between solidarist and pluralist variations of internationalism (e.g. in positions for and against a strong European Union). This scope is marked by the inner circle of the model. It delineates the focus of the analysis of risk assessments in the next chapter.

Before we turn to that analysis, we will now look closer at two examples from ongoing research in the SOURCE project that illustrate the salience and complexity of positions on the moral and social character of values for the understanding of threats. The first example is about the ways in which the
recent ‘refugee crisis’ is conceptualised in Europe. The second is on how European citizens perceive security needs, as compared to the security threats highlighted in the media.

2.4. The ‘refugee crisis’: Securing whom, and how?

Publications of mind-shocking pictures can sometimes represent pivotal moments in the unravelling of human crises. One example of this can be found in the picture of Kim Phuc, a teenage Vietnamese girl, running away from napalm bombing in 1972, in utter pain, burned to the skin, naked. This picture captured the final fall of Saigon, and the eventual failure of American decade-long efforts to keep South Vietnam out of the communist orbit. Another, more recent, example is the photograph of Aylan Kurdi, which was published in early September 2015. Aylan Kurdi was a two years old Syrian child, who had embarked with his family on a boat from Turkey to reach Greek shores. Weather conditions changed abruptly, which happens often in the Mediterranean, causing the boat to capsize and the young Aylan to drown, along with his elder brother and his mother.

When the photograph hit the mainstream media, in early September 2015, it resonated with, rather than ignited a Europe-wide controversy about the fate of the tens of thousands of human beings desperately trying to reach the old continent. The image of the toddler faced down, stranded on the sand, still wearing his clothes but drowned and dead shattered consciousness across the continent. It prompted journalists to write op-eds, activists to demonstrate and politicians to deliver statements. In a word, it widened an already vivid controversy.

The dispute dealt primarily with how to name those human beings who arrive, or tragically fail at arriving, in Europe? Are we to talk about migrants, refugees, asylum seekers or illegals? Also at stake was how to take care of ‘them’? Should we provide assistance and relief? Should we arrest and return them to where they came from? Should we, on the contrary, extend international protection to them? What was the meaning of ‘care’ in these sharply different, even radically contradictory, logics of action? Finally, the question of who should be responsible for them also gained center-stage. Should we continue with the rule according to which the first country of entry is responsible for processing asylum requests? Should we on the contrary suspend this rule, as the conservative German government had attempted to do in late August 2015? The controversy impacted not only the nascent European common asylum system, but also the thirty years old regime of free movement in Europe, as an increasing number of European Member States started re-introducing temporary border controls under art. 2.2. of the Schengen border code.

The refugee/migrants crisis therefore provides a particularly rich terrain where to observe how different actors bring in values when they make claims about security, protection and rights in Europe. In what follows, we start by questioning the issue of values as they relate to societal indifference. Then, we move on to tackle the (in)securitisation practices that are at stake in naming human beings as refugees, migrants or asylum-seekers. Thirdly, we look into these struggles over naming as they occur in two separate instances: the reports of Frontex on the one hand, and Al Jazeera reporting on the other.
Crisis, values and indifference

The current public controversy over the acceleration of arrivals of human beings at the external borders of the EU is usually framed as a ‘crisis’. Crises refer to temporary, exceptional and abnormal situations, which disrupt the usual state of affairs for a certain period of time. Crises start and end, their resolution opening the way for normalization. One may wonder whether the term applies accurately to the current situation however, insofar as people have been drowning in the Mediterranean by the thousands for over two decades now. As a matter of fact, the organization Watchthemed, the network Migreurop and the PICUM platform have documented over 13 000 border-related deaths, most of which are located at sea, in the period 1993-2012. 

Des morts par milliers aux portes de l’Europe

![Map of deaths at European borders](image)


Figure 2: Deaths in thousands at the gates of Europe

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91 [Watchthemed.net](http://watchthemed.net)
92 [Migreurop.org](http://www.migreurop.org)
93 [PICUM.org](http://picum.org/fr)
94 UNITED have documented more than 23 000 deaths since 1993: [United Against Racism](http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/campaigns/refugee-campaign/fortress-europe)
Most of these deaths have gone rather unnoticed. This observation begs a number of questions: why is it that European societies have produced emotions and debate over this issue only now? Why, more specifically, is it that the controversy over these deaths has been contained to such small activist and political circles for such a long time? Why is it, more specifically still, that those vast sections of European societies have, so constantly and for so long, lacked any sort of empathy towards the victims?

Any analysis in terms of values, societal or otherwise, should first come to terms with this striking absence of reaction. Although values do not necessarily mean empathy, it is widely acknowledged that they are unevenly distributed across societies. Not only are values different (societal, economic, political, national, etc.), but some objects and subjects are more valued than others. The temporal lag between the moment when people start drowning in the Mediterranean and the moment when other people start caring about this tells us much about what happens when human lives are not valued at all. Indifference, rather than values, prevails in this case and one must consequently first reflect upon the social conditions of possibility for this indifference.

In a recent article, Tugba Basaran looks into the active politics whereby indifference is created and used as a means to govern security. She observes that distress calls passed by ships of migrants and refugees are increasingly left unanswered by commercial and other boats cruising in the Mediterranean. Such behaviour represents a blatant breach of the most fundamental rule of the law at sea, according to which captains have a legal obligation to provide assistance to other ships when they are in distress. But seafarers are made to look the other way by the threat of prosecution in case they are held responsible for facilitating human trafficking or assisting illegal immigrants. In Basaran’s words ‘Increasingly, the duty to rescue at sea is at risk of becoming limited to an inner circle of human beings, as it is transformed from a question of duty encompassing all human beings into an optional act of charity for some people. Duties are owed to the other person, whereas charity can be weighed against other considerations, such as the seriousness of the situation and questions of convenience or financial results, and is open for individual utilitarian calculations’. Here, we see how the morality of values is embedded in social structures that influence how they are perceived and acted upon in practice.

**{(In)securitisation practices, symbolic struggles and the production of unworthiness**

But how are the lives of the others, of the drowned and the disappeared, being stripped of any value so that ‘we’ do not care for ‘them’? How is this unworthiness produced in the first place? Political sociology and critical approaches to security studies are of particular relevance here, insofar as they inform us about the socio-genesis of human groupings.

Critical approaches to security studies pay particular attention to practices of (in)securitization. Practices of (in)securitization comprise the whole range of human activities whereby a line is drawn between an object of security, that which must be protected, and a threat, that which jeopardizes the object of security. The metaphor of the line-drawing aims to capture a vast array of complex practices.

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Furthermore, the political sociology of Pierre Bourdieu highlights the central role that the symbolic dimension plays in how human groupings emerge and dissolve. The categories of perception and appreciation, including values, that actors use when they construct the world around them, are key in understanding how social groups form. Very different groups will form depending on whether the categories of identification draw from the socio-economic criteria, or from ethno-cultural values. Class-based politics differ quite radically from race-based politics. But these categories of perception and appreciation do not come from nowhere. They are neither natural nor God-given. On the contrary, they are shaped by symbolic and political struggles. Some actors do battles over the legitimate criteria of identification that human beings often unwittingly draw on when they approximate or differentiate amongst their peers.\footnote{Pierre Bourdieu, Propos Sur Le Champ Politique (Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon, 2000); David Swartz, Symbolic Power, Politics, and Intellectuals: The Political Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 79–122.}

Over the past couple of months, how to name the ‘crisis’ has become the object of such a symbolic struggle. Should we talk about a ‘refugee crisis’ or a ‘migrants crisis’? What is at stake over the naming of what ‘this’ is and, more importantly, what ‘they’ are? Two logics stand in tension with one another here. A rights-based logic of inclusion affirms that the human beings who arrive at the external border of the European Union are entitled to international protection. They are the ones to be protected. On the contrary, a security-based logic of exclusion holds that these human beings are merely migrants, if not illegal migrants. They are outsiders who may present a threat to the cohesion of the social fabric of European societies, or even to the security of the State and that of the institutions. They are the ones that the professionals of security should protect Europe from. This symbolic struggle fuels the dynamics of (in)securitization practices, whereby lines are drawn between threats and objects of security.

**Frontex and Al-Jazeera as contrasting illustrations**

We will provide an illustration of these controversies by looking into a number of instances of symbolic struggles over the labelling and characterization of the human beings arriving in Europe. The death of the young Aylan did not so much ignited the migrants/refugee controversy as it resonated with the dispute in such ways as to increase its societal echo and impact. The row over how to name what was happening in Mediterranean had been going on for a while already, when the photograph hit the news. On 20 August 2015, Salah Negm, the director of Al-Jazeera English, decided to stop using the word migrants in favour of the word refugee in reporting deaths in the Mediterranean. According to Barry Malone, the online editor of the same channel:
The umbrella term migrant is no longer fit for purpose when it comes to describing the horror unfolding in the Mediterranean. It has evolved from its dictionary definitions into a tool that dehumanises and distances, a blunt pejorative.

It is not hundreds of people who drown when a boat goes down in the Mediterranean, nor even hundreds of refugees. It is hundreds of migrants. It is not a person – like you, filled with thoughts and history and hopes – who is on the tracks delaying a train. It is a migrant. A nuisance.

It already feels like we are putting a value on the word. Migrant deaths are not worth as much to the media as the deaths of others - which means that their lives are not. Drowning disasters drop further and further down news bulletins. We rarely talk about the dead as individuals anymore. They are numbers.

This position-taking came as a clear-cut criticism of what had been the overall framing of the mainstream media, the national, European and international bureaucrats, as well as politicians so far. Already earlier in the summer the Eurotunnel company faulted delays in the crossing of the channels on ‘migrants’ activity’ – carefully chosen words indeed. David Cameron, the British Minister, had depicted the Calais situation as a ‘swarm of people’ trying to reach Britain.

Al-Jazeera. It prompted a series of clarifications from news media. David Marsh offered the following reasoning in the name of The Guardian:

You will still see the word ‘migrants’ or ‘migration’ in the Guardian as a general expression to cover people who for whatever reason have moved, or are moving, from the country of which they are nationals to another. But ‘refugees’, ‘displaced people’ and ‘asylum seekers’, all of which have clear definitions, are more useful and accurate terms than a catch-all label like ‘migrants’, and we should use them wherever possible.

Politically charged expressions such as ‘economic migrants’, ‘genuine refugees’ or ‘illegal asylum seekers’ should have no part in our coverage. This is a story about humanity. Reporting it should be humane as well as accurate. Sadly, most of what we hear and read about ‘migrants’ is neither.

