



VIRTUAL CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR RESEARCH SUPPORT AND COORDINATION ON SOCIETAL SECURITY

## D4.1 REPORT ON THEORY AND METHODOLOGY FOR MAPPING OF SOCIETAL SECURITY NETWORKS

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## D4.1 Report on theory and methodology for mapping of societal security networks

**Abstract:** This report designs methodological guidelines to map out the professionals and institutions in charge of securing society in Europe. It first takes stock of academic and policy debates on societal security and then exposes a mixed-method research cycle.

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## Introduction

This deliverable assembles a theoretically informed methodology designed to map out the professionals and institutions in charge of societal security in Europe. It starts by surveying the theories and practices of societal security with a view to sketching out a theoretical framework that is commensurate to mapping the actors in charge of securing society in Europe (I). Drawing on the theoretical framework, it then moves on to providing methodological guidelines and principles for the mapping. (II).

Theoretically, societal security has been defined in terms of practices of (in)securitisation referring to any object other than the state. Simply put, the concept has been applied variously to, for example, human population, cultural values, economic wealth, critical infrastructures, scientific potential, etc. The Copenhagen School frames societal security as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Waever 1993, 23). However, as will be argued below, this particular definition can be problematized when placed in the context of security practices and practitioners, and how these iterate the notion of ‘societal security’. What is evident is that the dualism between societal and state security is misconceived in that the very construct is a product primarily of state institutions (Didier Bigo 1998, para. 9)

We present a preliminary analysis of policy-oriented discourses showing that agencies of civil security define societal security as the resilience of society in critical situations, whereas corporate actors reframe it as the acceptance of the devices of security that they develop with the support of DG Enterprise. Most importantly, the apparently most state-centred security institutions such as intelligence services claim to protect other targets than the State, but they do so without resorting to terminology of “societal security”, “societal” or even “society”.

Actors and practices of societal security feature a profound heterogeneity. To account for what the institutions and the professionals of societal security actually do, we need to put them in context. This is why we conclude the first part of the deliverable by introducing the concept of the transnational field of European security professionals (Didier Bigo 2005). What is at stake in this social space is the authority to define and classify threats. Practices of (in)securitisation referring to objects other than the State partake in a wider array of security practices that are produced within this universe. Practices of societal security simultaneously result from and shape the structuration of transnational field of European security professionals.

Understood as a two-way street, the relation between structures and practice eschews determinism. Within this theoretical framework, we can formulate three more specific, and provisional, working hypotheses that we expose as a transition from the first part to the second part of the deliverable:

1. Practices of societal security reflect the **functional expansion** of the transnational field of European security professionals in general, and more specifically of intelligence services that are on the search for a practical regime of justification to vindicate large-scale digital surveillance beyond the sole purpose of guaranteeing national security.
2. The reframing of societal security as **societal acceptance** results from a double structural transformation of the transnational field of European security professionals, i.e. **the**



**increased value of the corporate type of bureaucratic capital** on the one hand, and **of sociotechnical capital** on the other.

3. The reframing of societal security as **societal resilience** is a strategy of distinction deployed by the most dominated **actors** of the transnational field of European security professionals.

Rooting our theoretical framework in a field analytical perspective entails an important methodological consequence that we draw in the second part of the deliverable: mapping out the institutions and professionals of societal security requires constructing the European field of security as thoroughly and systematically as possible.

Two distinct methodological operations come into play in constructing a social space: data generation and data visualisation. For each of this operation, a wide array of social science methods is available. Since, however, methods of data generation perform differently in capturing material and symbolic resources as well as discursive and non-discursive security practices, we start by exposing them in a comparative fashion. Furthermore, we contrast the different styles of reasoning that methods of data visualisation (correspondence analysis and network analysis) elicit.

We then move on to sequencing some of these methods in a research cycle. This research cycle is designed to be recursively implemented over the course of the SOURCE project, with a view to gradually deepen and widen the mapping of the institutions and professionals in charge societal security in Europe. Moreover, it seeks internal synergies with other components of the SOURCE project so as to reinforce the primary network. It also seeks external synergies with other research projects whose objective are convergent with our own, thereby extending the secondary SOURCE network.



## 1. Professions and institutions in charge of the security of society in Europe: a first cut

What do we know about the professions and institutions in charge of societal security in Europe? In the first part of this deliverable, we review the state of the art on societal security. In so doing, we mark out gaps in the existing corpus of knowledge that we think are of particular relevance to SOURCE. In the process, we introduce some hypotheses designed to fill in these gaps. We then wrap up these hypotheses and insert them in a more comprehensive framework in the conclusion of this first development.

We proceed in a two-step approach. Firstly, we go over the discourses of societal security in Europe. Although it is a rather schematic distinction, it seems fruitful, at this preliminary stage of our analysis, to set academic debates apart from policy-oriented discourses. The later is only partially captured by the former. Secondly, we examine the actors of societal security in Europe. We start from the most salient of them, i.e. the doctrinal producers of societal security, before shifting our analytical focus to the professionals of security in general. If we are to account for how the security of society is imagined, practiced, rationalized, carried out, sustained and provided in Europe, it is necessary to analytically embed these actors in the social space to which they partake: the transnational field of European security professionals. It is within this field that societal security is spoken about and acted upon in Europe.

### 1.1. The discourses of societal security in Europe

This development sketches out a preliminary analysis of the discourses dealing with societal security in Europe. To this end, it develops a two-step argument. Firstly, it focuses on the academic debate that has unravelled since the Copenhagen School coined the concept of “societal security” in the early 1990’s. Secondly, it tackles the rapidly developing body of policy-oriented literature on the security of society in Europe.

The development is thus structured so as to uncover a gap in the existing corpus of knowledge on societal security. **Most of the discursive practice occurring under the label of “societal security” is not appropriately captured by the academic concept of “societal security”.**

To make this point, we survey two corpuses of literature: academic and institutional. Whereas the first one will be inspected as systematically as possible, we will explore the second in a more impressionist fashion. It is still unclear how large and complex the record of policy-oriented discourse tackling societal security is. Indeed, most of the institutional discourses depicting a threat to society develop without explicit reference to the terminology of the “societal” or, even, the “society”.

#### 1.1.1 *State of the art: the academic discourses on societal security*

One can fruitfully distinguish three levels at which to engage with the academic discourses on societal security. Firstly, societal security emerged from the field of security studies, where it was distinguished from national security. Secondly, societal security also informs accounts of internal



security cooperation in Europe – albeit rather implicitly. Thirdly, societal security echoes a much larger debate that developed in political theory and sociology, on the relation between the societal and the social. We tackle the first issue, before enlarging our analytical focus to the second and third one.

### *The societal and the national*

In international relations and security studies, **societal security is first and foremost set up in tension with national security**. The concept of societal security emerged in a context of growing dismay with the neo-realist vs neo-liberal debate in security studies. Although it had dominated the discipline of international relations in the 1980s, this debate frustrated efforts to make sense of post-Cold War developments (Buzan and Waever 1997). The little analytical purchase offered by this classical framing of security triggered a movement of broadening and deepening of this concept. As a result, a number of new dimensions of security were laid bare – including the societal dimension (Booth 2005; Bilgin 2003; Saleh 2010).

Scandinavian political scientists in general, and the Copenhagen School in particular, made an important contribution to the conceptual construction of societal security. Ole Waever coined the concept in reference to “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Waever 1993, 23). Societal security is not considered as a mere sector of state security. In this analytical perspective, **society is instead conceptualised as a referent object, an actor and a factor of (in)security**. In other words, society may be secured (referent object), may do the securing (actor) or may pose a threat (factor) (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 119–140). Moreover, contrary to national security approaches, whereby the state wards off the society that it contains within its borders against threats originating from the outside, the concept of societal security accounts for the fact that threats may not only emerge from without, but also from within the societal fabric, understood as a domestic setting (Burgess 2014, 7).

At a deeper ontological level, security is intimately interwoven with society (Waever 2008; Burgess 2012). The ability of any referent object to be threatened depends, in the first place, on the societal values that give some kind of importance and meaning to the object under threat. What is deemed insignificant cannot be threatened, for no one cares for it. This ethical side of societal security is one amongst many other analytical dimensions (social, cultural, economic, etc.) of societal security that have since been brought out. One may wary of such conceptual inflation, which may eventually lead to analytical devaluation. Be that as it may, the concept remains geared towards describing the ability of a society to persist in its basic **material infrastructure as well as in its core immaterial values** (Burgess 2014, 4)

These values compose **the identity of a given society**. The concept of societal security was brought to bear on classical notions and objects in security studies, such as **ethno-territorial** conflicts and **security dilemmas** (Herd and Löfgren 2001; Roe 2002; Roe 2005). But it has been most dynamically and fruitfully put to work in **migration studies**. It has provided a robust theoretical framework to an increasing number of empirical studies that investigate how migrants are constructed as a threat to the cultural identity of host societies in official and political discourses (Doty 1998; Butler 2007;



White 2007; Rudolph 2010; Alexseev 2011; Swarts and Karakatsanis 2012; Raźniak and Winiarczyk-Raźniak 2014).

Scholars have however raised various **criticism regarding the creeping essentialization of identity to which this theoretical framing may eventually lead** (Huysmans 1995; Mcsweeney 1996; Theiler 2003; Williams 1998). Most importantly, as we will see below, this conceptualization of societal security does not quite sufficiently capture the terms in which security professionals in Europe speak about the security of society. But before tackling this point, we need to take a step backward and investigate the relation between the societal and the social in a wider perspective.

### *The societal and the internal*

Although it is not explicitly framed as such, societal security, or at least some of its components, informs a third stream of literature in security studies, one that deals more specifically with internal security in the European Union. The security of society features under various angles in the academic debates spinning around what has become known as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice since the Treaty of Amsterdam. One may more specifically draw out three specific angles.

Firstly, society is brought in under the claim that it constitutes a factor of insecurity. In this neo-functional understanding, the institutionalisation of police and security cooperation under the Third Pillar since the Treaty of Maastricht is understood as a necessary step to check the negative consequences yielded by the integration of European societies in general, and the lifting of controls at internal borders in particular. As Morgan puts it: “Intrinsically, we are talking about areas of policy where a certain negative type of integration of national societies forces those who are on the side of law, order and justice to work more closely together across the frontiers” (Morgan 1994, 18). This perception is only heightened by the prospect of the EU enlargement to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), which are broadly regarded as nexus of societal threats, such as organized crime, systemic corruption or illegal migration. Monar reflects this view when he writes that “serious structural weaknesses in the policing and border control systems, long and in large parts rather permeable land borders, lack of modern equipment and training, a high incidence of corruption in some countries and the CEEC’s exposure to organized crime and migratory flows from the CIS countries have all added to the perception on the EU side that enlargement will be a big and potentially even dangerous challenge in the area of internal security” (Monar 2000, 16).

Secondly, society is conceptualised as the telos of yet another neo-functional argument on EU integration. In providing security to individuals, EU agencies and institutions are supposed to trigger a shift in the loyalty of EU citizens, thereby prompting the emergence of a European political identity. Zaiotti identifies the roots of this discourse in what he calls a Brussels-based culture of border control, whose starting point he locates in the declaration “a People’s Europe” adopted at the European Summit of Fontainebleau in 1984. In capturing traditional assets of State’s sovereignty, such as flags, anthems or, more decisively, border control, European institutions would embody a larger, genuinely European, collective identity (Zaiotti 2011, 69, 89). In this perspective, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice works as the container of a European society-in-the-making.

This analysis, however, reflects quite closely official discourses eager to find new sources of legitimation in concrete EU achievements in the daily life of EU citizens, including the protection of





their personal safety. As Carrera and Guild have pointed out, this argument informs policy developments in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice since, at least, the Tampere Programme (Carrera and Guild 2006).

Other scholars have provided some critical purchase against this neo-functionalist approach, which registers official discourses on security integration in the EU instead of questioning them. Some have recalled that security agencies and institutions do not adapt to dangers emanating from society, but label some societal development as threats and ignore others as benign (D. (1956-) Bigo 1996, 20; Huysmans 2006). Others have questioned the politics of protection that the neo-institutionalist framing of internal security integration in Europe entails. Who exactly does the protecting, in what name, and for what consequences (Huysmans et al. 2006; Didier Bigo 2006)? Others have warned against the pitfalls of scaling up at a higher level the modern political imagination of the international, thereby not only reproducing lines of inclusion and exclusion, but also relapsing into an aporetic dead-end, indeed inescapable (Walker 2010, 1–18). Securing European society does not entail a process of line-drawing between an internal and an external representing two homogeneous and clearly distinct domains. Rather it reflects and enacts the blurring of the internal/external divide, which, as we will see below, is eventually rooted in the de-differentiation of the police and the military (Didier Bigo 2001).

#### *The societal and the social*

Writings on societal security routinely open with an **apparently benign clarification**: “societal security is not the same as social security” (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 120). At first glance, this distinction seems quite straightforward and rather uncontroversial. Whereas societal security refers to collective identification, social security covers individual livelihood. We argue however that **this opposition between the social and the societal carries much deeper implications** for the understanding of societal security in general, and its social conditions of possibility in particular.

Indeed, this opposition echoes a wider debate about how exactly the societal stands in relation to the social. Schematically, the social and the societal are set in tension with one another according to two modalities: either the societal is prior to the social, or the social is a limit to the societal.

The first opposition is rooted in a distinction put forth by Robert Castel. Castel uses the concept of societal as a theoretical background out of which he traces the emergence of the social question through the birth of various institutions. He writes: “there are some non-social societies. Indeed the social should not be understood here as the collection of relationships that distinguish humanity as the species for whom it is fitting to live in society. (...) one will term as “**societal**” **this general feature** of human relations, insofar as it refers to all forms of collective existence. The “**social**,” on the other hand, is a **specific configuration of practices** that is only found in certain human collectivities.” (Castel 2003, 10. Emphasis added)

This distinction finds resonance in the work of Hannah Arendt. Patricia Owens recalls that, for Hannah Arendt, **the social appears in the context of the merging of state politics and capitalist economy**. It refers to the process by which state bureaucracies take upon themselves to provide livelihood for the working class, with a view to mitigate, and thereby perpetuate, the capitalist exploitation of labour. The social therefore results from the scaling-up of household economics to



the level of the public. In Hannah Arendt's analysis, this transformation has the debilitating consequence of perverting the political into a hybrid domain, where labour-related issues become prominent and sidestep the possibility of truly revolutionary action with which citizens ought to engage (Owens 2012a). Patricia Owens goes on to suggest that this rise of the social continues at a transnational level where it is reflected in contemporary security practices such as counterterrorism and human security (Owens 2012b; Owens 2013).

As Patricia Owens is keen to observe, Hannah Arendt's view on the rise of the social echoes and precedes Michel Foucault's analysis on security (Foucault 2004a) and neoliberalism (Foucault 2004b). Indeed, working within this foucauldian framework, Niklas Rose fathoms the **welfare state as a particular form of power working through the social**. "Persons and activities were to be governed through society, that is to say, through acting upon them in relation to a social norm, and constituting their experiences and evaluations in a social form" (N. S. Rose 1996, 39). This form of power, however, produces unexpected consequences, semi-controlled failures and other negative effects calling for further refinements in the arts of government – what Rose dubs "advanced liberalism". **"Whilst welfare sought to govern through society, advanced liberalism asks whether it is possible to govern without governing society, that is to say, to govern through the regulated and accountable choices of autonomous agents"** (N. Rose 1993, 298. Emphasis added)

In **advanced liberal societies**, "(i)ndividuals are to be governed through their **freedom**, but neither as isolated atoms of classical political economy, nor as citizens of society, but as members of heterogeneous communities of allegiance, as "community" emerges as a new way of conceptualizing and administering moral relations amongst people" (N. S. Rose 1996, 41). The moral relations and the processes of collective identification that these communities of allegiance feature **bear resemblance to the identity-based society that the Copenhagen School described**. In other words, the apparently benign distinction that scholars of the Copenhagen School provide **between social and societal security actually roots the concept of societal security in the shift from welfare-driven governmentality towards advanced liberalism**, as it is captured by post-Foucauldian scholars.

Here, the argument reaches a tipping point. Conceptualizing societal security as the cultural facet of advanced liberalism reverses the logical relation between the societal and the social. In this regard, Jonathan Joseph observes that, although international institutions such as the EU, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund actively promote advanced liberalism, it fails at taking roots into non-Western societies. To make sense of this differential deployment of advanced liberalism throughout the international space, Jonathan Joseph calls in a deeper ontology. He writes: "the argument necessarily returns to the issue of the social limits of governmentality. For to explain why governmentality applies to some situations more than others, we have to go beyond the limits of the concept itself and explain what it is that makes governmentality possible in the first place. This necessarily entails a deeper social ontology than many governmentality theorists are prepared to accept" (Joseph 2010, 225; see also Joseph 2012, 22–77). In other words, the social sets the conditions of possibility of advanced liberalism, with which societal security entertains a relation of elective affinity. The reasoning has gone around a full circle.

Beyond the apparently benign clarification that societal security is not social security, we actually find a complex string of arguments and counter-arguments that one needs to lay bare before proceeding



any further in our analysis. **In the sense of “primary sociability”, the societal is prior to the social. As a facet of advanced liberalism, the social is the limit condition of the societal.** In our view, **both of these positions rely on an over-deterministic conceptualization of the social.** If we are to build the mapping of the institutions and professions of societal security in Europe on solid foundations, we need to come to terms with **what we mean by the social** in the first. We will come back to this issue when we introduce our theoretical framework below.

### *1.1.2. Survey of the controversies: policy discourses on societal security*

As we have mentioned in the above, the concept of “societal security” does not only inform academic debates, it also undergirds a more policy-oriented discursive practice. Although some of this literature makes reference to the original conceptualization by scholars of the Copenhagen school (ETTIS 2012), it evokes societal security in a less theoretically-controlled and much more notional fashion.

It therefore developed into very specific directions, which are only partially echoed in the academic debate. More precisely, societal security is redefined according to three lines of argument. The first one builds on the idea of **resilience** that, arguably, was already encapsulated in the academic conceptualization of societal security. The second one, however, is quite new and has so far gone rather unnoticed. It expands the meaning of societal security to a range of concerns more in touch with technological innovation. This expansion is best captured by the notion of societal **acceptance**. Finally, the third one goes one step further in the semantic expansion of the notion of societal security. It builds on the notion of protection and captures the underlying struggles that security agencies wage to broaden the scope of their missions

#### *Societal resilience*

Societal security gradually morphed into societal resilience. This transformation is reflected into a well-entrenched and widely **shared mantra: a “secure society is a resilient society”** (ETTIS 2012, 8). This thematic drift is occurring in close relation to the requisites and needs of **civil security**. Indeed, the “ability of a society to persist in its essential characters” readily echoes the capacity of a society to recover from man-made or natural disasters. Understood as resilience, societal security is also set in tension with civil security, insofar as it expands its focus to critical infrastructures, the protection of individuals and the core values of society (Burgess 2014, 5; Bailes 2008, 11). At a deeper level, societal resilience is grounded in an epistemic regime of surprise and novelty. It is the adequate response that society adopts in a world where surprising events with potentially devastating consequences are already incorporated as an irreducible component of reality – one that no one can know in advance. In a nutshell: resilience demands to continuously expect the unexpected (Aradau and Van Munster 2012; Aradau 2014).

This reframing is particularly well reflected in the **doctrinal work produced by Scandinavian agencies in charge of emergency situation and civil defence**. The Nordfosk, an organisation placed under the authority of the Nordic Council of Ministers, redefines societal security as “the ability of a society to sustain vital societal functions and secure its population’s life, health, needs and basic values under extraordinary stresses, known as crises” (*Societal Security in the Nordic Countries* 2012, 7,15). The



Sweden Agency for Civil Contingencies concurs in linking societal security to “society’s ability to deal with accidents and emergencies” (*Five Challenging Future Scenarios for Societal Security* 2013, 7)

Resilience, in this context, refers to “the capability of a social system (e.g. an organisation, city or society) to proactively adapt to and recover from both expected and unexpected disturbances” (*Societal Security in the Nordic Countries* 2012, 8).

Importantly, resilience is “set in a human, socio-technical, societal, organisational, political and transnational context” (*Societal Security in the Nordic Countries* 2012, 8,19). Reminiscent of the broadening movement out of which the academic concept of “societal security” was born in the first place, this move is also reflected in the report published by the Sweden Agency for Civil Contingencies. As a matter of fact, this document builds different futures into scenarios and then analyses how each case would affect the societal security of Sweden. Interestingly, **these narratives combine a wide range of factors, including demographic (ageing population), economic (high unemployment), ecologic (climate change), political (terrorism) and biological (bacteriological pandemic) trends.**

#### *Societal acceptance*

**Other practitioners have steered societal security towards yet another, and quite unexpected, direction; that of societal acceptance.** Contrary to resilience, acceptance bears little relation with the academic concept of societal security. **Instead, it is rooted in a discourse of marketization of ground breaking technologies.** To secure societal acceptance, it is necessary to **tame the unease that “advanced” technological solutions may raise amongst potential consumers.** It is also required to overcome the resistance that some actors may oppose to the diffusion of these solutions across society. Although societal acceptance must be secured for any kind of advanced technology (such as nanotechnology, cf. European Commission 2009b), the European Commission recognizes that this requirement raises particular issues when it comes to security technologies. It does so in the package it tabled in 2012 on the Security industrial Policy of the EU:

The societal acceptance of new products and technologies is a general challenge across different industrial sectors. There are, however, a number of specificities that distinguish security technologies from other areas. **Security technologies might directly or indirectly concern fundamental rights**, such as the rights for **respect for private and family life, protection of personal data, privacy or human dignity.** (European Commission 2012a, 5; see also European Commission 2012b, 26–27. Emphasis added)

As a matter of fact, EC-funded research in security is strongly inclined towards technologically driven solutions (Didier Bigo et al. 2008; Didier Bigo and Jeandesboz 2008; Jeandesboz and Ragazzi 2010; Burgess 2012; Burgess 2014). In this context, the imperative of societal acceptance is brought in under the claim that societal and technological aspects of security research must be more closely connected with one another. As a matter of fact, the DG Enterprise of the European Commission goes on to argue that **“(a) better integration of the societal dimension into security industry activities would help in reducing the uncertainty of societal acceptance”** (European Commission 2012a, 11. Emphasis added).



Such an **integration of the technological and the societal is deemed necessary to successfully secure societal acceptance**. Compared to the US, Europe supposedly displays low levels of societal acceptance for security technologies, such as devices for biometric identification (ECORYS 2009, 19, 68). Uncertainty regarding societal acceptance is framed both as a **threat to security** and as an **obstacle to the development of a European market of security technologies**, as the following excerpts illustrate

The problems associated to the societal acceptance of security technologies result in a number of negative consequences. For industry it means the risk of investing in **technologies which are then not accepted** by the public, leading to wasted investment. For the demand side it means being forced to purchase a less controversial product which however does not entirely fulfil the security requirements. (European Commission 2012a, 5. Emphasis added)

The main problems of the EU security industry are the highly fragmented nature of the EU security markets, the difficulty in closing the gap between research and market and the **uncertainty of societal acceptance for security technologies**. (European Commission 2012b, 18. Emphasis added)

In light of these constraints, “potential societal acceptance”, i.e. “the fact that proper market diffusion of security systems is possible only if society at large is prepared to accept them” (ECORYS 2009, 41) ought to be internalised as early as possible in the process of research and development of security technologies. The European Commission therefore proposes that “(a)lso at the level of the **pre-commercial development of products the societal dimension would be introduced**” (European Commission 2012b, 41. Emphasis added). In the work programmes of the security scheme of the 7th Framework Programme for 2013, the European Commission repeatedly asks that societal acceptance of security technologies be “tested” as early as possible in the implementation of the projects.

What surfaces from the series of quotes<sup>1</sup> that we have offered is that the **societal dimension of security is re-framed as the imperative to impose acceptance of technologies of security that may be perceived as highly intrusive by European citizens**. This particular problematisation of societal security bears little resemblance with the “society-identity-migration” nexus that dominates the academic debate. Relatedly, **the definitional work that has displaced the meaning of societal security along this axis has gone relatively unnoticed** (for an exception, see Jeandesboz and Ragazzi 2010, 29; Didier Bigo et al. 2014, 31).