The controversy was not contained in the columns of journalists and media outlets. The UNHCR took a clear position, recalling the legal distinction between migrants and refugees, the latter being entitled to international protection as provided by the corresponding law-biding international regime. It went on arguing that most of the human beings arriving at the external border of Europe probably qualify as asylum-seekers and, once protection was granted, as refugees. Some other international as well as European organisations continued insisting on the ‘migrants’ terminology. The IOM-funded project

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‘missing migrants’ keeps on refereeing primarily to arrivals as those of migrants, including refugees.101 Maybe the stronger stance in this regard is that of the EU agency for the control of external borders, Frontex. The word ‘refugee’ does not feature once in the second Frontex Risk Analysis Network Quarterly Report 2015, which was published in early July 2015. It remains to be seen whether the position of the agency will shift, even slightly, in the next issue of this series, which is due in early February 2016.102

This short survey has investigated the controversy over the deaths in the Mediterranean and, more generally, at the external border of the European Union as it developed over the past six months. The publication of the picture of Aylan Kurdi has certainly not ignited this dispute, which has been going on for a while longer and especially gathered pace at the end of the month of August 2015. It however dissipated a widely shared and long standing indifference towards the lives of migrants, which are constructed as unworthy of attention, un-valued in a sense, by complex mechanisms of power and governance.

Once it broke free from rather small circles of activists and militants, the controversy spread across different social worlds, including that of the media and also international bureaucracies. A key question here is how to name the human beings who arrive at the external borders of the European Union. The term ‘migrants’ is located within a broader discourse of (in)securitisation, whereby a line is drawn between those who arrive, and the European societies where they arrive. In this discourse, migrants threaten European societies, the cohesion of its social fabric, the sustainability of its economic welfare, the integrity of its political institutions. European societies should therefore be protected from those migrants, who must be kept at bay at all costs, including human costs. The production of indifference as a politics of active forgetting finds its place within this discourse. The term ‘refugee’ however, opens up on an alternative discourse whereby it is those who arrive who must be protected from the hurdles and obstacles that Europe has set up on their dangerous routes towards safety and asylum. Beyond claims of accuracy and precision, it must be clearly understood that the term ‘refugee’ takes on meaning in a broader and inclusive rights-based discourse, whereas the term ‘migrants’ tends to be located within an exclusionary discourse of (in)securitisation.

2.5. Everyday security: What do people really value – and what do they fear?

In this section, the threat responses of public security measures are compared with what citizens say that they value. While the role of values – in the analysis of what security threats are and how adequate measures look like – can be examined on many levels, our focus here will be on the perspective of the European citizens themselves. Based on data from qualitative, semi-structured interviews which have been conducted in the SOURCE project, interviews from 5 countries103 are analysed.104 One of the aims of the interviews was to provide a broad and complex picture of societal security based on everyday experiences of citizens, which is why the topics were kept as general as

103 Austria, Germany, Norway, Slovakia, the Netherlands.
104 SOURCE Work Package 3, D3.4, p. 85.
possible with regard to the typical standard security topics. We also included respondents from lower socio-economic status, as well as a few with mid and high status, and tried also to cover citizens who are often left-out in many similar researches – marginalised people like homeless persons, asylum seekers, (ex-)addicts, sex workers and prisoners.

The analysis examines what kind of social values are of importance for the respondents, how they rank these values and how these are challenged in a setting of (in-)security. While security topics in media and political debates often tend to be on a broader, global scale and involve a certain hype on specific issues, the conception of security for the respondents tends to be on the basis of everyday security. This means that basic topics of security are prevailing amongst the respondents – topics like job security, security of relatives and friends, or mundane problems – primarily with the aim of maintaining a certain status quo or having a certain predictability of life.

As such it can be observed that when asked about ‘what does security mean’, one respondent replied with the following quote:

‘Security for me is to be safe in your daily surroundings, the places to walk. It is really important that the overall conditions are kept in order. Such as the firemen, the police, and the hospitals. It is really important for me to know that those things are up and running and that they are actively doing something to prevent things from happening. It is also important to me that the place I live is safe and that it is a safe place to stay considering fires or other threats. It is crucial that you always take precautions in your life – one’s reasonable sense is the most crucial point. You need to stay awake and keep your eyes open.’ (Respondent NOR.7, Male, 56 years, no permanent job, alcoholic, Norway).

Although most respondents don’t state their concept of security as clearly as above, this perception of security and life in general appears to be a common tendency amongst respondents:

‘I think that security is that if I go to my work in the morning, nothing happened ‘till I got home at night and that everything is still the same.’ (Respondent NL.9, Male, 48 years, cook, Netherlands).

‘I am rarely in situations where I’m lacking security; but if there are a lot of things to do I feel less secure, because I have to accomplish them in a shorter period of time as usual, like e.g. purchases, public authorities, letterings, etc.’ (Respondent AT.22, Female, 46 years, unemployed, trained translator, Austria).

‘The fact that I can go wherever I want to go without feeling I’m in danger. In this sense I feel safe in my environment; I can go from A to B without any problems. Security can mean a certain routine too, going to work in order to earn money and return home.’ (Respondent NL.12, Female, 42 years, facility manager, Netherlands).

This corresponds with what Giddens calls the ontological security – meaning ‘the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action.’\textsuperscript{105} While a stable environment or surrounding provides a feeling

of security, deviations of the continuity can lead to situations of insecurity (as stated by respondent AT.22). Interestingly, ontological security seems to be independent of the socio-economic status of the respondents, but rather a ‘universal’ requirement for security and life. This can also be seen amongst respondents with psychological problems, for whom a certain predictable daily routine is most important for coping with their disabilities:

‘I have a specific routine that I do every day. I feel safer when I have something to do every day. I have to take my medicine at specific hours and make me sleep for a few hours. Then at noon [...] Then I come here [...] Then I go somewhere else [...] That’s how my weekdays look like and I like to be very punctual about it.’ (Respondent NOR.10, Male, around 50 years, schizophrenic, Norway).

Similar assertions can be observed amongst homeless respondents, where a daily routine is also essential for a feeling of security – which is however much more difficult to accomplish due to a home being crucial for a routine. Especially when relating to the ‘four markers’ of ontological security, the importance of housing for security is shown: ‘1) home is a place of constancy in the material and social environment; 2) home is a place in which the day-to-day routines of human existence are performed; 3) home is where people feel in control of their lives because they feel free from the surveillance that characterizes life elsewhere; and, 4) home is a secure base around which identities are constructed.’

It isn’t of much surprise that respondents without a home when asked about their personal future and what it is that gives them a feeling of security, often respond with the necessity of finding a permanent place to stay:

‘In the first place to find an apartment and get a job. That’s then for me security.’ (Respondent AT.23, Male, 52 years, shelterless & unemployed, Austria).

‘After getting evicted I was at the bottom, but I somehow ran into a community worker at the Café Excess [a café frequented by autonomists]. He brought me to a doctor, because I was really sick back then, and to an accommodation for homeless. He then also helped me finding an apartment. He negotiated with the city for the apartment, since as a community worker, he knows the legal situation a lot better than I do. The city agreed and now I have again an apartment. The problem with being homeless is that you have never the possibility to retreat.’ (Respondent DE.6, Male, 55 years, ex-shelterless & unemployed, Germany).

Vice-versa, when asking non-shelterless persons, housing is often considered as an important factor regarding something that is providing support to manage everyday challenges, or as something that makes them feel secure. The quotes above thus show already what is of importance regarding the intrinsic feeling of security amongst a large part of the respondent.

A daily routine and being in control of their lives, paired with a safe place to stay – housing – is evidently an important part of feeling secure for citizens. And thus challenges to the main aspects of ontological security are seen as a threat, and sometimes even as something respondents fear:

'I don’t think too much about my future. But at night in bed I ask myself if I will wake up the next morning. I am afraid of becoming care-dependent, I don’t want to be in a care home. [...] If I can’t go outside, I can kill myself as well.’ (Respondent DE.4, Female, 80 years, retired & widowed, Germany).

Not being fully in control of one’s life is perceived as a great challenge, especially amongst elderly people and when projecting on future situations, and thus also experienced as a situation of insecurity. Similar anxieties can also be observed in other quotes above – having no home is also a situation of not being in charge. In instances where it is obvious that one cannot be in control of the situation, even if it influences the life and the security of people – for example regarding health, crime, or disasters – it is important to be able to trust other institutions handling those situations, as respondent NOR.7 (see first quote p.1) states it.

Another aspect of ontological security can also be associated to personal financial security. Since many facets of life are affected by economic difficulties, financial issues are perceived as a threat and hence related to security:

‘I think security is connected closely with money. Without money, you are afraid of what is going to happen. It makes you insecure. (…) A man without money is like a fish without water.’ (Respondent SK.1, Male, 29 years, technician).

Especially the insecurity related to one’s job is a concern which is mentioned by several respondents when the topic of financial issues emerged:

‘If I lost this work, I would be completely screwed … I wouldn’t have funds to pay for the accommodation. I would lose that.’ (Respondent SK.3, Male, 33 years, street-paper vendor, Slovakia).

The main fear here is losing a steady income which is required for most of the needs in life and is even increased if one is not only responsible for one’s own life but also for others – a spouse, children, or other relatives. Having a job is thus being translated into being financially secure to provide for the many facets related to the economic needs in life. This financial insecurity can also be experienced independently of the socio-economic status of the respondent, as even with a relative stable life and income, those fears are expressed by respondents:

‘Actually I have only few insecurities. Sometimes I think about if I will succeed in providing an economic stable future for my child, in order for him to have the possibility in choosing the life he wants to live’. (Respondent DE.16, Female, mid 40ies, consultant, Germany).

These examples show the connection to ontological security – a lack of money, the possibility of losing the job is experienced as a disruption in the continuity of life, of day-to-day routines and a form of losing control of life amongst the respondents.

Social support in such situations of insecurity is experienced highly differentiated depending on the current life-situation of the respondent. For some, support from family members is highly valued (cf. Respondent AUT.1) while others rely on peers, who are in similar situations (of insecurity) (cf. Respondent NL.3). A distinction is difficult to establish, as the life history and experience of each
individual plays an important role in the social support they chose to rely on. Especially amongst respondents with a lower socio-economic status, or with marginalised respondents, social support can also appear to be absent or is, due to their experiences, not expressed as important as it is for others. They rather rely on themselves being responsible for their security instead of having to count on other people (c.f. Respondent AT.23). Also as the first quote already showed (c.f. Respondent NOR.7), many also rely on support from social welfare systems (c.f. Respondent DE.1) and other state or social institutions in situations of insecurity (c.f. Respondent NOR.17).

‘Friends and family [are important], in order not to go off the rails, to have somebody to talk to [about problems].’ (Respondent AT.1, Female, 23 years, Student, Austria).

‘When I was living on the streets, I got a lot of support from the group ‘We are here’. It initially started as a solidarity group of 20 asylum seekers who were living on the streets. [...] When people are forced onto the streets, they don’t have any place to go. That’s why we grouped together and decided we needed to raise awareness; to show the public that we’re here.’ (Respondent NL.3, Male, 38 years, refugee from Somalia, unemployed, Netherlands).

‘Unfortunately I am the only one who can back me up, because I’m basically alone. Since my parents died I am alone. I have 2-3 friends, but I rather try to cope with it alone.’ (Respondent AT.23, Male, 52 years, homeless, Austria)

‘I am rather concerned. (...) But in the meantime I also think that the social security system in Germany creates some amount of security.’ (Respondent DE.1, Male, mid 30s, researcher, soon to be unemployed).

‘I have gotten a lot of help from this centre where we are sitting now. They help me fill out papers and I can come here and feel safe. [...] I could not have done it without them. The people working at the place where I live are also making me feel safe.’ (Respondent NOR.17, Female, approx. 35 years, sex worker, Norway).

Lastly, apart from the ontological, financial, everyday security, respondents also relate security to the media-hyped threat-based approach of crime and war. Although this topic was not always mentioned primarily, it is perceived as a topic of insecurity, even in cases where respondents haven’t experienced actual situations of threats. The spatial or temporal proximity to certain events of insecurity can reinforce this sense of insecurity. Examples which were mentioned by the respondents were the attack on the Charlie-Hebdo editorial offices in Paris (temporal proximity), the attacks of Anders Breivik in Norway (spatial proximity), or the Ukraine conflict (temporal & spatial proximity mainly observed in Slovakia).

Since many of the interviews were conducted with respondents living in an urban setting, threat-based insecurities are also perceived by respondents as areas in cities that are to be avoided, due to experienced or reported criminal activities or due to a higher amount of migrants:

‘Yes, areas like Tøyen and Grønland. [Areas near the city centre of Oslo, which are known for their multicultural atmosphere but also in the news for criminal actions.] Those areas are filled with Africans who shoot people on the streets. They also stab people to death with knives. I
think it is safe to just stay away from those areas. I have never experienced anything myself, I have just heard other people talking about it.’ (Respondent NOR.4, Male, 18 years, Romanian, was shelterless when he arrived in Norway a few month ago).

Interestingly, especially these situations of insecurity are seldom combined with coping strategies, support seeking or other conflict resolutions, except for avoiding situations or place where insecurity might occur. While in general, the respondents tend to have a good opinion of law enforcement agencies and attribute them a role of safeness, when related to the above mentioned situations, the reliance on the police tends to be lower amongst the respondents – and increases the avoidance of places and situations:

‘I always try to be at places where there are a lot of people. I try to avoid abandoned places or streets. I definitely feel vulnerable when in these places. I was robbed twice in my life. Both times the police stated that I was at the wrong place at the wrong time, thereby trying to make it my mistake.’ (Respondent NL.1, Male, 45 years, Restaurant Manager, Netherlands).

The value of ontological security

As this overview with the interviews of European citizens demonstrates, issues of ontological security are insecurities, ‘anxieties’ and ‘fears’ perceived on the day-to-day level. Although media-hyped security-events have their effect, it appears as if the mundane problems and the struggle for ‘constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action’ is the more important agenda item.\(^{107}\) Whether of being higher on the socio-economic ladder or being marginalised in any way, for many of the respondents routines and control of life are their security issues. And as such support from family, friends, partnership and peers is valued highly, in order to cope with uncertainties and insecurities.

This finding is instructive also in the sense that security policies that prioritise high-profile hazards at the expense of everyday security concerns – concerns of far higher probability but much smaller impact as a one-time event, may be highly problematic. This concern should be reflected in the ways in which threats are analysed and risks assessed. In general, the findings from this survey illustrate the arguments of Luhmann and Bourdieu referred above, regarding how policies referring to values and risks of the citizens may still fail to recognise the values and needs of those worst off, unwittingly reinforcing social hierarchies. In the next chapter, we turn to the landscape of risk assessments in Europe, analysing which threats that are considered important and what underlying positions on values these assessments manifest.

\(^{107}\) Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity.*
3. Values in European Threat Analysis

With their role as securing the values of European citizens, risk assessments and security strategies in Europe indicate which values that are prevalent and how their political implications are perceived. On the other hand, we have also seen how such threat analyses are inherently biased and reflect strategic political agendas – be they perfectly democratic or otherwise. In this final chapter, we provide an overview of threat analyses across the civil and military domains, starting with the threat pictures presented in the security strategies of European countries and the EU. Then, we turn to risk assessments in the field of civil protection, some of which integrate military threats. While comments are made along the way regarding the values involved, the reader is invited to critically apply the conceptual framework from the former chapters in the interpretation of the approaches and results of the assessments.

3.1. Threats to Europe: EU and National security strategies

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, then Yugoslavia, then the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and subsequent attacks in the EU, European countries have rewritten their national security strategies, reorienting them away from the prospect of conventional or nuclear war with Russia, toward the threat posed by non-state actors, failed states and regional conflicts. Whereas prevailing western Cold War national security strategies were predicated on an arms race with an enemy seen to pose an existential threat, we have seen how contemporary national security strategies are premised on the protection of national values, ways-of-life, freedoms, and so forth. For instance, the French White Paper on Defence and National Security from 2013 opens its analysis with the following observation:

> Without wishing to underestimate the potential of certain states for doing harm, or ignoring the risk of a strategic shift, France no longer faces any direct, explicit conventional military threat against its territory. Unlike many other countries, for the first time in its history it has the good fortune to find itself – along with its European partners – in an exceptional climate of peace and stability. It is a member of the European Union, a political entity that has made any prospect of internal conflict quite unthinkable. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, the European continent has ceased to be the epicentre for global strategic confrontation. This is without precedent in the history of our continent: for more than 500 years, Europe has been at the heart of historic global power struggles, either of its own making through its colonial ventures, or which it has suffered during the two world wars and the long Cold War that marked the last century. Nowadays, Europe contributes to collective security by helping to contain regional crises. It does this by defending universal values. It is difficult today to imagine that it might be the source of a major conflict. This is a new situation for Europe and for France in particular.108

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This predominant view is both a tacit acknowledgement that the contemporary threats to national security are no longer of an existential magnitude, and a means of ensuring continuity in the extraordinary powers of security and military forces borne of war and espionage, from domestic intelligence services to alliances like NATO. Freed from their traditional war-fighting role and handed a fluid mandate that includes peace-keeping, humanitarian or ‘liberal’ intervention’, counter-terrorism assistance, failed states and disaster response, defence has come to embody a whole host of national security issues, while national security itself now encompasses a range of security or pseudo security issues that in no way threaten the security of the state, as defined as (the integrity of) an organized political community living under a single system of government. Instead, they defend the security of individuals within and across state borders. This includes man-made risks and hazards such as ‘home grown’ terrorism, cybercrime, nuclear accidents and ‘climate change’, as well as ‘natural disasters’ like earthquakes and floods.

Risk assessment at the member state level is strongly shaped by national security concerns, which can therefore be seen to encompass more and more threats, and broader processes of securitisation, which arise when issues not previously related to the security of the state – e.g. food security, extremism, climate change and health pandemics – are framed as security issues. But in examining the values that have shaped the development of national security strategies and broader risk assessments, two further factors need to be taken into account. The first is the way in which ‘European values’ such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law are positioned as the very raison d’être of national security, which at its most basic manifests itself in the claim that security policies are necessary for nothing less than the defence of ‘our’ way of life. The second is the relationship between national security and defence policies, which were traditionally seen as separate realms – i.e. the security of the state and the defence of the nation – but which since the end of the Cold War have increasingly merged to address the challenges posed by the new ‘multipolar’ world order and nebulous threats from non-state actors. The ‘militarisation’ of security policies might therefore be expected to shape elements of risk assessment and mitigation in much the same way that securitisation affects public policy areas not previously considered matters of national security. To provide a snapshot of how these two issues play out, we will briefly examine the role of values and threats in the formulation of national security strategies in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Hungary and the EU.

A commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law does indeed run through all six of the internal or national security strategies we examined. In Germany, security policy is explicitly driven by the values set forth in its Basic Law, which are seen to comprise the national interest of the country, ‘in particular, to preserve justice, freedom, and democracy for the citizens of our country’.109 Similarly, for the Netherlands, ‘Social and political stability’, which includes ‘respect for core values such as freedom of expression or violations of the rule of law caused by tensions between communities,’ is one of five vital interests (the others are territorial, economic, ecological and physical security).110 Hungary ‘considers such universal and strongly interlinked values as peace, security, the sovereignty

and territorial integrity of states, democracy and the rule of law, human rights – including minority rights – as well as respect for fundamental freedoms as its basic values’, and states that these ‘values and their protection define our security policy interests and objectives’\textsuperscript{111}. In the European Security Strategy, ‘establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights’ is seen as the ‘best means of strengthening the international order’.\textsuperscript{112} In the UK, these values appear secondary to the importance placed on economic prosperity by the UK National Security Strategy, which nevertheless states that its ‘national interest requires us to stand up for the values our country believes in – the rule of law, democracy, free speech, tolerance and human rights’.\textsuperscript{113} Hence, we see a common solidarist valuation of the life and freedoms of all individuals across borders. While overlapping with cosmopolitanism in this respect, the national security strategies are nonetheless solidly internationalist in their primary commitment to defending the sovereignty of the state.