It is therefore not surprising that practitioners react to this drift in **widely different manners**. Some try to resist this trend by reclaiming the concept of societal security in reaffirming the importance of society-based security research over technology-driven security research (Burgess 2014). Others, however, sharply oppose societal security to individual privacy and advocate the need to strike a

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<sup>1</sup> In the preliminary analysis, we cannot lay bare the many nuances that one finds in actors’ narratives, and which result from struggles between central and dominant actors. In a later stage of the project, we will however try to render this heterogeneity by bringing out controversies.



balance between the two (Cadzow; Liu, Ryan, and Chen) – thus relapsing into a metaphor whose flaws are now well documented (Martin-Mazé 2013b, 11–16).

### *Societal protection*

Before concluding this preliminary analysis of policy-oriented controversies dealing with societal security, a methodological caveat ought to be introduced. At this stage of the research, we have only surveyed these controversies in a rather impressionist fashion, for a systematic review is yet to be carried out. For this same reason, we have focused on policy-oriented documents where the terms “societal” is explicitly used. However, in doing so, we also run the risk of becoming trapped in terminologies. On the contrary, if we retain from the concept of societal security the central idea that not only the state, but also the fabric of society can be an object of security, a wider range of sources opens up that are absolutely relevant for the present research.

Consider for instance the following quotes, where **high-ranking officials of intelligence services in Europe characterize the mission** that they fulfil in the context of parliamentary hearings.

The work we do is addressing directly threats to this country, **to our way of life, to this country and to people who live here.** (Intelligence And Security Committee of Parliament 2013, 2. Emphasis added)

(...) they (the service men and women of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ) believe in protecting the values of this nation and defending us against the threats that we face. (Intelligence And Security Committee of Parliament 2013, 24)

Even though the priority goes to the fight against terrorism, where the situation is particularly stringent with regards to the number of French citizens leaving for Syria, the DCRI (Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieure) also struggles against espionage, radical armed movements seeking to undermine the Republican form of our institutions, proliferation and cyber-attacks. It does its best to protect our **economic, technological and scientific assets.** (Urvoas 2013, 3. Our translation. Emphasis added)

These quotes testify to the fact that, although the formal terminology of “societal security” does not appear, the **mission of these intelligence services are in fact formulated not solely in relation to State security, but also with regards to the values of society, to its political institutions or to its economic potential.** Such a move is also reflected in the development of military doctrines (Didier Bigo, Tsoukala, and Hanon 1999). Peace-keeping operations and counter-insurgency have re-actualised an array of military know-how that was shaped in the context of colonial conquest, pacification and independence war and which focused not solely on waging destructive power but also on securing the loyalty of the society (Olsson 2012). Population-centric warfare, as it is called, has indeed some degree of affinity with the concept of societal security inasmuch as it not only States that are targets and subjects of warfare, but also individuals and societies (Jabri 2006).

To put it in a nutshell, some policy-oriented discourses unwittingly refer to some features of societal security in defining the missions of intelligence services. Therefore, instead of focusing solely on the



terminology of societal security, a systematic survey of controversies dealing with the security of society must also take into account these implicit discourses. We will come back to this point in the second part of this deliverable.

## 1.2. The actors of Societal Security in Europe

Be that as it may, **the gap between the academic and policy-oriented discourses suggests that the conditions of production for societal security have undergone a discrete but dramatic metamorphosis in Europe.** Bearing this idea in mind, we shift the focus of this preliminary analysis on the **producers of societal security. Who are the actors who speak of and act about the security of society in Europe?**

To provide elements of answers to this question, we develop once again a two-pronged argument. We start by shedding light more precisely on the producers of the policy-oriented literature that we have analysed in the above. Then, we introduce the concept of the transnational field of European security professionals. Our driving assumption is that to properly understand what actors do and say about the security of society, we ought to put them in the context of this broader social space. Societal security is indeed one of the discourses defining what threatens European societies - a stakes around which the transnational field of European security professionals revolves. Additionally, this concept will usefully broaden the focus of the inquiry so as to encompass actors who speak of and act on societal security without producing the type of salient policy-oriented doctrines that we have analysed in the above, **but who still engage in meaningful and important practices regarding the security of society** (such as the intelligence services that we have briefly picked out in 1.1.2.3).

The structure of this development therefore reflects another one of our core-working hypothesis: **the transformation of the debates around societal security in Europe is rooted in the structural transformation of the transnational field of European security professionals.**

### 1.2.1. *The doctrinal producers of societal security*

Here, we focus on the producers of the policy-oriented literature that we have surveyed in the above, albeit in a rather impressionist fashion. Broadly speaking, it may be fruitful to distinguish two sources of doctrinal work on societal security – pending a full and systematic survey that is beyond the scope of this deliverable. On the one hand, we find a **loose alliance of research centres and agencies that are in charge of civil security.** This group of actors are mainly based in **Scandinavian Europe.** On the other hand, we witness an **emerging public-private complex, which has developed through EC-funded security research** over the past decade.

#### *Nordic research in societal security*

Scandinavian Europe enjoys a long-tradition of civil defence, which has deposited in the state agencies that are in charge of these issues. In relation with think tanks and research centres, this group of actors have contributed to **shift the meaning of societal security from the identity of society in a context of migration to the resilience of the society in the context of crisis.** Policy-oriented research has been the main vehicle of this definitional work. Analysing the participants and



donors to these programmes can therefore provide some insight into who these particular actors of societal security are.

From 2006 to 2011, the Research Council of Norway has implemented a research programme entirely devoted to societal security. Christened SAMRISK I, this Research Programme on Societal Security and Risk received 45 millions NOK (5,436 millions EUR) from the Ministry of justice, the Ministry of transport and Communication, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and the Fund for Research and innovation (Bing and Castenfors 2011). It was renewed under the name SAMRISK II for the period 2013-2018 with a budget of 100 millions NOK (12,08 millions EUR) (*Work Programme 2013-2018. Research Programme on Societal Security and Safety – SAMRISK II 2013*).

Under the Finnish Ministry of Research and Education, a national research strategy dealing with security was adopted in 2009. An entire component of this strategy focuses on the **security of society** (*National Security Research Strategy 2009*, 23). More precisely, the strategy was adopted by a Sub-committee chaired by the Ministry of Research and Education on the one hand, and the Ministry of the Economy on the other, but to which representatives from the following institutions participated: the Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Environment. Most importantly, the strategy was drafted by a joint task forced under the authority of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior (*National Security Research Strategy 2009*, 5).

In this context, the case of the **Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency** stands out to some extent. As a matter of fact, **this agency has developed autonomous capacities to define and fund research in the field of societal security**. It has recently adopted a Research Strategy for the period 2014-2018 (*Research for a Safer Society - New Knowledge for Future Challenges MSB's Research Strategy 2014*).

These different programmes testify that **civil security agencies of Scandinavian countries make up a dynamic environment where societal security can thrive**. Moreover, what is true at the national level is also true at the regional one. In 2009, Ministers in charge of societal security of Nordic Council adopted the Haga Declaration, calling for more research in the field of societal security. This call translated into a Nordic Research Programme for Societal Security which is administered by Nordforsk and whose output ought to be the foundation of a Centre of Excellence in societal security (*Nordic Societal Security Programme - Factsheet 2013*).

#### *EU research in societal security*

The documents produced by Scandinavian actors of societal security mention EU research in societal security. They are often closely articulated with it. Indeed, the European Commission has increasingly developed research capacities in the field of security over the past decade.

In the late 1990s, the European Commission developed the policy concept of a pilot programme in the field of security research. This concept emerged in the context of stalled integration of the internal market for defence procurements. In the institutional layout prevailing at the time, the Commission was prohibited from taking any action in the field of defence, which remained strongly





under the supervision of EU Member States. By framing security research as an internal issue, the Commission was therefore able to circumvent this obstacle. This helps understand why the Preparatory Action in Security Research was initiated in early 2004 for a period of two years (European Commission 2004). It was designed to fund small projects to be completed in this tight timeframe (30 projects) and also activities to address market conditions (9 projects). Next to the PASR, the European Commission also funded over 170 projects in security research through the 6<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme for the period of 2002-2006 (Didier Bigo and Jeandesboz 2008). Research in security continued under the auspices of the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework programme, for the period 2007-2013. This framework programme makes provision for a specific security scheme, under which 260 projects were funded (Jeandesboz and Ragazzi 2010; Didier Bigo et al. 2014). Finally, Horizon 2020 is the next framework programme for the period 2014-2020. It started lately and comprises a specific scheme dedicated to research for the security of society (European Commission 2013).

Interestingly, these initiatives were shaped, in form and content, through a high-level dialogue that the DG Enterprise of the European Commission steadily sought to develop with large security companies in Europe. To this end, it convened a series of forum: the Group Personalities on Security Research in 2003-2004 (Group of Personalities 2004), the European Research Advisory Board in 2005-2006 (European Commission 2006) and the European Security Research and Innovation Forum for the period 2007-2008 (ESRIF 2009). These different forum display strong continuity as far as composition and thematic focus is concerned. It was placed under the leadership of DG Enterprise, which was entrusted with overseeing the development of this kind of research – a surprising move indeed, given that managing EC-funded research usually falls within the remit of DG Research. These forums were composed mainly of representatives of large European security and defence firms. They played an instrumental role in reformulating societal issues in relation to the problem of societal acceptance and reassurance (Jeandesboz and Ragazzi 2010; Didier Bigo et al. 2014).

Most importantly, their recommendations readily percolated into the official documentations of the European Commission. This was particularly well reflected into the Commission's comments on ESRIF's final report, which it uncritically endorsed (European Commission 2009c). This position informs the package on Industrial Security Policy tabled by the European Commission in 2012, and that we have commented in the above. Through this high-level private-public dialogue, large security and defence firms have, by proxy of smaller firms created for this purpose, contributed to reframing societal security as societal acceptance.

### *1.2.2. The practitioners of societal security*

Societal security does not solely regard researchers, whether in social science and humanities or in science and technique studies. It also, and increasingly, raises interests amongst the professionals and institutions of security. This rising awareness is reflected in the instrumental role that Scandinavian agencies in charge of civil security played in reframing societal security as resilience capabilities of society. This is only partially reflected though. Indeed, Scandinavian agencies in charge of civil security are only one amongst many other players to engage with the security of society in Europe, and with the security of Europe in general. Although they have not necessarily resorted to the terminology of "societal security", as we underlined in 1.1.2.3, other actors and institutions have been active in this matter, including at EU-level



In this development, we start by pinpointing the increased **linkage between EU agencies of internal security on the one hand, and research in societal security on the other**. Then, we move on to introduce the concept of a transnational field of European security professionals. This concept captures adequately the broader social conditions under which societal security is uttered and acted upon in Europe.

#### *Security professionals and societal security research in Europe*

Professionals of security have manifested an increasingly keen interest in the design and implementation of EC-funded research in the security of society. The creation of the **European Network for Law Enforcement Technology Services (ENLETS)** under the French Presidency in 2008 can be regarded as an early manifestation of this interest. As an informal working group, ENLETS first gathered representatives from the technical departments of security agencies of the EU member States. It then gradually developed into a more structured forum, revolving around a core group comprising representatives from Belgium, Greece, France, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland and the United Kingdom. In September 2012, this group suggested to develop the vision of ENLETS as “the leading European platform that strengthens law enforcement cooperation and bridges the gap between users and providers of law enforcement technology” (Council of the European Union 2012a, 2).

This move corresponded to criticism voiced by the Council of Justice and Home Affairs as to the lack of involvement of internal security agencies in the EC-funded security research programmes. In November 2012, it was clear for the JHA Council that “authorities dealing with internal security should play a role in this matter. The right involvement of these authorities will benefit the EU's Security Industrial Policy but also be of direct interest to the authorities and their users in their tasks” (Council of the European Union 2012b, 2) Furthermore, the JHA Council was also fairly critical of the poor results that ENLETS had achieved in this regard. It therefore called for the creation of a unit with **Europol**, tasked with fulfilling an “(internal) security technology foresight function” (Council of the European Union 2012b, 2).