Where the six national security strategies begin to differ, and differ markedly, is in their approaches to conflict resolution and military intervention. In ‘Europe’s strategic cacophony’, Olivier de France and Nick Witney, analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), note that while most EU member states have a national security strategy of some kind, this ‘motley collection of documents’ is mostly ‘incoherent, derivative, devoid of the sense of a common European geostrategic situation, and often long out-of-date’.\textsuperscript{114} While the ECFR’s underlying interest is in the relationship between defence and security policies and in particular the allocation of defence resources, the labels they attach to the different strategic approaches EU member states suggest that the values of those countries also underpin the overall approach to national security, from the ‘grand strategists’ of France and the UK, to the abstentionist Austrians, Irish, Luxembourgers and Maltese (see Figure 3).\textsuperscript{115}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Olivier De France and Nick Witney, "Europe’s Strategic Cacophony," (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). Available at \url{http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR77_SECURITY_BRIEF_AW.pdf}.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 8.
\end{itemize}
Figure 3: ECFR’s typology of European security strategies by comprehensiveness and currency

For the UK, projecting its influence on the world stage is presented as the key to both national security and global stability: ‘The National Security Council has reached a clear conclusion that Britain’s national interest requires us to reject any notion of the shrinkage of our influence. We must be a nation that is able to bring together all the instruments of national power to build a secure and resilient UK and to help shape a stable world’. Conversely, for the Dutch, Germans and Hungarians, the strengthening of international alliances such as NATO, the EU and UN, is prioritised over the national interest. The European Security Strategy is also predicated on the ‘strengthen[ing] of the international order through effective multilateralism’. While the ECFR analysts accuse the EU of ‘strategic myopia’ in not updating the strategy in more than a decade, and warns that the cacophony of national approaches will have ‘far-reaching consequences for European defence capabilities,’ it may also be the case that the status quo is premised on a perceived decline in the threat to Europe of conventional warfare and substantial disagreement about how best to deal with failed states and regional instability (more recent assessments of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine notwithstanding). ‘Old’ Europe’s interest in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, which is central to the German and EU security strategies, has been rendered aspirational at best by the unilateral and multilateral military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, while the idea that the ‘Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe’ appears untenable in the face of growing European government support for Israel over the past decade. Linked to both growing intolerance for minorities in Europe and rampant Islamophobia in particular, it is not only the role of European nations in waging and extending the ‘war on terror’ that is airbrushed from the discourse, but its relationship to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘domestic extremism’. Despite, for example, the UK National Security Services

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having assessed the USA-UK invasion and occupation of Iraq as amplifying the risk of terrorist attacks on UK territory.\(^{117}\)

The lack of critical self-reflection in the national security strategies demonstrates the obvious: that these are declarations aimed at gathering unity and support rather than revealing the actual security strategies of the states in a nuanced manner. This also implies that the solidarist commitment to universal human rights may well be included for strategic reasons rather than reflecting a central dimension of the strategies. The solidarist wordings are nonetheless an indicator of prevalent values amongst the audience of the strategies.

Apparently united in their commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, but divergent in their approaches to conflict management – what role do national values and approaches play in the identification and assessment of threats? Common to all six of the inter/national security strategies we examined are the threats of terrorism, radicalisation and/or extremism, regional instability and/or failed states, organised crime and energy security. In addition, most states recognised the threat of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and/or nuclear) attack, including by terrorist groups, major disaster (natural or industrial), pandemic infectious disease and international conflict. But there were some differences in how these threats are constructed within specific national security strategies. For example, whereas the UK cites the threat of being ‘drawn-in’ to an international military crisis, Germany and the EU are concerned about ‘unresolved’ or ‘frozen’ conflicts destabilising regions. Similarly, whereas Germany, the Netherlands and the EU are concerned about the alienation, integration and vulnerability of marginalised groups, the UK and Hungary are primarily concerned about the extremists who threaten national values or interests.

This is really a debate about whether the threat to national security comes from the root causes of insecurity or its manifestations. In a similar vein, where Germany is concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal international arms trading and the availability and of small arms, the UK is concerned only with the prospect of their misuse. It is also noteworthy that whereas the UK considers a conventional attack by a state on another NATO or EU member to which the UK would have to respond a threat, Hungary’s national security strategy states that ‘the current likelihood of a military attack with conventional weapons against Hungary or its Allies in the foreseeable future is minimal’, while the European Security Strategy suggests that ‘Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable’ – though as noted above these strategies are currently being rewritten in the light of Russia’s involvement in the war in Ukraine. Other notable discrepancies among the security strategies we considered can be seen in the way certain issues and threats are framed, for example concern over terrorism, extremism, irregular migration, climate change and financial security. The way these ‘threats’ are framed is tremendously important in the policy measures proscribed to address vulnerabilities and mitigate risks. This is not just a question of how risks are framed, but the institutional and political setting in which counter-measures are developed and implemented. It is therefore more likely that divergences between the national threat

assessments stem from divergences of strategic interests and political orientation rather than from differences in the access to, and processing of, empirical evidence on the threats.

Most recently – basically since 2015 – this development has taken a new and dramatic direction, as European security agencies have identified Russia, IS and the extensive influx of refugees as threats that require extraordinary security measures. Upon Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, a Cold War logic has returned to European security debates, and after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, war was declared by France and European allies on the IS, activating the EU clause on mutual military assistance for the very first time.118 Furthermore, in response to the ‘refugee crisis’, border controls have been reactivated within the EU and tensions have arisen between members states over their responsibilities towards the refugees. Without abandoning the new citizen-oriented focus of their national and internal security policies, the scope of security is thereby further broadened by both encompassing conventional and unconventional threats and responses.

Symptomatic of this recent development, the European Council in June 2015 called for boosting and uniting the defence capabilities of the member states with reference to a radical shift in the security environment:

*Europe's security environment has changed dramatically. This requires action in three interconnected areas:*

a) *Further to the Commission's "European Agenda on Security" and the Council conclusions of 16 June 2015, work will be taken forward on the renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy; full implementation of the orientations on the fight against terrorism agreed at the February 2015 meeting remains a priority;*

b) *The High Representative will continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016;*

c) *In line with the European Council conclusions of December 2013 and the Council conclusions of 18 May 2015, work will continue on a more effective, visible and result-oriented CSDP, the further development of both civilian and military capabilities, and the strengthening of Europe's defence industry, including SMEs. The European Council recalls the need for:*

  - the Member States to allocate a sufficient level of expenditure for defence and the need to make the most effective use of the resources;
  - the EU budget to ensure appropriate funding for the preparatory action on CSDP-related research, paving the way for a possible future defence research and technology programme;
  - fostering greater and more systematic European defence cooperation to deliver key capabilities, including through EU funds;
  - mobilising EU instruments to help counter hybrid threats;

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- intensifying partnerships, namely with the UN, NATO, OSCE and AU;
- empowering and enabling partners to prevent and manage crises, including through concrete projects of capacity building with a flexible geographic scope.\(^{119}\)

Central to this new threat analysis is the threat of ‘hybrid warfare,’ involving a combination of conventional military tactics with unconventional tactics like cyber attacks and terrorism (see Fig. 4 for an example), and requiring further civil-military cooperation in response.

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Figure 4: Times are changing on the website of the EU Institute for Security Studies

In this situation, defence strategies reframe the civil security sector as an extension of military defence rather than the reverse. Instead of manifesting a demilitarization of security, the securitization of internal affairs has thereby paved the way for a further militarization of internal as well as external security. Both military and civilian agencies like the police get a prevalent role in the analysis and mitigation of threats to the individual citizen and to the social institutions upon which their welfare relies.

With the emergence of a common enemy in Russia and IS, the national and EU (and NATO) security strategies will probably become more harmonised. As during the Cold War, the allusions to universal values will certainly remain as a way of bolstering legitimacy for the defence against the external enemy. However, the emphasis on solidarist conflict management and aid elsewhere could be...

downplayed to the advantage of a more realist pluralist concern with the protection of European nations. The evolving field of global risk management nonetheless connects the two in ways that are already changing the international security landscape and makes the global dimension of risk ever more integrated in national security policies.

3.2. The global governance of risk: frameworks for action

Since the turn of the century, prominent governmental, intergovernmental and international organisations have become increasingly concerned with the governance of the risk posed by natural disasters and made-made hazards (which includes threats such as terrorism). The means devised to address and mitigate those risks have significant implications for how social, environmental and political challenges are addressed. Furthermore, they affect the landscape of regular security policy, creating new constellations between military and civilian, foreign and domestic security concerns of the state.

Disaster risk management is today ‘increasingly mainstreamed across key EU policy areas, including health, environment, climate change adaptation, development, cohesion, agriculture, transport, energy, research and innovation’. The European Civil Protection Forum, organised every two years by the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO), has now met five times since 2007, bringing together ‘the European civil protection community to take stock of common achievements in the disaster risk management field, share best practices and ideas, and discuss ways of addressing new challenges together’. EU member states are now obliged to submit periodic assessments to the European Commission in respect of the natural and man-made hazards and threats they face; the EU is developing an EU risk assessment on the basis of the member states’ concerns and calculations.

At the United Nations level, the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), a 10 year plan to make the world safer from natural hazards, has just drawn to a close. Titled ‘Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters’, the HFA was the first significant international action plan designed to increase resilience and reduce vulnerability to disaster losses. As shown in Figure 4, it was an ambitious plan that called on all UN states to legislate for disaster risk reduction (DRR). The HFA also called on regional bodies to support technical cooperation, capacity development and to undertake and publish sub-regional risk assessments. The stated objective is to protect lives and the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries. In a solidarist fashion, it thereby combines a

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122 The HFA was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in the Resolution A/RES/60/195 following the 2005 World Disaster Reduction Conference. See Website of the United Nation Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, ‘Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)’, available at: [http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa](http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa).
universal (cosmopolitan) valuation of life with a pluralist concern for the values of particular communities and states.

In March 2015 the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 was adopted as a successor to the HFA. For those hoping that the new ‘resilience’ would be developed hand-in-hand with international measures to combat climate change, it is notable that the new agreement is described from the outset as ‘voluntary’, ‘non-binding’ and ‘recognis[ing] that the State has the primary role to reduce disaster risk’. Moreover, whereas ‘Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities’ under the HFA had expressly linked DRR strategies with climate change adaptation (see Fig. 5), the Sendai Framework, which shares broadly the same objectives, refers only to the environment in terms of hazards and risks, assets and measures (see Fig. 6).

SUMMARY of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (Hyogo Framework)

Expected outcome, strategic goals and priorities for action 2005-2015

Expected Outcome
The substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries

Strategic Goals
- The integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning
- Development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities to build resilience to hazards
- The systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency preparedness, response and recovery programmes

Priorities for Action
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction (DRR) is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation
2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning
3. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels

Key Activities
- DRR institutional mechanisms (national platforms), designated responsibilities
- DRR and development policies and planning, sector wise and multi-sector
- Legislation to support DRR
- Decentralisation of responsibilities and resources
- Assessment of human resources and capacities
- Foster political commitment
- Community participation

Cross Cutting Issues
- Multi-hazard approach
- Gender perspective and cultural diversity
- Community and volunteers participation
- Capacity building & technology transfer

Figure 5: Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015
Chart of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030

Scope and purpose
The present framework will apply to the risk of small-scale and large-scale, frequent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters, caused by natural or man-made hazards as well as related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks. It aims to guide the multi-hazard management of disaster risk in development at all levels as well as within and across all sectors.

Expected outcome
The substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.

Goal
Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience.

Targets
- Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower average per 100,000 global mortality between 2020–2030 compared to 2005–2015
- Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower the average global figure per 100,000 between 2020-2030 compared to 2005-2015
- Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030
- Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030
- Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020
- Substantially enhance international cooperation to develop countries through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of this framework by 2030
- Substantially increase the availability and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to people by 2030

Priorities for Action
There is a need for focused action within and across sectors by States at local, national, regional and global levels in the following four priority areas:

- **Priority 1**: Understanding disaster risk
- **Priority 2**: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk
- **Priority 3**: Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience
- **Priority 4**: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to ‘Build Back Better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction

Figure 6: Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030
The new strategy also has ‘targets’ rather than ‘priorities’, and now seeks expressly to ‘Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030’. However, there is no explicit reference to how DRR should be funded. The HFA, in contrast, had called for ‘Financial risk-sharing mechanisms’ and ‘Emergency Funds’. Also gone from the headline document are the ideals of ‘Food security for resilience’, the ‘Protection of critical public facilities’ (emphasis added), ‘social safety-nets’ and ‘Sustainable ecosystems and environmental management’. In thus refining the UN approach to disaster risk reduction in 2015, the international community appears to have oriented itself away from any earlier aspirations regarding climate adaptation, social welfare and sustainable development toward a more orthodox neo-liberal disaster management, with implications for how ‘resilience’ is conceived and pursued.

Notably, as expressed under ‘expected outcome’ in Fig.3, the Sendai Framework adds ‘persons and businesses’ to the subjects whose assets (economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental) are to be protected. This involves a significant counterbalancing of ‘communities and states’ as the primary units to be served by the plan. Furthermore, not only the lives but the health and livelihood of individuals are to be protected through international cooperation. At a discursive level, this involves not only a neo-liberal turn but a turn towards a stronger solidarist orientation. (In the model of Fig.1, it leaves the document in the north-eastern liberal solidarist part of the inner circle.) This is interesting, as the emphasis on resilience could also take the project in a more pluralist direction. As a mode of self-protection, resilience is often identified with the capacity of communities to sustain threats and disasters—as an addition to institutions that manage risks at a governmental and international level.

Yet, resilience is also understood in very different terms, as the capacity of individuals and corporations to sustain risks through market mechanisms. For instance, markets are expected to adapt to climate change by developing ‘green economies’ etc., as a mode of resilience. This is a neo-liberal version of resilience for which state or community borders are of less importance, and which is driven by individual self-interest. Depending on how this self-interest is defined, it does not necessarily conflict with collective values like solidarity or trust. However, according with individualism, it leaves the judgements of how threats are to be mitigated in the hands of individuals and private corporations as well as those of public authorities and social institutions.

Not only do economic and security concerns come together in this framework of global risk management. Also humanitarian relief, development assistance, peacebuilding/conflict management/stabilization, statebuilding and civil protection merges in a peculiar ways when the life, health and livelihood of individuals become a global concern of risk management. Not only has this expanded the scope of civil protection into the humanitarian and development fields (in addition to the military and police spheres discussed above), it has also broadened the relevance of humanitarian, development, peacebuilding and statebuilding actors as risk managers. Over the past decade, all these actors have met under the notoriously vague banner of resilience.

125 There is a non-comital target that aims to ‘Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions’ by 2030.
It appears that the take-up of disaster risk reduction by regional fora such as the EU, as encouraged by the Hyogo Framework for Action has, somewhat paradoxically, contributed to the reframing of some of the core values in the new Sendai Framework. In the EU in particular, risk assessment and mitigation is still closely tied to national sovereignty, particularly where it touches upon issues of national security, which remains almost entirely outside the EU’s competencies. This issue is explored further in Section 3.3.

Indeed, the values and principles that underpin the various intergovernmental and international organisations that have sought to shape the way risk is assessed and addressed are reflected in the approaches they have adopted. In the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) framework, the focus is also on reducing the economic impact of disaster. The OECD estimates the total damage caused by natural and human-induced disasters in OECD and BRIC countries at nearly USD 1.5 trillion over the last decade. Although the OECD does not conduct its own risk assessments, it adds that ‘New vulnerabilities and interconnections seem to amplify the economic impacts,’ with recent events’ providing ‘a stark warning for economic systems that are dependent on global supply chains.’ Here, the values at stake are measured in economic rather than moral terms. Yet, it directly relates to the livelihood of individuals, the viability of corporations and the resources of states.

The World Economic Forum (WEF), which describes itself as the ‘International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation’ and is famed for its annual Davos gatherings, shares the OECDs concern about ‘systemic’, or ‘interconnected global risks’. WEF’s 2014 ‘Global Risks’ report, its ninth such annual assessment, calls for a move away ‘from urgency-driven risk management to more collaborative efforts to strengthen risk resilience [to] benefit global society’. The concern here is that under globalisation, modern societies have become reliant on global supply lines, industrial food production, transnational infrastructure and high-tech communications, exacerbating vulnerability by ensuring that disaster or catastrophe in one place now reverberates far beyond the initial point of contact, producing what are also known as ‘complex emergencies’. Or as the WEF puts it: ‘As international systems of finance, supply chains, health, energy, the Internet and the environment become more complex and interdependent, their level of resilience determines whether they become bulwarks of global stability or amplifiers of cascading shocks’. To tackle these risks, the WEF calls for international cooperation among business, government and civil society. A highly solidarist agenda indeed, promoting global liberal governance as an essential addition to governance by state governments.

values in which such global liberal governance would itself be seen as a threat to the preservation of the values of states and communities.

Values thus appear to affect the entire risk management cycle, from the way risk is assessed, which threats are prioritised, and what should be done to mitigate them. In addition to pressing national governments to address global risks as well as localised threats, international bodies have also sought to shape the risk management process at the national level. In addition to the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism, which is examined in the following section, organisations like the OECD and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) have provided guidance on risk management and risk assessment techniques, calling for transparency, accountability and evidence-based approaches to disaster risk reduction. For example, in 2014, the OECD’s High Level Risk Forum of the Public Governance Committee, established in 2011, adopted a Recommendation on the Governance of Critical Risks in recognition of ‘the escalating damages that occur due to extreme events.’ The Recommendation calls on states to:

i. establish and promote a comprehensive, all-hazards and transboundary approach to country risk governance to serve as the foundation for enhancing national resilience and responsiveness;

ii. build preparedness through foresight analysis, risk assessments and financing frameworks, to better anticipate complex and wide-ranging impacts;

iii. raise awareness of critical risks to mobilise households, businesses and international stakeholders and foster investment in risk prevention and mitigation;

iv. develop adaptive capacity in crisis management by coordinating resources across government, its agencies and broader networks to support timely decision-making, communication and emergency responses;

v. demonstrate transparency and accountability in risk-related decision making by incorporating good governance practices and continuously learning from experience and science.

Similarly, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has provided guidance on risk management and risk assessment techniques designed to help all organisations ‘increase the likelihood of achieving objectives, improve the identification of opportunities and threats and effectively allocate and use resources for risk treatment’.}

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The broad scope of these measures and the expectation to streamline risk management according to a universal standard indicates how effective threat analysis and risk management can be as a ‘Trojan horse’ by which particular value sets may be smuggled into the core of national and global governance. Presumably, the values underpinning the management strategies reflect the predominant values of the societies into which they are brought – especially if subjected to effective democratic control. However, as argued in the previous chapter, if risk management is left to experts, specialised agencies and private consultancies, without making their value judgements explicit and subject to public consideration, their policies may depart from the values of the wider public and suffer from a democratic deficit. Then, there is a significant chance that the policies get co-opted by actors with a self-interest in exploiting the deficit. This could be governments and bureaucrats with an opportunity to form the policies in accordance with their own values, or it could be public agencies or private corporations with an interest in designing the threat and risk analyses in ways that place themselves at the centre of their management.

3.3. Risk assessment under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism

To what extent can the values that underpin international frameworks for disaster risk reduction influence risk assessment and mitigation strategies at the national level, especially if nation states have (re)asserted their ‘primary role’ in the context of UN efforts? What does the EU DRR strategy tell us about the tensions between vested national security interests and international concern for global risks and objective risk assessment? And what is the role of values in this connection?

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism was established in 2001 to foster and organise cooperation among national civil protection authorities across Europe; some non-EU countries also participate. The underlying objective of the Mechanism is to facilitate the provision of coordinated assistance from EU states to victims of natural and man-made disasters. Any country in the world can request help from the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and since its launch the EU has received more than 180 such requests for assistance.

In 2007 the EU adopted further legislation to improve the coordination of civil protection assistance intervention in major emergencies, including natural, technological, radiological or environmental disasters, accidental marine pollution, and terrorist attacks. These provided, inter alia, for the compilation of an EU inventory of competent authorities and contact points, assistance and intervention teams, and specialist resources (including military assets); the establishment of an EU Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), Common Emergency Communication and Information

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136 The Mechanism currently includes all 28 EU Member States in addition to Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Turkey has recently signed the agreements to join the Mechanism.
System (CECIS), training programmes, assessment and coordination teams; and the development of detection and early warning systems. A seven-year funding programme to support the development and implementation of the Mechanism was also adopted.\textsuperscript{139}

In 2010, the European Commission published ‘Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management’ (see Section 1.1 and further below). While continuing to inform risk assessment methodologies, these were formally superseded according to provisions in new legislation on the Civil Protection Mechanism adopted in 2013. This established an Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) to act as an operational hub during disasters, and formalised the pool of voluntary resources upon which it can call into the European Emergency Response Capacity (EERC).\textsuperscript{140} The 2013 Decision also introduced a common approach to disaster prevention and preparedness ‘aimed at achieving a higher level of protection and resilience’ and ‘fostering a culture of prevention, including due consideration of the likely impacts of climate change and the need for appropriate adaptation action’.\textsuperscript{141} This includes a general framework for the sharing of information on risks and risk management capabilities without prejudice to Article 346 TFEU, which guarantees that no Member State should be obliged to supply information, the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security.

According to the decision, ‘risk assessment’ means ‘the overall cross-sectoral process of risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation undertaken at national or appropriate sub-national level’,\textsuperscript{142} while ‘risk management capability’ means ‘the ability of a Member State or its regions to reduce, adapt to or mitigate risks (impacts and likelihood of a disaster), identified in its risk assessments to levels that are acceptable in that Member State’.\textsuperscript{143} Risk management capability is assessed in terms of the technical, financial and administrative capacity to carry out adequate: (a) risk assessments; (b) risk management planning for prevention and preparedness; and (c) risk prevention and preparedness measures.\textsuperscript{144}

The European Commission was mandated to ‘support and promote Member States’ risk assessment and mapping activity through the sharing of good practices, and [to] facilitate access to specific knowledge and expertise on issues of common interest’.\textsuperscript{145} To this end, the Commission was instructed to produce guidelines on the ‘content, methodology and structure’ of the national risk assessments by 22 December 2014, and to ‘facilitate the sharing of good practices in prevention and preparedness planning, including through voluntary peer reviews’.\textsuperscript{146} In turn, the EU Member states are expected to ‘develop and refine their disaster risk management planning’,\textsuperscript{147} and submit a summary of their actual


\textsuperscript{141} Preamble, para. 8, Decision No 1313/2013/EU.