By July 2013, however, the line had slightly changed. The JHA Council adopted conclusions on strengthening the internal security authorities' involvement in security-related research and industrial policy where it re-iterated “the importance of using modern and adequate technologies in the field of internal security which necessitates an increased involvement of internal security authorities in research and a proactive involvement with suppliers of modern security technologies” (Council of the European Union 2013, 1). But this time, it drew a different conclusion in calling for the creation of “a security technology watch function within the ENLETS framework in order to ensure a better and effective involvement of the end users of the internal security authorities in the EU's security-related research and industrial policy” (Council of the European Union 2013, 3). With this enlarged mandate, it befalls to ENLETS to define, provide and disseminate technical standards, report to the Permanent Comity on Internal Security (COSI), cooperate and liaise with Member States security institutions, CEPOL, FRONTEX, EUROPOL and the IT agencies (ENISA and EU-LISA) as well as explore funding opportunities under Joint Framework Programmes and the Internal Security Fund.



The endorsement of ENLETS by the JHA Council thus expanded its mandate, turning it into a vehicle dedicated to the steering of societal security research by internal security agencies, whereas this research agenda had so far mainly been framed by the interest and views of private security firms allied to the DG enterprise of the European Commission. Needless to say, this move is contested and largely uncompleted. It is however reflected in the increased involvement of ENLETS’s core group in designing of the current programmes of research dealing with societal security in Europe. More precisely, the chair of the ENLETS core group was elected as chair of the Horizon 2020 Secure Societies Advisory Group (Statewatch 2014). This group is a sub-formation of the broader Security Advisory Group, which is tasked with providing DG Enterprise with relevant expertise in the decision-making process related to the implementation of the FP7 projects (European Commission 2009a).




Table 1: Graph of the legal bases of EU security agencies (adapted from Bigo et al. 2007, 15)

Interestingly, the minutes of these forum record different attempts made at improving the position of EU security agencies within security research. We find for instance the claim that only “response organizations” are able identify problems and solution in the name of society – a move that may effectively silence societal actors that are not security institutions such as NGOs. Furthermore, if trust must be fostered, it is the one that EU security agencies place in security research – as opposed to that of EU citizens in security technologies. Finally, social science might be called in, but for the sole purpose of providing security solutions or enhancing societal acceptance (DG ENTR 2014).

*The transnational field of European security professionals*

A cursory look at how societal security is acted upon and spoken about in Europe suggests how contentious this issue has become. In the first analysis, it pits proponents of society-driven research against supporters of technology-driven research and development. It opposes Scandinavia-based national institutions in charge of civil security to a EU-based public-private network geared towards the unification of an internal security market. It sets corporate interest in developing profitable products with the support of public subsidies in tension against security agencies’ motivations in accessing affordable technologies tailored to their needs.




Table 2: The position of EU agencies in the process of Europeanization (adapted from Bigo et al. 2007, 22)

What surfaces from these controversies is the issue of who has the authority to define what constitutes a threat to society in Europe, and what counter-measures ought to be implemented in order to mitigate, control, thwart, deflect, suppress, anticipate or prevent these threats. Beyond or, rather, underneath the controversies that we have surveyed in the above, these various actors tacitly agree that the very practice of defining threats and managing unease are worth disagreeing upon or even fighting for. We touch here upon one of the distinctive feature of what has been identified as the transnational field of European security professionals; **the struggle over threat construction. The core theoretical assumption that drives this research is that the security of society is one of the practices that is produced within this transnational social space, and which structures it in return.**

The concept of “field” is drawn from the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. In its most generic sense, it denotes a structured arena of conflict, where distinctive products, whether material or symbolic, are manufactured, consumed, exchanged, defined, transformed, accumulated, etc. (Bourdieu 1971; Bourdieu 2013; Bourdieu 1992; Bourdieu 1992; for a general introduction, see Swartz 1997, 117–142; Swartz 2013, 47–78; for a critical appraisal, see Lahire 2001; Lahire 2012, 143–223). In this specific case, the transnational field of European security professionals revolves around the production and allocation of security. But security can only be guaranteed with regards to a threat that must be constructed and classified in the first place. Practices of threats construction and classification therefore constitute a central feature of the transnational field of European security professionals (Didier Bigo 2005, 70; Didier Bigo et al. 2007, 30–31; Didier Bigo and Tsoukala 2008, 12).

Controversies about the security of society that we have briefly surveyed in the above ought to be analytically casted in a much larger set of struggles concerning security in general (Didier Bigo 2005, 68–69). Indeed, the transnational field of European security professionals harbours a series of



confrontations. Those who resort to traditional methods of policing aimed at investigating past events struggle against those who are more interested in anticipating future events and preventing them from occurring. Other cleavages pit individual security *versus* individual protection, human intelligence *versus* large-scale digital surveillance, or the blurring of the internal/external divide *versus* its re-affirmation (Didier Bigo et al. 2007, 31–32). What constitutes the unity of this field is neither ideological consensus nor a function that the field would provide to a bigger whole (here, providing security to society), but rather the integrative effect of these struggles.

Field struggles feature **not only a discursive side (definitional struggles, for instance) but also a powerful material dimension**. Actors try to accumulate resources that are only valued within the field to which they partake. **These context-dependent resources correspond to what Bourdieu calls capitals** (Bourdieu 1980a, 209; Bourdieu 1979, 127). In the case of the transnational field of European security professionals, research has shown that **control over information** represents a particularly structuring capital. This **informational capital** comes under different shapes: as the capacity to produce and disseminate reports, the capacity to access and manage large-scale database or the capacity to process and exploit personal data (Didier Bigo et al. 2007, 32; D. Bigo 2013).

Other resources come into play in structuring the transnational field of European security professionals. **Social capital** is one of them. It may refer to **working relations with other agencies or with third-states institutions such as the US security agencies** (Zimmermann 2006, 127; Didier Bigo et al. 2007, 25). Empirically, capitals come under different shapes. They can be grasped either **in their institutionalised and objectified state or in their individualised and incorporated form** (Bourdieu 1979, 122–123; Bourdieu 1997, 52; Denord et al. 2011, 87–88). It is worth noticing that research on the European field of security professionals has so far mostly focused on the institutionalised forms of those capitals (CHALLENGE 2005).




Table 3: Prerogatives of EU security agencies (adapted from Bigo et al. 2007, 36)

Much attention has indeed been devoted to the different security agencies institutionalised at EU level, such as EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, CEPOL, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, OLAF, and SITCEN/INTCEN (Didier Bigo et al. 2007; D. Bigo, Bonditti, and Olsson 2010). The uneven distribution of capital amongst these actors has been documented, as well as the evolution of this distribution over time. For instance, the adoption of the Internal Security Strategy by the Council of the European Union has considerably bolstered the position of EUROPOL and FRONTEX and weakened that of CEPOL and EUROJUST (for a comprehensive study, see Didier Bigo et al. 2011, 36–87). Moreover, the dense network of formal and informal relations that these agencies had with one another in the pre-Lisbon context has also been carefully mapped out (Didier Bigo et al. 2011, 136–137)<sup>2</sup>.

One of the most promising features of this field analytical perspective resides in the better understanding that it enables of the dynamic and non-deterministic relation between practices and capitals, between the space of position-takings (what actors say and do) and the space of positions (from where actors act and speak). As such, it represents a promising venue in order to account for the relation between the social and the societal without opposing the two as we have seen in 1.1.1.2. However, in order for this approach to unleash its full heuristic potential in accounting for the practices of societal security in Europe, the focus on the institutionalised forms of capitals ought to be complemented by a thorough investigation in the resources **that the individual actors of security have incorporated during their respective social trajectories and professional careers.**

<sup>2</sup> Those maps are available on <http://jimmy.medialab.sciences-po.fr/deviss/pre-lisbon/institutional-relations>




Table 3: Positions of EU agencies, targets of security practices and relation to intelligence-led policing (adapted from Bigo et al. 2007, 42)

Grasping capitals in this incorporated state seems all the more necessary that some practices of societal security do not fit neatly with institutional designs. As we have seen in the above, part of these practices appears to be driven by a process of hybridization, whereby professionals of security with a background in public service start working for corporate actors, thereby straddling between the public realm and the private domain. Focusing solely on institutionalized capitals may not be enough if one is to understand how these actors successfully cross the public/private institutional boundaries, and what effects these crossings yield on the way societal security is practised in Europe.




Table 4: Technology, interconnections of databases and intelligence-led policing (adapted from Bigo et al. 2007, 46)

In the course of this first development, we have touched upon a few of our working hypotheses. We would like to recall them before exposing the methodological sequence designed to measure their empirical validity. The following list is not exhaustive. It is designed to inform exploratory research. However, depending on provisional results provided by the first phase, hypotheses will be overhauled and restructured so as to best orientate the confirmatory phase (see below).

Research hypotheses are formulated within the theoretical framework provided by the concept of the transnational field of European security professionals. This theoretical orientation specifies in two distinct assumptions:

1. Societal security is a specific category of security practices, to which it partakes.
2. Societal security is best explained in relation to the structuration of the transnational field of European security professionals.

Based on these two assumptions, we can formulate the following hypotheses and sub-hypotheses:

- 1) European security agencies increasingly define their mission not solely in reference to the State, but the society in general, including its economic, infrastructural, technological, scientific, cultural, sociological, demographic and other facets. Societal security therefore reflects a process of functional extension of security practices.





- 2) Societal security is reframed as societal acceptance of technologies of surveillance. This reframing is rooted in a double structural transformation of the transnational field of European security professionals.
  1. Firstly, a two-way street process of public/private hybridization is occurring on multiple levels. Low- and middle-ranking security professionals increasingly join corporate actors. High-ranking corporate officials gain more and more influence on decision-making processes regarding European security in general, and European security research in particular. This traffic indicates that the corporate kind of bureaucratic capital yields a powerful structuring power in the transnational field of European security professionals.
  2. Secondly, the technological capacity and professional skills to extract, collect and transmit data on a large-scale represents a set of resources whose value is on the rise. These resources are best described as socio-technical capital. This capital is increasingly shaping the state and stakes of the transnational field of European security professionals.
  
- 3) Simultaneously, societal security is redefined as the resilience of society in times of crises. Although this line of reasoning seems to stand in the most straightforward relation with the academic concept of societal security, it does not actually reflect the dominant practice.
  1. Defining societal security as societal resilience can best be captured as a strategy of distinction deviating from, confronting and resisting the “societal acceptance” line.
  2. This strategy is adopted by the most dominated actors of security in Europe, such as the Nordic agencies of civil security.



## 2. Professions and institutions in charge of societal security in Europe: guidelines for a comprehensive mapping

In the second part of this deliverable, we develop a set of methodological principles with a view to mapping out the professions and institutions in charge of the security of society in Europe. In the process, we hope to bridge some of the gaps that we have identified in the literature as well as widen and deepen our understanding of societal security. So far, we have argued that the practices of societal security can only be accounted for if they are analytically contextualized in their social space of production, i.e. in the transnational field of European security professionals. Mapping out the professions and institutions of societal security in Europe consequentially requires constructing this social space as thoroughly and comprehensively as possible.

To this end, one can resort to an array of various methods provided by social sciences. **Network analysis** and **correspondence analysis** allow for a fine-tuned description of the structuration of this social space. **Semantic network analysis** and **controversy analysis** can foster a better understanding of discursive security practices. Combining these different methods with a view to building a thick and comprehensive cartography of the transnational field of European security professionals therefore appears as a tempting move. It is however a misleading one. Indeed, these different methods process different type of data that must first be generated. Although secondary use of data is possible, the conditions of data generation are informed by the type of method that it serves it the first place. The more methods we use, the more data we need to generate, thereby running the risk of exceeding the resources that are assigned to SOURCE WP4.

More importantly still, contrary to the commonly held view that methodological choice is distinct from theoretical work, **methods are not theoretically neutral**. They are not inert tools whose choosing solely derives from the sophistication of theoretical elaboration. Methods are devices that enact some kind of world (Aradau and Huysmans 2013). **They enable certain types of hypothesis and disable others**. They entertain **elective affinity with certain theories and stand in uneasy relation with others**. They construct certain objects more solidly than others. They are **equipped with on-board questions and assumptions** that they carry on along the inquiry, and which must be clearly identified from the outset of the research.