\textsuperscript{142} Article 4.7, Decision No 1313/2013/EU.

\textsuperscript{143} Article 4.8, Decision No 1313/2013/EU.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{145} Article 5.1(b), Decision No 1313/2013/EU.

\textsuperscript{146} Article 5.1(f), Decision No 1313/2013/EU.

\textsuperscript{147} Article 6(b), Decision No 1313/2013/EU.
risk assessments to the Commission by 22 December 2015 and every three years thereafter.\textsuperscript{148} In addition to the tri-annual risk assessments, the Member States are also expected to provide the Commission with an assessment of their ‘risk management capability’.\textsuperscript{149} The first of the national capabilities assessment is due three years after the production of the aforementioned Commission guidelines, and again, every three years thereafter.

The ‘Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management’ that were included in a 2010 Commission Staff Working paper, built on existing EU legislation mandating risk assessment, including the Directives on flood risks,\textsuperscript{150} protection of European Critical Infrastructures,\textsuperscript{151} and on the control of major accident hazards,\textsuperscript{152} and the Water Framework Directive (drought management).\textsuperscript{153} The guidelines were based on a ‘multi-hazard and multi-risk approach’ and covered ‘all natural and man-made disasters both within and outside the EU’, excluding armed conflicts and threat assessments on terrorism and other malicious threats.\textsuperscript{154} The objective of the guidelines was ‘to improve coherence and consistency among the risk assessments undertaken in the Member States at national level in the prevention, preparedness and planning stages and to make these risk assessments more comparable between Member States’.\textsuperscript{155} To this end, the Commission also suggested that:

\textit{Coherent methods for national risk assessments will support a common understanding in the EU of the risks faced by Member States and the EU, and will facilitate co-operation in efforts to prevent and mitigate shared risks, such as cross-border risks. Comparability of risk assessment methods would add value to the individual efforts of Member States and would allow risk assessments to be pooled (shared risk assessments) among regions or Member States facing shared risks. Comparable methodologies would also enable a wider and better appreciation of the impacts of disasters experienced in some but not all Member States. A number of challenges currently impair comparability between countries. These include country-specific assessment and impact criteria, specific terminology and linguistic diversity. There are also variations in the assumptions about the nature of harm and differences in appreciation on the scale of events for which investments into planning, prevention and preparedness are justified.}\textsuperscript{156}

Disaster risk management hereby becomes another field in which the governance of European countries are to be further integrated. With its wide scope, it can be an effective instrument for

\textsuperscript{148} Article 6(a), Decision No 1313/2013/EU.
\textsuperscript{149} Article 6(c), Decision No 1313/2013/EU.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 6-7. European Commission (2010: 6-7).
tapping into political spheres that have so far been largely unaffected by EU standardization. Because it is presumed at EU level that all member states share the same fundamental values, as defined in the EU Charter, such standardization should be unproblematic from a value perspective. However, this argument glosses over the extensive variation in political and cultural orientation across Europe – a variation that makes the call for transparency and democratic accountability in the new European Agenda on Security highly relevant.157

In the above-cited EU guidelines, ‘risk’ is defined as the combination of the consequences of an event/hazard and the associated likelihood/probability of its occurrence, as shown in the following matrix.158

![Figure 7: Example of Risk Matrix](image)

‘Risk identification’ was described as ‘a screening exercise [that] serves as a preliminary step for the subsequent risk analysis stage’, in which the nature and level of risk are determined.160 The guidelines explained that while risk identification ‘should be based as much as possible on quantitative (historical, statistical) data... it is appropriate to extensively use also qualitative methods, such as expert opinions, intelligence information, check-lists, systematic team approaches, inductive reasoning techniques... brainstorming and Delphi methodology (interactive forecasting method relying on a panel of experts)’.161 In effect, it may be presumed that the role of values in the assessments is determined by the values of the involved experts in how they interpret the general objectives of securing life, health and selected assets.

157 See quote in the Introduction of this report.
159 Ibid., 19.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid., 20-21.
Risk identification and analysis may involve the development of scenarios which should ‘be based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about key relationships and driving forces’. On this issue the Commission made the following observations:

Like any other simplification of reality, the definition of a scenario entails subjective assumptions. It is therefore essential that all information leading to the definition of a scenario is made explicit so that they can be reviewed and updated...

As a matter of necessity, scenarios building must be undertaken according to a minimum degree of common understanding. It will otherwise be impossible to compare the information presented by different Member States and may even lead to a distorted overall view. For this purpose, national risk identifications would need to consider at least all significant hazards of a [sic] intensity that would on average occur once or more often in 100 years (i.e. all hazards with a annual probability of 1% or more) and for which the consequences represent significant potential impacts, i.e.: number of affected people greater than 50, economic and environmental costs above € 100 million, and political/social impact considered significant or very serious (level 4)...  

Here, the guidelines address the subjective element of risk assessment, and introduces certain seemingly objective criteria for the evaluation of impact. The subjective element in interpreting these criteria, especially the issue of political/social impact, is also recognised. Instead of seeking to dictate how such assessment should be made, it is recognised that this remains with the authority of the members states: ‘The present EU guidelines on national risk assessments and mapping will not advocate any particular risk criteria, benchmarks or standards, but would encourage transparency in this area including for the purpose of the overview of risk to be prepared by the EU in 2012.’

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162 Ibid., 20.  
163 Ibid., 21.  
164 Ibid.  
165 Ibid., 24.  
166 Ibid., 31.
The ‘Risk Management and Capability Assessment Guidelines’ mandated by the 2013 EU Decision on the civil protection mechanism were published in August 2015. They are comprised of 51 questions divided into three sections: (i) Risk Assessment, (ii) Risk Management Planning, and (iii) Implementation of prevention and preparedness measures. Unlike the 2010 guidelines, the document has nothing at all to say with regard to how to identify risks, save for suggesting ‘that Member States that carry out their national risk assessment process for the first time should concentrate on the most important risk scenarios,’ or how to determine what level of risk is acceptable, though this is deemed to be ‘an implicit element in any capability assessment’. National authorities will thereby decide on which values that are to be prioritised, for instance when assessing whether climate change, terrorism, pandemics, riots or food scarcity are the gravest threats. The questions of the guidelines on risk assessment suggest that they should fit within ‘an overall framework’, that the responsible experts should be ‘adequately informed and trained’, and that ‘relevant stakeholders’ should be involved in the process. Yet, the setup where authorities may refer to EU requirements of risk assessment procedures but fill the procedures with their own interpretations of the mandate poses a challenge of transparency and democratic accountability. It invites a decidedly top-down approach to the management of risks in society – a situation in which democratic oversight demands a clear sense of the ways in which values are invoked and interpreted.

3.4. The first national risk assessments

As part of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism package in 2013, member states agreed to carry out a number of disaster prevention actions, including the sharing of the ‘... assessment of their risk management capability at national or appropriate sub-national level every three years following the finalisation of the relevant guidelines’. As noted above, these guidelines were not adopted until in August 2015, so the deadline for the initial risk assessment is not until 2018. However, by 2014 at least 11 member states had already produced ‘complete or well advanced summaries; by synthesising these with the partial assessments of a further six EU member states plus Norway, and drawing on risk assessments produced by other EU and international bodies, the European Commission was able to produce its first EU level risk assessment in April 2014 (see the following section).

There is a wide variation in the total number of risks identified by the 18 MS that have conducted full or partial NRAs. On average, member states identified 18 separate risks, with the UK managing as many as 80, and the Netherlands 39. At the other end of the scale, four states identified less than five

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168 Ibid., 7.
169 Ibid., 6.
170 Ibid., 19.
172 Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK).
significant risks. While this may well suggest wider vigilance, risk aversion or even paranoia on the part of the British and the Dutch, it also certainly reflects the fact that the UK and the Netherlands have the most developed national risk assessments, as will be shown further below. Obviously there was a wide variation in the types of risks identified, though this too reflects the scope of the documents on which they were based. Among the eight states (CZ, EE, IE, LT, NL, NO, SE UK) that identified ‘very high’ risks, floods, cyber-attacks and pandemics featured most prominently. The aggregate data is discussed further in the following section.

Of the case studies we examined in Section 3.1 (UK, NL, DE, EU, HU, NL, UK), only the UK and the Netherlands have developed the detailed risk matrixes devised by the OECD and adopted by the EU. These allow a ranking of threats according to both potential impact and likelihood of occurring (see Fig. 8 and 9, below). In the case of the UK, it is notable that of numerous threats identified in the national security strategy, only terrorist incidents, cyber-attacks, pandemic disease, social unrest, extreme weather-related events and man-made accidents appear on the matrix. It is also notable that, despite not appearing in the UK’s national security strategy, the UK authorities apparently consider public disorder and disruptive industrial action among the most likely threats to national security to materialise over the next five years. It is not known how these judgments are made because in contrast to the OECD Recommendations on transparency (above), the UK NRA is actually a confidential assessment conducted every year, which draws on expertise from a wide range of departments and agencies of government. The National Risk Register (NRR) is the public version of the assessment.\(^{174}\)

Whereas the UK risk matrix only included a handful of the myriad threats identified in its national security strategy, the Dutch risk assessment is premised on preventing a duplication of efforts by different government agencies, and the possibility of specific risks going unaddressed. ‘Looking beyond threats’ to the degree to which national security is or can be threatened, it assumes that the borders between sub-areas of national security (which have been demarcated between ministries, local governments and other organisations) become blurred. In accordance with the guidance, the risk assessment plots the likelihood that a scenario will occur and with its potential impact, which is seen to have an ‘objective component (e.g. disruption of essential supplies, material damage, number of victims)’ and a ‘subjective component (the psychological effect on the population, and, e.g., the public outrage aroused by an - imminent – event)’.

Figure 9: UK Risk assessment matrices
The inclusion by the Dutch assessment of national security concerns like ‘cyber espionage’ and ‘oil geopolitics’ makes it highly interesting from a value perspective. These are traditionally kept apart from civil protection concerns due to their supposedly exceptional nature of national security – a sphere in which ‘everything is allowed’ in a state of exception. Liberal solidarists and cosmopolitans challenge this status of state security as ‘above the law’ – arguing that the value of the state should always be measured according to its value for individuals. Supposedly, the graveness of all the threats in the Dutch assessment have been analysed with a view to their impact on the individual citizen. It present a picture where threats like cyber conflict (currently a major military concern in many countries), snow storms and severe flu pandemics are evaluated as of similar importance. If these assessments are to be reflected in the priorities of risk management, it has clear political implications for the distribution of resources for purposes like vaccination, rescue services and the military. With the potential reductions to military budgets that this entails, one might expect the military to gain significant interest in the national risk assessment and highlighting the prevalence of military threats like Russia or IS that would justify continuity in the defence budget.

While the Dutch risk matrix has a liberal solidarist profile in reducing state security to individual security, it does still not include threats to non-nationals. This is obviously a function of the mandate

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175 Source: Nationale risicobeoordeling 2012, edited by authors.
of the national risk management authorities, and does not exclude similar efforts at managing risks through foreign policy instruments. Still, a fully solidarist approach would arguably challenge this way of organising risk management, demanding continuity between national and international risk management. According to solidarist internationalism, international collaboration is essential to addressing the security needs of the world, and insisting on addressing domestic security challenges through domestic instruments undermines the investment in such collaboration. As we have seen, both the UN, EU and other international organisations are taking an active role in providing guidelines and support for risk management, but the risks are still primarily to be addressed at the state level. This can be explained pragmatically by the continuous prevalence of the state in world politics. Yet, dividing between national and international risks reinforces this situation. A solidarist alternative would be to include global risks, like civil war or natural disaster in foreign countries, in the matrix and take a stance on their significance versus the risks ‘at home’. In order to harmonise with political priorities, it would then be necessary to attach a lower value to foreigners than nationals, also distinguishing between e.g. Europeans, Africans, and also between countries and groups of citizens within these regions. Such a gradation would be coherent with solidarism because it is recognised that the primary responsibility of states are their own citizens, and that the rights of foreigners are to be addressed through effective international collaboration. Absolutist cosmopolitans, to the contrary, would object to any such differentiation between the values of individuals, entailing a different way of organising world politics than through sovereign states.

The comprehensiveness of the Dutch risk matrix is also interesting regarding the ‘social value’ scale. For instance, it includes issues like ‘food scarcity’ and ‘mild flu pandemic’, but rates them as far less significant than more commercial concerns like ‘mineral scarcity’ although they are already a prevalent concern for the poor and for people with serious health conditions for whom even a mild flu is dangerous. It is also fascinating how ‘left-wing extremism’ is only considered slightly less dangerous than ‘right-wing extremism’, while ‘Muslim extremism’ figures much higher, while beaten by ‘animal rights extremism’. Certainly, the severity of impact of these threats is assessed on the basis of certain scenarios and statistics. Yet, with the prevalence of right-wing extremist attacks on immigrants throughout Europe, and also with events like the bombing and massacre in Norway 22 July 2011, it is remarkable that its impact is only deemed slightly substantial – not ‘serious’ – and less so than for instance ‘concern about Salafism’. Potentially, there is an underlying value judgment involved, where Muslims are considered as outsiders with the wrong values and where immigrants who are particularly vulnerable to attacks by right-wing extremists are valued lower than the rest.

Interestingly, ‘animal right extremism’ is rated even higher than Muslim extremism, however. As a way of illustrating the point of the role of values in this picture, we could imagine a situation where the authorities truly shared the concern of animal rights extremists with the impact of human civilization on animals and bio-diversity. Perhaps they would then sympathise with the need for violent action in the absence of political attention or will – similar to the need for violent action against terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Syria. Would they then rate the impact of animal rights activism as a severe threat? Similarly, in a country with a radically right-wing regime, right-wing extremists ‘fighting for their cause’ would probably not be consider a threat but an asset with a positive impact for societal security.
Regardless of such thought experiments, it is quite odd that the lives and ‘assets’ of animals do not figure explicitly in any of the risk assessments considered in this chapter. It is a clear illustration of how values are at stake. However, it is not evident that these value judgements stem from conscious decisions. They may as well be reflections of institutional arrangements and a division of labour where e.g. animals are considered as belonging to a different ‘sector’ and authority.

3.5. The first EU risk assessment

In April 2014, the European Commission produced its first overview of natural and man-made disaster risks in the EU. As noted above, this was based on 18 member state contributions, 11 of which were described as ‘complete or well-advanced’, with the remaining seven ‘yet to assess their identified risks and produce finalised versions of their NRAs’. Despite the shortfall, the Commission found that sufficient information was available to start identifying ‘the most important disaster risks that a large number of Member States are addressing, focusing in particular on risks with a cross-border dimension’. In addition, ‘information on some natural hazards, collected at a European level for research projects, for other sectoral policies, including climate change adaptation, and for the forecasting tools developed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), can complement the national risk assessments’. This suggests that research and development activities – and the funding priorities that underpin them – is also shaping risk assessment at the European level. This is discussed further in section 2.7.

The Commission suggested that its first European risk assessment should be considered a ‘living document’ and seen as a first step towards a full overview and the beginning of a medium term cooperation process with Member States. In addition to the JRC’s research activities, the information provided to the Commission by the 17 Member States and Norway was ‘supplemented with projects, systems, methodologies and datasets managed by the Commission’, as well as external sources such as the World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report, Interpol, the OECD, and UN agencies. Out of the 18 national contributions considered by the European Commission, a total of 25 hazards, both natural and man-made, including malicious and non-malicious events, were identified. The Commissions observed that the ‘depth of assessment (listing, scenarios, and risk matrix analysis) of each hazard risk varies across the risk assessments and progress reports submitted’, so

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176 European_Commission, "Overview of Natural and Man-Made Disaster Risk in the Eu, Swd 134, 8.4.2014."
177 Ibid., 4.
178 Ibid.
179 This includes data collected through the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination system (GDACS) for earthquakes and tsunamis, the European Flood Awareness System (EFAS), the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) and the European Drought Observatory (EDO), as well as information collected for EU funded research projects on natural hazards and climate change. Additional information comes from other EU policies including Agriculture and Rural Development, Climate, Development, Energy, Enterprise, Environment, Health and Consumers, Home Affairs, Internal Market, Research and Innovation, Integrated Maritime Policy and Transport'.
limited its analysis to the ‘frequency of denomination of each risk’ as a ‘first-step’ toward a ‘picture of the geographical distribution of the main risks across Europe’. Having analysed the frequency of denomination of the hazards (see figure 10, below), the Commission then took the ‘12 most commonly occurring hazards’ as a basis for inclusion and further analysis in the overview. These are (Natural hazards): Floods, Severe weather, Wild/Forest fires, Earthquakes, Pandemics/epidemics, and Livestock epidemics; (Man-made hazards): Industrial accidents, Nuclear/radiological accidents, Transport accidents, Loss of critical infrastructure, Cyber-attacks, Terrorist attacks.182

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard</th>
<th>Frequency of denomination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural hazards</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floods</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Severe weather</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pandemics/epidemics</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Livestock epidemics</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wild/Forest fires</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquakes</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landslides</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Droughts</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Space weather</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcanic eruptions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmful organisms</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tornadoes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Man-made hazards</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial accidents</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear/radiological accidents</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport accidents</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber attacks</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loss of critical infrastructure</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public disorder</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine/coastal pollution</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water/food contamination</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN attacks</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees/unmanaged migration</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment pollution</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis outside the EU</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: Most commonly identified risks by the member states

In addition to the 12 most commonly occurring risks, the European Commission included additional sections on ‘multi-risk disasters’ and ‘emerging disaster risks’. The former was comprised of ‘cascading risks’ (or knock-on effects arising from natural hazards (severe weather events, earthquakes etc), ‘natech risks’ (technological accidents involving the release of hazardous substances, fires and explosions etc. triggered by natural hazards) and technological and man-made risks (e.g. nuclear, chemical and transport accidents caused by terrorist attack). The Commission predicts that the ‘cascade effects’ of risk are likely to increase due to climate change, sea-level rise, more extreme weather conditions and the growth of population density in hazard risk zones’. This is taken up in the section on ‘emerging disaster risk’, which focuses on the impact of climate change and ecosystem

182 Ibid., 6-7.
degradation. This is predicted to increase natural hazards, create new challenges for critical infrastructure protection and lead to greater environmentally-induced migration. However, on the last point, the Commission notes that the ‘evidence currently available would suggest that most movements will happen in an intra-state context or within developing regions, and mainly from rural to urban environments’, adding that ‘new large-scale international population movements to developed regions such as Europe are unlikely’.\(^\text{183}\) In addition to climate change, the ‘emerging risks’ section includes space environmental hazards (space debris, solar storms, near earth objects etc.) and anti-microbial resistance. However, whereas many of the member states had mentioned the included the potential impact of climate change in their risk assessments, these additional emerging risks are based on the EU activities in these areas.

None of the questions in the 2015 EU guidelines on risk management address the causes of risks – except in connection with their mitigation. The result is a EU assessment where the risks are listed without regard to their broader social and political context. There is a deeply conservative element in this approach, as it takes the potential effects of the current state of affairs as problems to be managed within these premises. For instance, the risk posed by refugees/unmanaged migration becomes a fact to be addressed through border management, integration measures and, possibly, aid to their countries of origin in order to reduce the eventual numbers. However, the ways in which the ‘risk’ relates to global economic, cultural and military relations that cannot be are excluded from the picture. Arguably, this is a counterproductive approach to risk management, requiring a more comprehensive approach than the EU mode of threat analysis in disaster risk management.

3.6. The World Economic Forum risk assessment

According to the European Commission, ‘a number’ of the hazards identified by the EU member states ‘are also assessed in Global Risks Landscapes 2014 produced in the World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report’. These ‘converging assessments’ are said to ‘confirm the relevance’ of the EU’s risk assessment. But while it is true that the headline risk addressed in the Commission’s first EU-wide assessment do figure in the WEF’s report (see Fig. 12, below), there are substantial differences between the WEF and EU risk assessments of 2014. These are worth considering, as they provide an alternative way of thinking about the most serious risks the EU faces.

The WEF has produced an annual Global Risks report since 2007. The 2014 report is based on a survey ‘of over 700 leaders and decision-makers from the World Economic Forum’s global multi-stakeholder community’.\(^\text{184}\) It was produced in conjunction with Marsh & McLennan Companies, Swiss Re, Zurich Insurance Group and the universities of Singapore, Oxford and Pennsylvania. Survey respondents were given a list of 31 pre-selected global risks (see Fig. 13, below) and asked to identify and rank the five risks they were most concerned about – this was the first time the WEF had asked respondents to rank the risks in this way. For each of the 31 risks, respondents were also asked to assess how likely, on a scale of one to seven, the risk was to materialize globally within the next 10 years, and what the

\(^{183}\) Ibid., 55.