This is why we will develop a two-step argument. We start by reviewing and comparing various methods that are available to construct the transnational field of European security professionals. In so doing, we distinguish two methodological moments that are chronologically ordered but logically interdependent: generating data on the hand, visualising it on the other. We will try to understand how **various methods of data generation and data visualisation perform differently in capturing effectively the practices and capitals of the transnational field of European security professionals**. Informed by a clearer of view of what these methods entail in terms of theoretical questioning as well as what they demand in terms of empirical work, we then proceed to sketch out a research cycle that combines, where it is possible and fruitful, a limited number of the methods that we will have previously identified.



## 2.1. Mapping social spaces: generating and visualising data

Our theoretical perspective is firmly rooted in the field analysis put forth by Pierre Bourdieu and, more generally, in a social space approach (Duval 2010). Following Bourdieu, one needs to construct a social field as a two-dimensional space. On the one hand, one finds what Bourdieu calls the “structured **space of positions** (or posts) whose properties result from their positions in this space, and which can be analysed independently from the characteristics of the actors occupying these positions” (Bourdieu 1980b, 113 - our translation). As we have stressed in the above, these positions are structured by valued resources (capitals), whose distribution can be described in terms of volume, structure and evolution over time (Bourdieu 1979, 138; Bourdieu 1994, 20; Bourdieu 1984, 195–196). On the other hand, one finds the **space of position-takings**, i.e. the discursive and non-discursive practices that actors carry out from the symbolic and material positions that they hold. Once again, these practices are defined and analysed in relation to one another, as a “**system of differential deviation**” (Bourdieu 1994, 22).

This analytical distinction between space of positions and space of position-takings yields most of the heuristic power of a social space approach because it draws attention to how valued resources and human action relate to one another in context. **What kind of material and symbolic capitals do security professionals accumulate through practice? How do power relations amongst security actors change as a consequence of differential capitalist accumulation over time? What consequence do these structural change yield on security practices, both discursive and non-discursive? Indeed, what capitals enable security actors to act upon and speak about security with some kind of authority?**

Although the relation between practices and capitals informs our reasoning throughout, it does not structure the following development. Since this deliverable focus on methodology, we have chosen to distinguish two categories of methodological operations that are implied in constructing social spaces: **data generation and data visualisation**. Like any inquiry in social science, data must first be generated in order to construct the object of knowledge, i.e. the professionals and institutions in charge of securing society in Europe. We insist on using the terminology of “**data generation**” rather than the more positivist language of “data collection”. The latter implies that data is already out there, waiting to be harvested by the researcher, whereas the former conveys a sense of the painstaking work that is implied in constructing scientific facts. In the first part of this development, we therefore present the two streams of methods that are available to conduct such an endeavour: archive and fieldwork.

The second methodological operation that mapping implies is **visualisation**. Projecting the generated data in Euclidean space is one of the most powerful heuristic outcomes of a social space approach. In the second part of this deliverable, we contrast the two categories of methods that can potentially enable the construction of the space of positions and the space of position-takings: network analysis on the one hand, and correspondence analysis on the other.

### 2.1.1. Data Generation



At first glance, the abovementioned distinction between practices and capitals fades away somewhat in light of the concrete operations that are implied in generating data. Capitals can be directly observed only in their objectified state. Buildings and equipment are instances of this particular shape that capital sometimes takes<sup>3</sup>. In their incorporated state, capitals can only be inferred from the observation of practice, or, to be more precise, from the textual or digital traces that practices leave behind. At any rate, the objectification of capitals implies a great deal of, mainly bureaucratic, writing. One can approach cultural capitals through curriculum vitae and university degrees, institutional capital through the legal acts founding an organization and laying out its inner working, economic capital through the budgets, accounts and other scriptural games that accountants master. **Capturing the textual or digital traces left behind by practices therefore represent the bulk of the empirical challenge in documenting the transnational field of European security professionals.** This is why the following development focuses mainly on this methodological issue, although the practice/capital distinction entails practical consequences in conducting fieldwork that we will also highlight.

Practices refer to the everyday routines of bodily and mental actions. These actions do not result from conscious and self-aware calculation but rather flow from the encounter between cognitive and bodily dispositions internalised by actors, and the structuration of the social context where they act. Security practices correspond more precisely to “those practices, both discursive and non-discursive, drawing lines between groups and categorizing what is threat, what is fear, what is danger, what is unease, what is fate and destiny, what is protection, what is security ” (Balzacq et al., 2). Practices of societal security therefore refer to those routine processes of (in)securitisation where lines are drawn between society on the one hand, and fear, danger and unease on the other hand.

Generating data on the transnational field of European security professionals mainly requires capturing those discursive and non-discursive (i.e. bureaucratic, technological, material, etc.) security practices that are implemented in the name of society and, most importantly, how they are related to other practices of security (those carried out for the sake of State’s protection, for instance). In other words, the empirical perimeter cannot be limited to practices of societal security. Rather, the **inquiry must more generally strive to construct the entire distribution of capitals and the entire economy of practices related to security in Europe.** In so doing, two different situations may come into play; either security practices have left textual or digital traces behind or they occur without leaving any trace. In what follows, we attend to these two different situations and what they imply in terms of data generation, namely **building an archive in the former case, and conducting fieldwork in the later.**

#### *Building an archive*

Security practices usually leave textual or digital traces in the forms of international treaties, legal norms, webpages, administrative regulations, hyperlinks, organizational codifications, bureaucratic reports, official testimonies, parliamentary hearings, witnesses’ interviews, blogs, etc. These scripts

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<sup>3</sup> Things, however, tend to quickly become more complicated. Think, for instance, of computers: hardware is indeed an objectified capital, but software amounts, in fact, to series of lines of code which, although not entirely comparable to texts, partakes in the overall category of scripts.



provide indication in the kind of material and symbolic resources that are available to actors. They also record practices that may be discursive as well as non-discursive. For instance, in assessing terrorist attacks that occurred in Europe, the T-SAT report published annually by Europol enacts a categorization and a prioritization of threats that amounts to a discourse of (in)securitisation. But, at the same time, it also results from a chain of routines such a legal criminalization, intelligence gathering, police surveillance, juridical prosecution, national classifications and transnational information exchange that do not solely feature discursive but also material, bureaucratic, technological, institutional aspects.

The first challenge is therefore to **gather these various texts and consolidate them into a corpus**. In this regard, the growing digitalization of texts, images, videos and other kind of material may ease the task of building this archive by rendering content more accessible. This is even more so when data is uploaded on the Internet and searchable on Web engines. Indeed, anything digital is traceable, which enhances the ability to generate a greater amount of data in a shorter period of time (Venturini 2012). It ought to be pointed out that the perspectives opened up by this **digital turn** in social science method both raise very specific **ethical issues** (Boyd and Crawford 2012) as well as they may potentially enhance **critical questioning** (Marres 2012).

Furthermore, one may fruitfully distinguish two sets of sources. On the one hand, we find what might be referred to as institutional sources. Such sources range from legislative and executive acts (national legislation, EU regulations and directives, international treaties and agreements, etc.) to the most mundane administrative and organizational writings (activity reports, annual budgets, position papers, minutes of meetings, parliamentary auditions, official letters, communication of the commission, codes of conducts, work programmes etc.). On the other hand, one finds personal accounts. These comprise interviews, memoirs, books, book chapters, articles, blogs, and so on authored by actors of societal security.

How to distinguish analytically between institutional sources and personal accounts? Institutional sources result from bureaucratic practices of writing, regardless of whether the bureaucracy is private or public. As such, these texts cannot be attributed to an individual, but rather to the institution (or institutions) in the capacity of which actors participate in the writing process. Even when one finds bureaucratic writings that might seemingly be attributed to individuals, as it is the case for minutes of meetings or parliamentary hearings for instance, these individuals are only allowed to make statement in the name of the institution that they represent. On the contrary, personal accounts can be attributed to persons speaking in their own names, even if their working experience for a particular institution may be one of the resource on which they draw to assert their authority. Although useful in the first analysis, this distinction should indeed not be overstated inasmuch as both institutional sources and individual accounts result from bureaucratic processes of writing where multiple actors come into play. Moreover, individuals speaking in the name of an institution may very well be regarded as spokespersons and their narratives interpreted as the institutional discourses.

Furthermore, it is important to avoid the trap of terminological closure in constructing this archive. As we have seen in 1.1.2.3, practices of societal security may not be deposited in the terms of “societal security”, “societal” or even “society”. On the contrary, they may be very well articulated



with a wide array of notions such as “the values of nation” or the “economic potential of a country”, the “individual safety of the citizens”. To register the textual and digital traces left behind by practices of societal security in Europe, one must therefore widen the empirical focus so as to encompass any scripts of (in)securitisation processes that occur in reference to an object other than the State. This, in turn, may heterogenize the corpus to the point of rendering it unfit for some methods of visualisation, which is why we focus around the three hypotheses of societal acceptance, societal resilience and societal protection.

### *Conducting fieldwork*

Some security practices are not registered in legislative and executive acts, administrative and bureaucratic writings, digital websites or even personal accounts. Others are, but remain out of reach, because they are not searchable by Web search engines, because their records have been damaged, or because they are purposefully shielded from public scrutiny (such as classified documents). In these cases, it is necessary to complement the archive by a range of sources specifically produced during fieldwork. The core idea is that the researcher either records directly how practices unfold as he or she observes or participates in them, or that he or she registers narratives of actors when they account for practices that they have carried out, observed or experienced.

**Interviews** represent one of the most common methods of fieldwork to which social scientist resort. One distinguishes three kinds of interviews: unstructured (where the interviewee freely chooses what he or she want to talks about), semi-structured (where the interviewer steers the interview along pre-determined lines of questioning), and structured (where the interviewer sticks to a set of pre-determined questions, either closed or open). Semi-structured interviews are best suited to elicit narratives of everyday professional routines. Oral history resorts to interviews specifically designed to collect practices that occurred around past events (Brown 1973). They are distinct from in-depth biographic interviews that are geared towards reconstructing the social trajectories of actors. These interviews perform particularly well in capturing the various capitals that actors have accumulated along their respective lives as well as those that they have inherited. When conducted with a large number of interviewees, biographic interviews generate sufficient data to feed proposographic studies, although other methods of data generation are also available for this purpose<sup>4</sup>.

In preparing and conducting interviews, utmost care ought to be given to the interviewer-interview relation, as symbolic domination necessarily comes into play during the interview, whether to the “benefit” (sic.) of the interviewer or to that of the interviewee when he or she occupies dominant positions (Willemez et al. 1994). Relatedly, obtaining detailed accounts of daily routines may be more or less difficult for the same reason. Whereas low- and middle-ranking officers of security agencies are keen to explain the practical know-how that they have to master in order to carry out their professional occupation, high-ranking officials may prove more prone to engage in semi-reflexive

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<sup>4</sup> See for instance the methodology selected by the team of the project POLILEXES (Politics of International Legal Expertise in European Societies) to generate and analyse prosopographic data on European jurists, cf. <http://www.polilexes.com/POLILEXES/methodologie.html>



elaboration about the stakes of what they do, rather than describing what they actually do (Bonelli 2001).

**Questionnaires** represent another method for collecting accounts of security practices. They can fruitfully be compared to structured interviews whose questions are circulated to a number of respondents that is greater than the number of actors one single researcher can practically interview. Questionnaires are therefore particularly well suited to the generation of data about practices of security on a large scale – provided a reasonable proportion of disseminated questionnaires are filled-in and returned. Furthermore, they can also provide insight into the resources that actors are endowed with (Imbert et al. 1993). Here, two remarks seem of some significance. Firstly, since no interviewer is here to steer questions in relation to the reaction and the understandings of the respondent, developing a questionnaire that actually asks questions relevant to the professional experiences of would-be respondents represents a considerable challenge. This phase of development may articulate nicely with a campaign of semi-structured interviews aimed at getting a first sense of what relevant questions could be, although it must be pointed out that such a campaign is necessarily time-consuming. A second methodological challenge of questionnaires corresponds to the mode of dissemination. Support ought to be secured in targeted institutions so as to ensure the widest possible degree of dissemination<sup>5</sup>.

**Observation** corresponds to a third category of fieldwork that may be useful in generating data not only on practices, but also on capitals in their objectified state. The researcher records the unfolding of actions as he or she witnesses it. Observation may be participant, where the researcher takes an active part in the action that he or she observes. It may also be simply direct, where the researcher plays a more passive role. It must be noted, here, that it is rather difficult to observe practices, let alone security practices such as border security practices (Ratelle 2012; Martin-Mazé 2013a, 100–103). As a matter of fact, practices are patterns of bodily and mental actions that tend to reproduce over time with some kind of regularity. Long-term field presence is therefore necessary to document a given regime of practices. Direct or participant observation may however perform better in documenting capitals in their objectified states such as architectural forms and other technical equipment.

### 2.1.2. Data visualisation

Mapping entails a second methodological operation: **visualisation** of data<sup>6</sup>. Broadly speaking, visualisation refers to a wide array of practice, ranging from the most mundane histograms generated under Excel to the most sophisticated mapping of digital data. In narrower sense,

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<sup>5</sup> The project “Bound to cooperate? Mapping Swiss Security in a Changing Global Landscape” has selected the questionnaire as the central method of their methodological design. Questionnaires are currently administered through an internet website but ought to be circulated within Swiss security institutions with the support of high-ranking officials (personal communication with Dr. Davidshofer, in charge of the project. London, June 2014).

<sup>6</sup> Rigorously, we ought also to distinguish a third operation: data consolidation, i.e. the transformation of the data generated with a view to constructing a particular dataset. However, since the structure of the dataset largely depends on the kind of visualising methods that it serves, we treat both data consolidation and data visualisation in the same development.



constructing social approach implies spatialising data in Cartesian plane with a view to revealing patterns that would remain unseen to the naked eye, thereby providing powerful heuristic tools to explore the structuration of the social space under examination.

As we have mentioned in the above, the present research is grounded in the concept of field coined by Pierre Bourdieu. This particular theoretical perspective has an elective affinity correspondence analysis. Notwithstanding, network analysis may also bring out some interesting features of the transnational field of European security professionals. Both correspondence and network analysis may bolster the **exploration of the space of positions** as well as that of position-takings. However, **these two methods require different types of data consolidation and, most importantly, elicit different kinds of questioning.** In what follows, we present them separately before concluding in comparing their differences and similarities.

### *Network Analysis*

Network analysis can be subdivided into three different streams: policy network analysis and social network analysis, which are relevant to constructing the space of positions, and semantic network analysis, which, together with controversy analysis, may perform well in building the space of position-takings.

Policy network analysis has gradually gained in methodological sophistication, growing from metaphorical uses to complex frameworks (Thatcher 1998). It has for instance been used to lay bare the dual and fragmentary social structure of the world polity (Beckfield 2008; Beckfield 2010; Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009). Policy network analysis has however not developed any robust and original procedures of visualisations (Brandes et al. 1999). When it did seek to precisely delineate policy networks, this stream of network analysis actually borrowed from social network analysis (Sandström and Carlsson 2008; Pappi and Henning 1998).

Indeed, sophisticated techniques of spatial modelling have developed in the field of social network analysis (van Duijn and Vermunt 2006). They have for instance been fruitfully applied in the sociology of corporate elites with a view to teasing out the formation of a transnational capitalist class as well as its structuration in inner and outer circles (Burriss 2005; Carroll 2009; Dudouet, Grémont, and Vion 2012). Social network analysis applies to dyadic attributes of pairs of statistical individuals as opposed to monadic attributes of unique individuals. The dataset of that network analysis processes therefore usually takes the shape of a one-mode matrix (Borgatti and Everett 1997). It is particularly well suited to investigate the **patterns of interactions** between actors, such as co-participation in events (conferences or meetings), co-belonging to groups or organisations (co-employment by EU security agencies) or mutual acquaintances (through, for instance, exploitation of data provided by digital social networks such as LinkedIn).

By and large, social network analysis offers a rich and solid methodological toolbox to investigate the structural properties of networks (Otte and Rousseau 2002; Bodin and Crona 2009). But it does so in drawing attention to some particular features of these social structures. Amongst those, **network centrality** arguably carries most of the heuristic power of SNA. It summarizes the node's involvement in the general structure of the network as well as its contribution to its cohesiveness (Faust 1997;





Borgatti and Everett 2006). Social network analysis therefore provides a **powerful grasp on the amount of social capital that actors accumulate in a given social space.**

What kind of hypothesis does social and policy network analysis inform? Beyond notable differences in spatial modelling and visualisation techniques, social and policy network analysis share a common scientific interest in *predicting* how action will unfold. These predictions are based on the structuration of the network laid bare by network analysis. Scholars in policy network look into the determination of policy outcomes by network characteristics (Pappi and Henning 1998; Daugbjerg 1999), whereas observers of social networks tease out the impact that the topology of the network yields on actor's behaviour (Bodin and Crona 2009). What surfaces from this particular *libido sciendi* is an elective affinity with causal models of explanations in social science, although it remains unclear what kind of causality network analysis actually summons (Doreian 2001).

**Causality is less central in semantic network analysis and is completely absent of controversy mapping which relies solely on description as a heuristic device.** Both methods provide useful tools for the specialisation of practices and, more specifically, of discursive practices associated with societal security. **Semantic network analysis processes matrix of co-occurrences of terms in large and heterogeneous corpus of texts.** Co-occurrences are then spatialised as a network, which allows for an exploratory analysis of discourses along the same lines as social and policy network analysis (centrality, in-betweenness, etc.) (van Atteveldt, Kleinnijenhuis, and Ruigrok 2008; Doerfel and Barnett 1999; Bhattacharya and Basu 1998).

**Controversy analysis is distinct from semantic network analysis, although it may also spatialise patterns of co-occurrences as networks of nodes and edges** (Venturini et al. 2013; Venturini et al. 2014). Controversy analysis is not interested in any kind of discourse, but rather in **situations where actors disagree** (Venturini 2009). It works best with a homogenous corpus of digital data and is geared towards understanding disputes as something else than binary oppositions (Venturini 2012; Venturini and Guido 2012). **In this regard, it captures definitional struggles under a different angle than the ones highlighted by correspondence analysis .**

#### *Correspondence Analysis*

Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) can be regarded as a sub-category of Geometric Data Analysis (GDA), a group of methods developed by the mathematician Benzécri in the late 1960s and 1970s (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010, 1–10). These methods exploit the relation between statistical and geometric properties in order to visually project large-n population described by multiple variables in a Euclidean space. Whereas Principal Correspondence Analysis (PCA) applies to quantitative (continuous) variables, **Multiple Correspondence Analysis processes qualitative (categorical) variables.** Although it can apply to any kind of data, MCA tallies well with **career data**, i.e. with information describing mutually exclusive positions that actors have occupied in their professional life (Heijden, Teunissen, and Orlé 1997; Ellersgaard, Larsen, and Munk 2013). Before performing MCA, data needs to be consolidated into a dataset where the **numbers of modalities** per variables are approximately equal, and where **no modality describes marginal parts of the population. This may require time-consuming work of pre-coding.**



MCA yields Euclidean spaces structured by two or more dimensions. **It is designed to lay bare the dimensions that capture most of the variance of the original population**, i.e. that conserve the greatest proportion of the distance characterizing the original cloud of individuals. In other words, these dimensions summarize the properties (the variables) that most powerfully structure the statistical population under examination. MCA is therefore particularly well suited to ferreting out **what resources are endowed with most significance in the structuration of a given social space**. Depending on the type of information that is fed into the dataset, it is able to grasp the **“constellations of plural capitals”** (Wacquant 2013, 274) Whether these capitals are economic, social, cultural, symbolic or informational depend on how well the actors’ objective properties have been grasped by the generated data and its consolidation into the dataset. It is therefore important to root data generation, consolidation and visualisation in sociologically informed hypotheses from the outset of the research.

Moreover, **MCA opposes extreme individuals** and their properties alongside the dimensions that it has yielded. Inspection of the cloud of individuals and modalities as it is projected in the Euclidean space yielded by MCA therefore allows for a precise identification of sets of oppositions that undergirds the social space under examination. Most of the heuristic value of MCA is therefore **situated at the extremities of the graph and not in its centre, as opposed to visualisations produced by network analysis**. Finally, in contrast with network analysis, MCA works **not on interactional data (co-participation, co-belonging, co-occurrences, etc.) but on objective properties** that are then displayed in relation to one another. **Therefore, individuals featuring similar properties with regards to structuring dimensions will be represented in neighbouring positions even though they do not directly interact with one another.**

What kind of questioning does MCA elicit in crafting such analytical tools as valued resources, set of oppositions and objective relations? Although its use is not as widely spread in social science as that of network analysis, MCA has been brought to bear on variety of objects ranging from the sociology of elites to the sociology of culture. It has informed two great streams of questioning. Firstly, MCA undergirds exploration into the structuration of a specific social space such as the social space of Swiss corporate network between 1980 and 2000 (Bühlmann, David, and Mach 2012) and the structuring power that cosmopolitan capital wields on it (Mach, David, and Bühlmann 2011; Bühlmann, David, and Mach 2013). It has also been used to construct the space of power elites in Norway (Hjellbrekke et al. 2007; Hjellbrekke and Korsnes 2009), with particular attention paid at the role of social capital in structuring the Norwegian field of power (Denord et al. 2011). What surfaces from these two sets of studies is that the construction of a particular social space and the excavation of particular resources go hand in hand.

A second line of questioning focuses on the **relation of homology, which describes the correspondence between the structures of opposition characterizing one space of position and one space of position-takings**, or two spaces of positions with one another. According to Bourdieu, the structural homology between the field of cultural producers and the field of cultural consumers explains much better than market theory why cultural products find their audience (Bourdieu 1979, 257). Dezalay and Garth see a condition of possibility for the transnational circulation of governmental expertise in the homology between importing and exporting fields (Dezalay and Garth 2002, 43, 375). Sapiro documents the relation of homology between the literary field and the

political field in France under Nazi occupation. She shows that literary heterodoxy corresponds to political resistance and that literary orthodoxy corresponds to political collaboration (Sapiro 2002). This relation of homology carries the bulk of the heuristic power of a field theoretical perspective.

	<b>Network Analysis</b>	<b>Correspondence analysis</b>
<b>Data</b>	Dyadic	Monadic and qualitative
	Little consolidation	Massive consolidation
<b>Object</b>	Social capital	Constellation of capitals
	Discursive practices	Discursive and non discursive practices
<b>Tools</b>	Nodes and edges	Clouds and dimensions
	Centrality	Oppositions
<b>Questions</b>	Interactions	Relations
	Causality (social network) or description (controversy)	Structural or functional homology

Table 5: Correspondence and Network Analysis: Strengths and Weaknesses

## 2.2. A research cycle: sequencing the methods

We now have a clearer view of what is implied not only by the different methods of data generation, but also by the two streams of visualisation techniques that we have studied. Although they require various levels of data consolidation, craft different analytical tools and set out diverging theoretical perspectives, both network analysis and correspondence analysis are suited to explore the transnational field of European security professionals, both as a space of positions (capitals) and as a space of position-takings (practices).

Network analysis requires less data consolidation than correspondence analysis but tends to focus only on social capital when it comes to the space of positions, and on discursive practices and it comes to the space of position-takings. It therefore overlooks the different types of resources that may be relevant in the structuration of the field. It also ignores non-discursive practices that are key in understanding how discourses of (in)securitisation yield practical effects.

Correspondence analysis performs particularly well in identifying sets of oppositions but tends to reduce disputes to binary struggles although they may entail more complexity. Furthermore, correspondence analysis provides less information than network analysis as to which actors or texts are indeed central in a given social space. Finally, network analysis grasps direct interactions whereas correspondence analysis highlights relations between objective properties.



We can now proceed with exposing the **research design** that we will implement in order to map out professions and institutions in charge of securing society in Europe. Let's first recall our main theoretical assumption: these professions and institutions are embedded in the broader transnational field of European security professionals. Consequently, practices of societal security are but one category amongst a wider array of practices of (in)securitisation that are produced within this space.

Constructing this social space is a daunting task, which is why we will sequence the above-mentioned methods of data generation and visualisation in two main phases. **The first phase might be described as an exploratory one based on the construction and the exploitation of an archive on societal security. We aim at exploring how the discourses of (in)securitisation referring to society relate to the wider discursive universe of security in Europe. We also aim at laying bare the social network of security professionals working at EU level.** These two tasks will yield a number of short-range empirical results valuable in themselves. They also will pave the way for theoretical progress in helping to refine the working hypotheses that we have mentioned at the end of the first part of this deliverable.