\(^{184}\) World_Economic_Forum, "Insight Report: Global Risks 2014."
estimated global impact would be if were to materialize, with impact ‘to be interpreted in a broad sense beyond just economic consequences’. Whereas the EU risk assessment identifies six natural hazards (floods, severe weather, wild/forest fires, earthquakes, pandemics/epidemics, and livestock epidemics) and six man-made hazards (industrial accidents, nuclear/radiological accidents, transport accidents, loss of critical infrastructure, cyber-attacks and Terrorist attacks), the WEF’s members were most concerned about social and economic concerns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Global Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fiscal crises in key economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Structurally high unemployment/underemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Water crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Severe income disparity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Greater incidence of extreme weather events (e.g. floods, storms, fires)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Global governance failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Food crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Failure of a major financial mechanism/institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Profound political and social instability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 12: World Economic Forum ‘Global Risks of Highest Concern in 2014’.
In fact, only one of the WEF’s Global Risks of Highest Concern – flooding – appears in the top 12 risks identified by the EU member states. The elite representatives of business, government, NGOs, academia and international organisations represented in the WEF are apparently much more concerned about the consequences of the economic crisis, climate change, growing inequality and
political and social instability. Although the more conventional risks identified by the EU member states do figure prominently in the WEF’s ‘Global Risk Landscape’ of all 31 risks (see Fig 13, over), the WEF’s 2014 report is much more concerned with the interconnections between different risks (the ‘cascading risks’ that are briefly highlighted by the European Commission, above), and the global, systemic nature of many of the drivers of risk. The WEF report calls for international cooperation to address ‘risk in the hyperconnected environment’ posed by cascading shocks, ‘increased carbon emissions and reduced ecological diversity resulting from unsustainable economic growth’, and the ‘oldest form of systemic risk is that arising from viruses and pandemics’. The WEF also notes that:

*Society can also generate its own systemic risks, notably from growing economic inequality and weakening social cohesion within countries, which threaten political stability. Globalization has left some countries behind and has been associated with rising inequality between and within countries. This is augmented by restrictions on migration and a failure of policies at the national and global levels to promote a more inclusive system. Together, these factors render poor people and poor countries vulnerable to systemic risks.*

Indeed whole sections of the report are dedicated to the production of risk by government action and inaction, recognising the potential impact of national security decisions on societal security in a way that only the Dutch and Nordic states have done in Europe.

*The growing complexity of today’s interconnected world reduces the ability to make well-informed decisions, leading to a loss of responsibility. Politicians often do not gather the support required to focus on longer-term strategic concerns. As social cohesion weakens and citizens seek to wrest control from distant and apparently unaccountable institutions, there is more visible support for extremist parties, as well as nationalistic, protectionist and xenophobic behaviour.*

*When ‘foreign’ becomes synonymous with ‘threat’, the case for collective action is made more difficult. Yet it is only through collective action that resilience can be built and the gravest systemic threats mitigated. Social cohesion could, therefore, underpin more effective management of systemic threats – as could a greater understanding of causal connections between actions and events, allowing for the construction of decision-making scenarios in which the consequences of actions may be anticipated.*

Whole sections of the WEF report are also dedicated to ‘Generation Lost?’, the generation coming of age in the 2010s which is most affected by the legacy of the financial crisis and slow economic growth, and ‘Digital Disintegration’, which links the threat of cybercrime to the impact of mass surveillance and the offensive and defensive measures taken by governments to address cyber- and more conventional threats. Suggesting that the ‘main casualty of US spying allegations may not be US relations with Germany or Brazil, but people’s trust in their government’s integrity on online privacy’, the WEF warns that concerns about the offensive cyber capabilities of nation-states and hackers could ultimately restrict the openness, resilience and ultimately the value of cyberspace.

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185 Ibid., 26.
186 Ibid., 27.
The threat analysis of WEF clearly draws on a much more sociological outlook than the disaster oriented outlook of EU civil protection. Instead of treating the ‘man-made threats’ as given facts to be managed – along the lines of a natural disaster – they are regarded as integral to broader social and political processes. With this perspective, the focus of ‘risk management’ should remain with the processes of regular political decision making rather than figuring as a separate sphere of ‘disaster management’. The EU approach does not exclude a broader political approach to the prevention of man-made disasters, but as described in the section on risk in the former chapter, there is a tendency in disaster risk management of treating disasters, including the man-made, as unpredictable and unpreventable – requiring a different approach than long-term prevention (namely resilience based on market adaptation, and on capacities for pre-emption and effective response). Regarding the individual-collective dimension of value conceptions (see Section 2.3), the resilience approach has much in common with the individualist conception of values in treating value formation (e.g. radicalization) not as a social phenomenon but a question of autonomous will formation to be addressed at the individual level.
Figure 14: WEF’s Global Risks Landscapes

Conclusion

The overarching purpose of this report was to explore the construction and role of values in security threat analysis in Europe. Three key questions frame the conclusions.

Q: What do values mean in the context of European politics?

A: Values are defined as those things people perceive as important or valuable in life. They offer a means of distinguishing between aspects of life that are dispensable, e.g. conspicuous consumption, and indispensable, e.g. the satisfaction of basic needs, a sense of safety, etc. In the absence of an all-encompassing religious or political doctrine, values are central to the justification of authority in European politics. In the liberal tradition, values are primarily considered a private matter, with the role of the state perceived as limited to facilitating the autonomous judgment by individuals of what their values are and how these ought to be pursued – with the proviso that these judgments do not restrict the right of others to reach or pursue their own conclusions. This tradition is not therefore value neutral: it is rooted in the assumption that individual autonomy, or liberty, is itself a core value. In practice, this value, associated with human rights, is up against other values in European politics, like the collective values of the nation, the value of state sovereignty (partly as a prerequisite for individual autonomy), the value of humanity – entailing obligations towards foreigners, the value of animals and nature – involving further constraints on individual liberty. Hence, although the idea of ‘individual autonomy’ is often held as sacrosanct (and restrictions associated with other cultures, such as the ‘Asian’ emphasis on community), philosophers like Foucault and Bourdieu have long since shown how this ideal is itself the result of values pertaining to the self-preservation of economic elites and the wider justification of state power.

The way in which values figure in political debates is in part dependent upon basic assumptions about the universality and sociality of values. Central political positions like realism, internationalism, cosmopolitanism, liberalism, republicanism and socialism may be distinguished according to divergent positions on these questions. Rather than reiterating one of these positions – e.g. liberalism or realism – the analysis of values in European politics demonstrate the fluid interaction between universal and relative, and social and individual conceptions of values.

Q: What is the role of values in the construction and analysis of European threats?

A: There is a wide range in emphasis on values and their political implications between civilian and military threat analyses at the national level, and among the EU and international organisations such as the OECD and WEF (World Economic Forum). Whereas national security strategies in Europe refer to international law and the recognition of the sovereignty of foreign countries, and the commitment to human rights and democracy, their approaches to risk and risk assessment differ markedly from the socio-centric approaches of international organisations like OECD and WEF. Unsurprisingly, the EU’s approach represents a compromise or hybrid between the two, which relies on support for the national interests of its member states (again relying on the value of the state as against a
cosmopolitan/universal value of the individual across borders), while promoting universal values of human rights and democracy. Generally, there is a tendency in threat analyses to express a liberal conception of values as relative to individuals, rather than as a social product. This is a presupposition for analyses in which the conflicting sources of individual values within and across European states are recognised, resulting in a more coherent threat analysis that includes the inability of governments and political elites to address these conflicts – which should itself be highlighted as a major threat. The absence of conceptions of justice in threat analyses beyond the general reference to human rights is a symptom of this tendency – a tendency that could both be explained by liberal conviction and pragmatic avoidance.

Q: Against this backdrop, do values contribute to coherent security policies or merely provide a convenient justification for them?

At the level of European policy, the analysis of threats appears to reflect a coherent compromise based upon the valuation of the life and health of all European individuals, the sovereignty of European states working within a framework of collective European security, and a commitment to universal human rights.

These policies are decidedly liberal as far as they refer to the values of individual life and liberty rather than the value of particular individuals who are free to hold specific values – be they national or common European. The liberal orientation of these policies is convenient insofar as it presents a threat landscape that entails continuous collaboration with the more general security strategies elaborated by the member states.

However, in respect to the practices of European security, the threat analyses gloss over the extensive disagreements and conflicts of interests between European citizens. In a sense, they serve as a rallying call that seeks to unite people across divides – downplaying divisive threats (e.g. threats invoking competing value judgements or conflicting perceptions of justice – or, competing institutional interests). Crucially, however, the downplaying of divisions also involves their suppression. Threat analyses are formed in ways that maintain hierarchies of power within and across states, as well as institutional hierarchies – reflecting conflicting systemic logics of self-interest and the reproduction and extension of the prevailing social order.

In this respect, threat analyses are a useful starting point for threat management, but a bad starting point for general policy formation. As emphasised by Luhmann, threats have a crucial role in forming values – values and conceptions of their threats are intrinsically linked, and changes in the threat landscape frequently entail ‘corrections’ to pre-existing value formations as part of the aforementioned consolidation of power.

When European security strategies and threat analyses refer to the protection of values like democracy, human rights or state sovereignty, these claims may be coherent with predominant policies. But they also provide a convenient justification for those policies by presenting them as the opposite to major threats to society. For instance, the management of natural disaster makes the societies that are protected seem inherently valuable (instead of themselves posing an existential
threat to nature), and the management of terrorism reinforces the prevailing ideals of the societies that are protected as the normal, justified state of affairs – while excluding other marginalised or suppressed groups within those societies. In this way, threat management is integral to the preservation of the values representing the status quo rather than a value-neutral response to objective threats. It has a crucial role in defining the values of society by being their radical opposite. In this respect, threat analyses that explicitly refer to values are only coherent if they express the values that the identified threats correspond to, and the justification of a security strategy for the mitigation of threats by values like human rights and democracy is only coherent if the values are the ones that the threats are conflicting with, and that will thereby motivate the response to the threat.

Questions for policy makers:

What exactly are the values that are threatened by an identified security threat?

Is there a democratic mandate for premising security policies on these values?

Would the threat be assessed and managed differently if these democratically determined values are taken as a starting point?

To what extent are the values universal? Are the threat analyses and response strategies coherent with the universality of the values?

To what extent are the values a product of social structures or individual agency? Are the threat analyses and responses coherent with the origins of the values?

To what extent do threat analyses reflect the self-maintenance of the institutions that carry them out?

What would it take to make the methodologies and value basis of politically significant threat analyses subjected to effective democratic control and public debate?
Literature