**The second phase will widen our mapping of the transnational field of European security professionals and deepen our understanding of how it produces societal security. It will draw on original fieldwork: a campaign of semi-structured interviews with node-actors of EU security and liberty agencies, a questionnaire circulated amongst private security firms and a workshop dedicated to capturing the oral history of the institutions of security in Europe.** The data thus generated will be **consolidated in a relational database describing the capitals of European security, both at individual and at institutional levels, as well as the practices of European security, both in their discursive and non-discursive facets.** Finally, we will apply specific multiple correspondence analysis to these different datasets. Our aim is to shed light on the structures of the transnational field of European security professionals in general, and on how the professionals in charge of societal security are positioned within this social space in particular.

In carrying out these different tasks, we will draw on the resources made available by the SOURCE programme. We will also seek to develop synergies on two levels. Internally, we will seek to develop synergies with other components of the SOURCE project. Externally, we will coordinate with other research projects that share our theoretical preoccupation and methodological orientations. In so doing, research undertaken under WP4 will practically contribute to deepening and widening the SOURCE network of excellence.

Research Tasks	
PRIO	Conduct interviews with node-actors
FOI	Collect institutional sources: Nordic Council and EU institutions
FHG	Collect Institutional sources: security civil agencies

CEPS	Collect institutional sources: EU Liberty Agencies
VUB	Collect Academic Sources
EOS	Circulate and collect questionnaire
TEC	Circulate and collect questionnaire

Table 6: Research tasks of SOURCE primary network in WP4

### 2.2.1. Phase one: short-range mapping

The first phase of the analysis qualifies as short-range mapping because it is not aimed at restoring a comprehensive view of the transnational field of European security professionals. Rather, it explores **only limited facets of this social space**. We aim at producing original empirical outcomes (1), to refining the working hypotheses that we have presented in the above (2) and laying the groundwork for the subsequent phase of the research cycle (3). In what follows, we expose the methods to which we will resort to generate data and visualize them, namely archive work and network analysis.

*Data generation: building an archive on societal security*

Our aim is to build an **archive of textual and digital traces** left behind practices of (in)securitisation referring to any object other than the State in Europe. In this exploratory phase, we purposefully set broad parameters for empirical research with a view to circumventing terminological traps. Indeed, as we have seen in 2.1.1, discourses of (in)securitisation may refer to economic, infrastructural, scientific, institutional, ethical and a myriad of other facets of society without even uttering the terms “societal” or “society”. Four different types of source may be distinguished: **institutional, individual, academic and digital**. It should be underlined that this archive work may combine with the activities foreseen under Work Package 8 of the SOURCE project. With regards to the first category, we will focus on a first range of sources produced by EU institutions and agencies:

1. European institutions: legal and non-legal acts framing threats to the European Union and prepared or published by the DG Justice, Home and Research of the European Commission, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs of the European Union and the European Parliament - including their respective experts and working groups and standing committees.
2. EU agencies of security: institutional acts, annual reports, financial records and risk analysis published by FRONTEX, EUROPOL, EUROJUST, CEPOL, CTC, INTCEN, OLAF, ENISA and EULISA.
3. EU agencies of liberty: institutional acts, annual reports, financial records and any other declaration published where the EDPS, the FRA, the art. 29 Working Party and the European Ombudsman directly or indirectly tackling the issue of securing society in Europe.



In the three cases above, documentary research will be facilitated by drawing on the work that the Centre for the Study of Conflicts, Liberty and Security carried out for the preparation of the EU Parliament briefing study in the Internal Security Strategy (Didier Bigo et al. 2011), as well as different FP6 and FP7 projects (ELISE, CHALLENGE<sup>7</sup> and INEX<sup>8</sup>, most notably)x.

In keeping with what we have observed in 1.2.1.2, we will take under consideration the documentation produced by the agencies that are in charge of civil security in Scandinavian Europe:

1. The Nordic Council: declarations and other documents framing threats to society that are produced by the Nordic Council of Ministers and its executive agencies such as Nordfosk.
2. Civil security agencies: institutional acts, annual reports, financial records, and other bureaucratic writings where threats are framed and which are produced or published by the civil security agencies of Iceland, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

As we have seen in section 1, another category of institutional sources that we may also be interested in incorporating into the archive corresponds to documents defining the missions of intelligence services of EU Member States. Indeed, in so doing, they often refer to threats that are not solely framed in relation to the State, but also to different facets of the societal fabric. In this case, we will seek to build synergies with the project UTIC, which is funded by the French National Research Agency.

This project deals with international interceptions of communications. Their sweeping development reconfigures the logics of surveillance, interrogates their usual discourses of justification, redefines the limits of democracies and questions States' sovereignty. Such diverse stakes calls for a trans-disciplinary approach cutting across social science and science and technique studies. This perspective enables a comparison of the social uses of these technologies in France, Great-Britain, Germany, Spain, Sweden and Estonia, as well as their uses by agencies of the European Union, and in transatlantic networks such as 5 eyes. In order to carry out the objectives of the project, three steps have been defined.

Firstly, it is necessary to question the current controversy dealing with the nature of surveillance when it relies on untargeted interceptions of internet and phone communications (dragnet), outside of any individualized subpoena. Does the collect of data on a large scale change the nature of surveillance ? Is surveillance becoming massive, thus jeopardizing the privacy of all internet users, and even more those who are no citizen of the intercepting Stat ? *A contrario*, is surveillance remaining targeted in the sense of content analysis ? In spite of the undertones of certainty emanating from the current discussion, this question is far from being settled. It is therefore important to distantiate oneself from these recent revelations and position-takings. This move will allow for an in-depth investigation into a phenomenon that is so defining that no quick decision can solve it in a near future.

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.libertysecurity.org/>

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.inexproject.eu/>



Secondly, we will shed light on the justifications of this type of surveillance, where data are caught into a dragnet, without any specific subpoena, but which are carried out with the authorization of the law or of national courts' decisions. We will specify these modalities in each country brought under examination, as well as at European, Transatlantic and global levels. How do security services relate to one another when it comes to the uses of collected data and their aim? Fighting terrorism or organized crime is one thing, but collecting data on the economic and social situation of an ally is quite another. Although intelligence and law-enforcement agencies exchange information under the seal of secrecy, their operational aim are different, as are their regimes of legitimation.

Thirdly, we aim at understanding how the issue of national security, and its relation to fundamental rights, is transformed by the transnationalization of exchanges of information, by the globalization of the Internet, by the collect of data for surveillance purposes, and by the exchanges amongst security services of data corresponding to certain profiles, regardless of whether these data are personal or anonymized. It is at this level that the issue of the proportionality and the necessity between the risk and the negative consequences of surveillance comes into focus in terms of discrimination and fundamental rights. The collect and the storage of data is no longer national and public. They rely on exchanges of data at the global scale between intelligence services and private operators working in specific regional areas. They also rely on more or less asymmetrical alliances and on a transnationalization of the retention of data by private operators running the risk of being held accountable by national authorities other than their own. That is why the hybridisation of public-private relations will be at the heart of our investigation.

Box 1. Rationale for the UTIC project

Besides institutional documents, the archive on societal security will also comprise three other of sources:

1. Personal accounts: we will collect an array of published and unpublished material accounting for the history of the EU security institutions and agencies. We will put particular emphasis on accounts where debates over the framing of threats are recounted. In this case, synergies will be sought with a doctoral research currently undertaken at Sciences Po Paris and focusing on the oral history of the third pillar.
2. Academic sources: we will build a repository of academic sources (monographs, dissertations, articles, chapters, edited volumes) documenting practices of (in)securitisation that occur in reference to an object other than the State. Researchers have indeed carried out a vast amount of fieldwork (interviews, focus groups, observation, etc.) that may prove particularly useful to reconstitute the security practices leaving no or inaccessible digital and textual traces behind (VUB and KCL).
3. Digital sources: drawing on the know-how of the Medialab in terms of digital methods, we will extract career and network information from LinkedIn profiles mentioning work experience for at least one of the EU security agencies. **Extraction will be manual and depend upon acceptance by the targeted actors of a networking request sent by the**

**research team. Any automated extraction (scraping, crawling or other) is indeed strictly forbidden by the terms of use set forth by LinkedIn. Infringement may constitute a basis for legal prosecution as well as a breach in ethical approval.** We will therefore create a public profile of the SOURCE network to conduct this research.

#### *Visualising data: exploratory network analysis*

We will then perform a series of visualisations with a view to conducting an exploratory analysis of our archive: social network analysis will apply to the digital data extracted from online profiles on social network, semantic network analysis will apply to a sample of the institutional component of our corpus.

The social network analysis will first require building two datasets with the data manually acquired from LinkedIn profiles. The first dataset will correspond to a matrix of mutual acquaintances. The second dataset will comprise co-belonging to security agencies in time. We will then visualize these two networks using GEPHI. These visualisations will enable an exploratory investigation into the structural properties of these networks: which actors and institutions are involved with societal security? How deep does the network go and how far does it extend? Does it comprise security institutions of EU Member States? Which are the most central nodes – i.e. institutions and professionals? Can we identify any “structural holes”? On top of valuable and original empirical outputs, this analysis will therefore delineate a group of node-actors to be targeted for further steps of the research.

The semantic network analysis aims, first and foremost, at exploring the discourses of (in)securitisation in general with a view to situating precisely the particular discourses of societal security in this discursive universe. Secondly it aims at describing the internal differentiation of these discourses of (in)securitisation referring to objects other than the State. To what facet of the societal fabric are they articulated? Semantic network analysis can therefore be subdivided in four different tasks:

1. Identify a corpus. We will select a sample from the overall corpus whose generated is described in the above. To do so, we will strike a balance between heterogeneity and homogeneity. The sample will have to be sufficiently heterogeneous to reflect the diversity of the discourses of (in)securitisation. In other words, the sample must vary in the same proportion as the corpus. The sample will also have to be sufficiently homogeneous so that the number of expressions extracted under ANTA does not exceed the limits of what is realistically doable given the resources affected to WP4. It will therefore probably be best to proceed recursively in a step-by-step approach. As research cycles develop, we will gradually add more, relatively homogenous, samples, thereby widening the part of the corpus that has been explored. To first research cycle will more precisely focus on the institutional discourses of (in)securitisation produced by EU security agencies. There again, we will draw on the work





carried out by the Centre for the Study of Conflicts, Liberty and Security in collaboration with the Medialab<sup>9</sup>.

2. Extract expressions. We will then extract expressions from this corpus and reduce their numbers to the most meaningful ones. Besides criteria such as frequency of occurrence and redundancy, the reduction will be informed by a preliminary analysis of the archives as well as working hypothesis. Our aim is to extract expressions that reflect the referent-objet of the discourses of (in)securitisation.
3. Create a matrix of expressions / documents. Based on the expressions thus extracted, we will create a matrix of expressions / documents, whereby we will refer the documents to the institutions that have produced them.
4. Spatialise the universe of discourses. Using GEPHI, we will spatialise the nodes/documents matrix as a network.

In focusing on the referent-objects of discourses of (in)securitisation, this semantic network analysis will shape a better understanding of how the security of society relates to the more discursive universe of security in Europe. As for social network analysis, it will also pave the way the second phase of the research. In particular, we will seek to develop a set of variables from the most central expressions in order to describe more systematically the discourses of societal security.

### *2.2.2. Second phase: long-range mapping*

The second phase of the research cycle will draw on the results achieved in the first phase. Indeed, besides valuable and original empirical results, the social and semantic network analysis will provide empirical material and refine theoretical hypothesis for the long-range mapping. Long-range mapping elaborates on the result on short-range mapping insofar as it explores areas thus far not covered by network analysis, namely the non-discursive facet of the economy of practices, and resources other than social for the constellation of capitals. In contrast with the first phase, the second phase will also be based on material generated during original fieldwork: questionnaire, interviews and oral history. **Methodologically, it will shift from network analysis to correspondence analysis with a view to building a more comprehensive mapping of the transnational field of European security professionals.**

#### *Data generation: conducting fieldwork on societal security*

In this second phase, we will focus on the security practices that leave little or inaccessible textual and digital traces behind. We will also strive to generate data on the capitals authorizing some actors to act upon and speak about the security of society in Europe. We will take under consideration those capitals both in their objectified and incorporated states. To this end, we design a three-pronged fieldwork strategy geared towards generating original empirical data in and on the transnational field of European security professionals.

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<sup>9</sup> Semantic network analysis has already been performed on a corpus of institutional sources produced by EU institutions and security agencies cf. <http://jimmy.medialab.sciences-po.fr/deviss/documents/full-network>



The first component of this research strategy consists in building and circulating a **questionnaire amongst the corporate actors of societal security**. We focus on the firms that develop or provide technologies aimed at securing society in Europe. The empirical parameter of this study is set on the members of the European Organisation for Security (EOS). We will develop the questionnaire along two axes. On the one hand, we will document the modalities of participation of EOS members and EOS in the decision-making processes of security policies at EU level, including that of security research. On the other hand, we will request anonymous information on the staff of EOS members and EOS with a background in EU or EUMS security agencies.

The second component of the research design is **oral history**. KCL and CEPS will organise a workshop on the “history of the third pillar”. It will invite actors who have played an instrument role in creating EU agencies and negotiating the institutional layout of the ex-Third Pillar. The component is a further divided in three tasks: identifying relevant actors, building a timeline of “milestones” documents, conducting a focus group where actors will be invited to identify which documents are significant on the one hand, and recount how these documents were practically negotiated on the other.

Conducting a campaign of semi-structured interviews with civil servants of EU agencies of liberty and security represents the third component of the research strategy. The first phase will provide the empirical parameters of this campaign of interviews, namely the 70 most connected node-actors laid bare by the exploratory social network analysis<sup>10</sup>. It is expected that interviews will unfold along two axes of questioning. The first one will generate data relevant to the space of position-takings, and the second one will focus on the space of positions. Each line of questioning is subdivided in the following analytical categories. Bureaucratic practices, institutional practices, operational practices, informational practices will shore up the line of questioning on the position-takings. General questions, economic capital, cultural capital, social capital, European/cosmopolitan capital, and professional capital will support the investigation into the space of positions. Questions and, where necessary, potential follow-up questions are detailed below. We will favour on-site interviews with a view to collect institutional archives when and where it is possible. Also, we will systematically ask our interviewees to provide an updated version of the curriculum vitae.

Parts of the questions structuring the interviews are adapted from the online questionnaire of a project entitled “Bound to Cooperate? Mapping Swiss Security in a Changing Global Landscape”. Funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, this project is jointly implemented by the Center for Security Studies of the Ecole Polytechnique of Zurich and the Department for political Science of the University of Geneva<sup>11</sup>. Given the theoretical resonance with WP4, we will seek to develop strong methodological synergies with this project, thereby contributing to extend the SOURCE network of excellence.

1. Axis of questioning n°1: practices.
  - 1.1. Analytical category: bureaucratic practices
    - 1.1.1. Question: How many people work in your service?

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<sup>10</sup> At this stage, the number 70 is only indicative. It will be adjusted to resources available to carry out the campaign.

<sup>11</sup> The rationale of this project is available on [http://www.css.ethz.ch/research/SNF\\_Project\\_ENs](http://www.css.ethz.ch/research/SNF_Project_ENs)



- 1.1.2. How do you participate in drafting the reports published by your institutions?
  - 1.1.3. How do you source reports?
  - 1.1.4. What internal meetings do you attend to?
  - 1.2. Institutional practices
    - 1.2.1. Does your service cooperate with other EU security agencies?
      - 1.2.1.1. Which ones?
      - 1.2.1.2. How (face to face, meetings, email, etc.) ?
      - 1.2.1.3. How often?
      - 1.2.1.4. On what issue?
      - 1.2.1.5. On what hierarchical level?
    - 1.2.2. Does your service cooperate with other EU liberty agencies?
      - 1.2.2.1. Idem
    - 1.2.3. Does your service cooperate with 3rd States institutions?
      - 1.2.3.1. Idem
    - 1.2.4. Does your service cooperate with EUMS institutions?
      - 1.2.4.1. Idem
  - 1.3. Operational practices
    - 1.3.1. How much time do you spend out-of-office?
    - 1.3.2. How much time did you spend on the field?
    - 1.3.3. How much time did you spend in headquarters?
    - 1.3.4. What are the most important threats to EU security today?
    - 1.3.5. Do you take part in special task forces?
  - 1.4. Informational practices.
    - 1.4.1. What is the best way to find a piece of information?
      - 1.4.1.1. Database?
      - 1.4.1.2. Liaison officer?
      - 1.4.1.3. Personal network?
        - 1.4.1.3.1. Face-to-face?
        - 1.4.1.3.2. Phone?
        - 1.4.1.3.3. Email?
      - 1.4.1.4. Other?
    - 1.4.2. What database do you consult?
      - 1.4.2.1. Databases external to your agency?
        - 1.4.2.1.1. Other EU databases
        - 1.4.2.1.2. Other European databases?
        - 1.4.2.1.3. International databases?
      - 1.4.2.2. Databases internal to your agency?
    - 1.4.3. What database do you inform?
      - 1.4.3.1.1. What kind of information?
      - 1.4.3.1.2. How often?
    - 1.4.4. How do databases impact on your work?
2. Axis of questioning n°2: capitals.
  - 2.1. General question
    - 2.1.1. Date and place of birth
    - 2.1.2. Place of residence
    - 2.1.3. Nationality
    - 2.1.4. Gender
  - 2.2. Economic capital
    - 2.2.1. What was the professional occupation of your parents when you were 15?
    - 2.2.2. What was the professional occupation of your grandparents?



- 2.2.3. How much money do you earn on a monthly basis – pre taxation?
- 2.2.4. What other assets do you assess (capital shares, real-estate, etc.)
- 2.3. Cultural capital
  - 2.3.1. What is the highest degree that you obtained?
    - 2.3.1.1. When?
    - 2.3.1.2. Which university?
    - 2.3.1.3. Which faculty?
  - 2.3.2. What degrees had you previously obtained?
  - 2.3.3. What professional certification have you obtained?
  - 2.3.4. Have you published?
    - 2.3.4.1. In professional journals or reviews?
    - 2.3.4.2. In newsletters?
    - 2.3.4.3. In public reports?
    - 2.3.4.4. Other?
  - 2.3.5. Do you go express yourself publicly?
    - 2.3.5.1. Where?
      - 2.3.5.1.1. In written press?
      - 2.3.5.1.2. On TV?
      - 2.3.5.1.3. On the radio?
      - 2.3.5.1.4. On the Internet?
    - 2.3.5.2. How often?
  - 2.3.6. Do you regularly read professional journals or reviews?
    - 2.3.6.1. Which ones?
- 2.4. Social capital
  - 2.4.1. Are you a member of a trade union?
    - 2.4.1.1. Which one?
    - 2.4.1.2. Since when?
    - 2.4.1.3. Why not?
  - 2.4.2. Are you a member of a professional association?
  - 2.4.3. Do you participate in professional events?
    - 2.4.3.1. Which ones?
    - 2.4.3.2. How often?
  - 2.4.4. Which are your most important partners in your day-to-day job?
  - 2.4.5. Did you know anyone in this institution before taking up your first job?
    - 2.4.5.1. If yes, who?
    - 2.4.5.2. Under what circumstances did you meet?
- 2.5. European / cosmopolitan capital
  - 2.5.1. What is your professional status?
    - 2.5.1.1. EU civil servants?
    - 2.5.1.2. Detached national experts
    - 2.5.1.3. Other
  - 2.5.2. Do you speak foreign languages?
    - 2.5.2.1. How many?
    - 2.5.2.2. How well?
    - 2.5.2.3. Where did you learn them?
      - 2.5.2.3.1. Family?
      - 2.5.2.3.2. School?
      - 2.5.2.3.3. University?
      - 2.5.2.3.4. On the job?
    - 2.5.2.4. Do you work in a foreign-speaking environment?



- 2.5.3. Have you studied abroad?
- 2.5.4. Have you had international working experience previous to this one?
  - 2.5.4.1. What kind of experience was this?
    - 2.5.4.1.1. Field?
    - 2.5.4.1.2. Headquarters?
  - 2.5.5. Have you been received training in international or European institutions?
- 2.6. Professional capital.
  - 2.6.1. Since when do you work for this position?
  - 2.6.2. How long have you worked at EU-level?
    - 2.6.2.1.1. For which institutions
    - 2.6.2.1.2. In what positions?
  - 2.6.3. What other institutions have you worked for previously
    - 2.6.3.1.1. In what position?
  - 2.6.4. What is the first institution you worked for and in what position?
  - 2.6.5. Have you worked for the private sector?

Box 2. Guidelines for semi-structured interviews

### *Visualising data: correspondence analysis*

Based on the data generated through the abovementioned modalities, the second phase of the research cycle will widen and deepen the mapping of the institutions and professionals of security in Europe, with a particular emphasis on societal security. To this end, we will first consolidate the data into a relational database and then visualise it by the means of multiple correspondence analysis. This double move will yield significant heuristic value inasmuch as it will shape a robust understanding of the social conditions under which societal security is practised and produced in Europe.

Since we will resort to multiple correspondence analysis, data consolidation will represent a first step of this part of the research process. As explained in 2.1.2.2, multiple correspondence analysis can only apply to datasets whose number of modalities per variables are balance (1), and where no modality describes too marginal a population (2). Furthermore, prior this work of pre-coding, answers to interviews and questionnaires must be translated into modalities of variables. Interview guidelines are therefore structured so as to facilitate this work – as will be the questionnaire on corporate actors of societal security.

The coding and pre-coding will allow for the construction of a database that will be relational in a double sense. On the one hand, it will put in relation the space of positions and the space of position-takings with a view to investigating the possible homology between both. This would give a robust indication on the degree of sedimentation and structuration of the transnational field of European security professionals (Didier Bigo 2011). We will enable this relation by affecting the columns of variables describing capitals and variables describing practices to rows describing actors in the same



dataset. By activating only one set of variables and defining the other one as illustrative, one will be able to project the space of position takings into the space of positions and vice-versa<sup>12</sup>.

The dataset will be relational in a second sense: it will bring into relation professionals and institutions. To do so, we will construct two different datasets. The first one will capture institutional security practices as well as capitals in their objectified states. The second one will document individual security practices and capitals in their incorporated states. We will bring both in relation by specifying which bureaucracies individuals work or have worked for. One should therefore be able to locate institutions, agencies and firms in the spaces of positions and position-takings based on individual data.

We will therefore be able to produce the following series of map:

1. Space of the individual positions
2. Space of the individual position-takings
3. Space of the individual positions projected as illustrative variables into the space of individual position-takings
4. Space of individual position-takings projected as illustrative variables into the space of individual positions.
5. Space of the institutional positions
6. Space of the institutional position-takings
7. Space of the institutional positions projected as illustrative variables into the space of institutional position-takings
8. Space of institutional position-takings projected as illustrative variables into the space of institutional positions.

These maps will yield significant heuristic value. The dimensions of the spaces of positions will lay bare the capitals that structure the transnational field of European security professionals, both in their objectified and in their incorporated shapes. The dimensions of the space of position-takings will provide robust indications on how the practices of (in)securitisation referring to objects other than the State relate to other security practices, both discursive and non-discursive. The configurations of the clouds of individual and institutional actors will help craft a more precise understanding of the objective relations that security actors have with one another. It will also shed a different light on the structures of their oppositions. All of these analytical tools will help investigate, refine or drop the working hypotheses that we have exposed in the above, namely:

1. Societal security reflects a process of functional extension of the Transnational field of European security professionals.
2. The reframing of societal security as societal resilience is rooted in the increased power of that private and socio-technical capitals wield on the structure of the Transnational field of European security professionals.

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<sup>12</sup> In multiple correspondence analysis, active variables contribute to defining the variance of the original population, while illustrative variables do not. The later one can, however, appear in the planes of modalities and individuals yielded by MCA.



- The reframing of societal security as societal acceptance results from a strategy of distinction that civil security agencies deploy from the most dominated positions within the Transnational field of European security professionals.




Table 7: Mapping methods



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